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Federal Department of Justice and Police FDJP
Federal Office of Police fedpol



annual report fedpol 2019



Shortening distances

As we complete work on the 2019 Annual Report we find ourselves in an extraordinary situation. Either we are confined to our home, or if at the office we must maintain a two-metre distance from our colleagues and follow strict hygiene rules. To blame is a coronavirus which is spreading across the world at breakneck speed. Our globalised, interconnected, highly mobile world is coming to a standstill.

We do not yet know where this pandemic will lead us. Our globalised world is under global threat. What is now becoming a reality for health authorities has long been a reality for law enforcement services: like the virus, crime does not stop at borders. Most crime in Switzerland today has an international dimension to it. Take the case of investment fraud described in this report, for example – although the scam was insti-

gated abroad, the perpetrator targeted victims in Switzerland and sought to launder the proceeds through convoluted, international money flows. Or 'Operation Familia', which illustrates how Switzerland, a small country at the heart of Europe, can become a hub for drug trafficking. Just like the armed robbers who attacked an armoured security van before fleeing to neighbouring France with the booty, today's criminals are fast-moving, interconnected and efficient.

The only possible response to this kind of transnational crime is national and international cooperation between police services. In every area of policing, from ensuring security at the WEF Annual Meeting to identifying the victims of terrorist attacks, cooperation is the key to success and the guiding principle in all fedpol's operations.

The most effective means of cooperation is sharing information, and this is aided by digital technology. In this report, you can read about various projects that are under way to develop systems that can communicate with each other, allowing police authorities and other law enforcement services to access valuable information in time. These projects require substantial financial and human resources – the price of security in our globalised world.

The key to fighting crime lies in shortening distances. In other words, having the right information, in the right place, at the right time. This is the main theme of the 2019 Annual Report.

I wish you an enjoyable read!

Nicoletta della Valle, Director





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Carte Blanche for Patric Sandri

From fingerprints, mobile phones, computers, a labyrinth and a skull, to globes, light and airy, suspended in the universe and connected above a cloud. Patric Sandri from Zurich has created multifaceted, digital collages to illustrate how distances are short for fedpol. An aesthetic expression of fedpol's themes, so to speak, somewhere between the modern and the nostalgic. Sandri exposes different worlds from which he extracts the essence of the image, yet leaves the viewer with sufficient space for their own interpretation. Sometimes appearing technical and abstract, but at times dreamy and complex. As complex as fedpol's work.
www.ps-illustration.com



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
More than 500 wounded and 250 dead. Two fedpol officers give their all to identify the Swiss victims of the attacks in Sri Lanka.

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
fedpol is more than just a police service. Switzerland's federal police overcome frontiers – but distances are short thanks to efficient cooperation.

A strategy of three dimensions




Strategy The FDJP's new anti-crime strategy for the years 2020–2023 is based on three pillars, three approaches and three priorities. The graphic below shows the interconnections between these dimensions. These are illustrated by the cases presented in the pages of this annual report.

Three pillars




Prevention

When we hear the word 'police', we may automatically think 'repression'. However, this aspect of policing is not enough by itself. In order for the fight against crime to be effective, repression needs to be complemented by two further aspects. The first of these is prevention. Let's take an example – terrorism. What should be done when there are indications that an individual is influenced by jihadi ideology, but these indications are insufficient to open criminal proceedings against them? What should be done when a dangerous person cannot be returned to their country of origin because their life or freedom would be under threat there (non-refoulement principle)? In May 2019, the Federal Council submitted to Parliament the Dispatch on the Federal Act on Police Counterterrorism Measures (PCTA), proposing measures that can be taken without the need for criminal proceedings, such as contact bans, restrictions on movement, or house arrest. Such 'administrative' measures can already be applied in criminal proceedings, including expulsion and entry bans for potential jihadi terrorists or members of mafia organisations.



Cooperation


Cooperation is another key aspect in fighting crime effectively. Offences such as fraud, corruption or forgery are as old as the hills, but nowadays criminal activities are mobile and connected, and criminals make use of the internet and operate across country borders. Yet prosecution systems remain a national affair, and this poses a number of challenges that can only be met through cooperation and information exchange. These must take place at both national and international level, between cantonal and foreign police forces, and with the support of organisations such as Europol and INTERPOL. One of fedpol's tasks is to manage this cooperation, and it does so by supporting several projects aimed at promoting international police cooperation. These include the development of the Schengen Information System, interoperability of information systems, and the rapid exchange of digital fingerprinting data and DNA profiles of wanted persons.



Repression

The third pillar in the 2020–2023 Anti-Crime Strategy, besides cooperation and prevention, is repression. fedpol has a mandate from the Office of the Attorney General to conduct inquiries into offences falling under federal jurisdiction such as terrorism, activities by criminal organisations and money laundering.


Three approaches



Criminal Intelligence-Led Policing


Nowadays the police have access to a mass of information which can no longer be processed manually or individually. Criminal Intelligence-Led Policing is an approach which enables information obtained in an investigation to be linked to that obtained in other cases. The aim is to identify possible connections between the main players, identify networks and establish whether the suspect or suspects form part of a larger criminal undertaking.

By compiling data in this way, it is possible to see if the suspect forms part of a broader criminal network. It may also reveal other persons who are of interest to the security forces and give a broader and more complete understanding of a complex situation. This can lead to lines of enquiry and strategic choices, and thus help to anticipate a specific risk. By creating an overview of the general situation – the fruits of criminal analysis – the law enforcement agencies can prioritise the use of resources so they are employed efficiently.



Public Private Partnership (PPP)




Organised crime, corruption, money laundering and human trafficking are all crimes that take place in the shadows. Perhaps for fear of reprisal, victims rarely seek to expose the perpetrators and avoid cooperating with the police. Collaboration between the police and civil or private-sector partners has proved very effective in this context, for example with financial institutions in the fight against money laundering, with NGOs in the fight against human trafficking, and with pharmaceutical and other commercial companies in an attempt to prevent terrorists purchasing precursors to make explosives. In the fight against organised crime, greater involvement of private-sector partners and closer cooperation between the immigration authorities, tax authorities and labour inspectorates is essential.



Follow the money

What is the aim of criminal activity? Usually it is to make money! So in all cases, it is worth following the money trail in order to uncover criminal networks. Since financial flows are now largely digitalised, in most cases money can be traced, allowing investigators to track down the perpetrators and reconstruct their networks.

Three priorities



Terrorism

Switzerland does not exist in isolation. It forms part of the Western world and thus constitutes a legitimate target in the eyes of jihadi terrorists. The Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) reports that the terrorist threat remains high in Switzerland and in Europe, and that in Switzerland that posed by Islamist extremists (Islamic State, Al-Qaeda) is particularly grave, most probably taking the form of a low-sophistication attack carried out by an individual or small group. Persons returning from war zones should be viewed as a potential threat.

However, jihadism is not the only terrorist threat. Acts of terrorism may also be carried out by other violent extremist groups, inspired by attacks such as those in Christchurch, New Zealand or in Halle, Germany.

Organised crime

Italian mafia groups are a reality in Switzerland, not only in the border cantons of Ticino, Valais or Graubünden but throughout the country, in particular in urban centres. Mafia members use the Swiss financial system to launder money and to reinvest it in criminal activities in the property business, the restaurant trade and other areas.

fedpol has launched a plan of action for both the cantonal and federal authorities to combat mafia activity. In recent months it announced the expulsion of two mafia members and entry bans on fifteen others. In the coming years, priority will also be given to combating criminal groups originating in South East Europe (primarily engaged in drug trafficking and human trafficking) and from the Commonwealth of Independent States (money laundering).

Cross-border crime

Human trafficking, people smuggling, drug trafficking and property crime are all offences which lie within the jurisdiction of the cantonal prosecution authorities. However, they are never confined to one region. Often several cantons are involved and there are frequently links with other countries. This is particularly true of property offences, whether committed on the internet or physically, as in the case of the recent cash truck heists and ATM attacks in Western Switzerland. fedpol thus plays a central role in supporting the cantons, coordinating investigations, encouraging networking and promoting the exchange of information.

Terrorism *One of the largest anti-terrorism operations in Switzerland to date took place in the early hours of the morning of 29 October 2019. On behalf of the Office of the Attorney General (OAG), fedpol planned, coordinated and led the mission, working in close cooperation with the Zurich cantonal police and with additional support from the Bern and Schaffhausen cantonal police forces. In their search for evidence, the investigators turn everything inside out.*

Go! Go! Go!

It's a dark night. Rain droplets glisten in the diffused light of the streetlamps. Most people are fast asleep, but police officers at fedpol and the cantonal police forces of Zurich, Bern and Schaffhausen are wide awake. Just a few more seconds – then the instruction goes out simultaneously at eleven different places in three different cantons: Go!

High threat level

Five teenagers and six young adults are ripped awake as special units enter and secure their homes. The usual procedure for an anti-terrorist operation, which always involves the highest possible threat level, is followed.

Then the terror investigators step in. They begin by conducting a house search. The young people are suspected of having contravened the ban against

Al-Qaeda and Islamic State groups and of supporting a criminal organisation. This is the reason why the OAG (for the adults) and the juvenile prosecution services in Winterthur and Bern (for the underage teenagers) conduct criminal proceedings, acting closely together.

Day X

On Day X, everything has to happen very quickly. The police look for missing or new pieces of the puzzle that could play a very important role in the investigation.

Cooperation among the specialists is the key to the operation's success. Investigators specialised in terrorism sift through potential evidence, with support from analysts with special language skills. And as always in the digital age, IT forensic specialists and police analysts have more than enough to do.

Which devices should they confiscate? Which data should they copy or remove? Analysts and IT specialists work closely together; their findings will make it easier for the chief investigator to make decisions.

Operation: successful

Discussions and agreements such as these also take place between the OAG and the juvenile prosecution authorities, who are running the operation, and the Zurich cantonal police and fedpol, who are carrying it out, shoulder-to-shoulder in the command centre. The operation is successfully concluded just a few hours after it was launched. But the work of the fedpol investigators for the OAG criminal proceedings is really only just beginning. Now they need to get down to analysing the evidence.

House searches at the homes of 11 terrorist suspects: While Switzerland sleeps, officers from fedpol and several cantonal police services take their targets by surprise.

New measures

One of the persons arrested at the end of October 2019 is already well known to the Swiss prosecution authorities. He is a jihadi returned from the war in the Middle East who has already been convicted for contravening the law against terrorist groups. After his conviction there are grounds for more proceedings to be

opened. But what happens when there is too little evidence to open proceedings against a suspect?

What if a foreign national in Switzerland poses a terrorist threat but cannot be deported because of the non-refoulement principle – because they would face torture and possibly death in their country of origin? What if a person is released from prison

after serving their sentence but continues to pose a threat, as was the case in the London attacks in November 2019 and February 2020? In such cases, the cantonal authorities have few means at their disposal to counter the threat.

In May 2019 the Federal Council approved the Dispatch on the Federal Act on Police Coun-

terterrorism Measures (PCTA). This law provides for additional instruments to be made available to the cantons when their possibilities of dealing with a person who poses a terrorist threat are exhausted. This might be once criminal proceedings have already been opened or, indeed, after the person has been released from prison.

القاعدة



Terrorism *There is sometimes a fine line between violent extremist and terrorist, as the case of a Swiss teenager demonstrates. With an outpour of hatred against Muslims on social media, he orders a cocktail of substances perfect for making a powerful explosive. However, the young man is unable to do any physical harm thanks to fedpol, the cantonal authorities, international partners and ... a pharmacist.*

A determined young man

In an online chat, a young man posts extracts of the video of the Christchurch massacre, in which the killing of 51 Muslims in the New Zealand city on 15 March 2019 was streamed live online. He writes in the chat: "I'd like to do the same thing in Switzerland one day."

Ready to make a bomb

This is a young Swiss teenager who spends his time on social media and in forums which spread hate against Muslims. He belongs to an online group made up of various nationalities – German, Dutch, English. They do not know each other in real life, and are not recognised criminals. They share an ideology, a mixture of pseudo-Christian, anti-Muslim values, tending to the far right. The Swiss teenager is very active, claiming regularly to have ordered explosive precursors to make bombs, and to possess weapons. As well as being a member of this group, he is also

in online contact with some individuals in the UK who are known to the police and are under investigation. But the Swiss lad is not on the police's radar – for now.


Tip-off from foreign police services – and a pharmacist

A police service abroad brings the teenager's chat discussions and social media activity to the attention of the Swiss authorities. His accounts are under different identities and lead to English telephone numbers. The UK Metropolitan Police confirm that the numbers belong to persons known to them. At the same time, the German police identify the teenager on a specialist forum on explosives. But none of this is sufficiently concrete evidence. Until fedpol receives this message: "We have received an order on our online sales website which has aroused doubts about the intended use because of the quantities and substances described as precursors. The order has

been blocked until we know whether or not the person in question has criminal intentions." The author of the message, a pharmacist at an online pharmacy, informs fedpol that a certain Mr X has ordered 7.5kg of acetone, 4kg of hydrogen peroxide and 5kg of hydrochloric acid, the perfect mix to create TATP, a powerful explosive used in many terrorist attacks in Europe in recent years. And Mr X is our young Swiss. His house is raided by the cantonal police, he is arrested and placed in detention. The criminal procedure takes its course.

Regulation required






This case is emblematic. In particular, it highlights the need for legislation on explosive precursors. Whereas the European Union introduced legislation to restrict access to and the misuse of substances to manufacture homemade explosives in 2014 in response to the attack in Oslo by Anders Breivik, such substances can still




be readily purchased in Switzerland. In 2015, aware of the risk that Switzerland might become a supermarket for terrorists, the Federal Council decided to introduce legislation on the issue; a bill will be debated by Parliament in 2020. But without waiting for a new law to be passed, in the autumn of 2016 fedpol alerted the sectors concerned with the

sale of explosive precursors – pharmacists and specialist sales points – to the problem, and these now notify fedpol of any transactions that they consider to be suspicious. There have been 57 such cases since the measures were put in place. The case described here was one of them. Thanks to our conscientious pharmacist, many lives were perhaps saved.

Homemade explosive compound: The Federal Council intends to restrict access to explosives precursors to prevent the manufacture of homemade bombs.







Max Muster

Fedpol123

Go



Organised crime *In 2019, fedpol ordered the expulsion of Italian mafia members in two separate cases – the first time it had taken action this kind. Expulsion is one of several administrative measures in the anti-mafia action plan aimed at dismantling the criminal organisations and making life more difficult for mafia members in Switzerland. Here we give you a fuller picture.*

One-way ticket to Italy

The phone conversation is picked up in an investigation by the Italian police. Two mafiosi are talking about Switzerland; the one assures the other: “You know, in Switzerland, as long as your papers are in order, you can pretty much do what you like.”

This is how things used to be. The presence of the Italian mafia in Switzerland was underestimated for a long time, but now the anti-mafia operational plan put forward by fedpol to the cantonal and federal authorities is changing the game. For example, in 2019 fedpol announced the expulsion from Switzerland of two mafia members. Since 2018, 15 persons suspected of belonging to mafia organisations and of threatening the country’s internal and external security have been banned from entering Switzerland (see table opposite). The tone has been set.

Switzerland, an ideal bolthole and linking point

Italian mafia organisations are a reality in Switzerland. They are thought to be all over the country, not just in Ticino, Valais and Graubünden, the cantons bordering on Italy. Although it is not known how many mafia members are active here, fedpol is aware of about a hundred, mainly members of the ‘Ndrangheta, but also

Cosa Nostra and the Camorra. Involved in drug and arms trafficking, these active members also launder money via Switzerland and reinvest the proceeds of their criminal activities – mainly conducted in Italy – in the property business, restaurant trade and other more minor businesses. Situated at the heart of Europe, Switzerland is the ideal bolthole, a place you can leave just as quickly as you enter it. It is also an ideal place for mafia groups in the north of Europe to link up with the clans from southern Italy.

A high-ranking member of the ‘Ndrangheta made use of the country in this way. For a while he was a cross-border commuter living in Italy and working in Switzerland. Back in Italy, he was charged with involvement in mafia activities and sentenced to a long term in prison. At the request of the Swiss canton in which he had worked, fedpol issued an 18-year entry ban in order to prevent his possible return. The measure to keep him out of Switzerland is still in force, and final.

Cutting the octopus’ tentacles

An entry ban or removal order are preventive measures under administrative law that avert a threat to Switzerland’s internal or

external security. Although administrative measures alone may not be able to eradicate mafias in Switzerland, they can make their lives less comfortable and restrict their spread across the country. It may not be possible to kill the octopus, but you can at least cut off its tentacles.

To date, 15 entry bans have been issued to persons who have for the most part already been convicted in Italy for involvement in mafia activities. This measure may also be imposed on a person without a previous conviction. The criteria for issuing a removal order are more stringent. fedpol issued such an order for a father and son living in Ticino and running several businesses there. Both had a residence permit for Switzerland. They were suspected of being closely involved in a mafia clan; the fact that they were resident in Switzerland was seen as a threat to internal security, and so their removal was justified. This was the result of close cooperation with the Ticino authorities, pioneers in the fight against mafia activity in Switzerland. This kind of cooperation should be instituted throughout Switzerland (see box) in order to ensure that Mafiosi operating here obtain the correct paper: a one-way ticket to Italy.

COC: Joint intelligence to combat Italian mafias

The fight against mafias forms part of the Federal Department of Justice and Police's anti-crime strategy. One of the objectives of this strategy is to make Switzerland unattractive to these criminal organisations – whether as a place to build up structures, as a bolthole or as a rear base for concealing or laundering profits from criminal activities.

When dealing with mafia members, a multi-dimensional approach combining prevention, repression and cooperation is required. This

includes cooperation between all the authorities concerned, at both federal and cantonal level. Countering Organised Crime (COC) is a working method created to strengthen this cooperation. Launched in October 2019, COC brings together all those involved in the fight against the mafia: the criminal prosecution authorities, the cantonal and federal security authorities, and migration, social, financial, market and competition authorities. The aim is to step up the exchange of information and to ensure appropriate measures are taken at all levels going forward, such as police, reg-

ister of residents, financial controls, auditing and checks on companies, and public-private partnerships. For example, collaboration with the banking world is essential; this sector, which has its reputation and credibility to maintain, can provide very valuable information, tools and recommendations. COC will enable all partners to share key information and will create a joint intelligence base (intelligence-led policing), providing a common response to this form of organised crime in order to thwart mafia activities in Switzerland.

Entry bans	Total	Terrorism related	Including preachers of hate	Non-terrorism related	Violent extremism	Illegal intelligence activities	Italian organised crime	Other organised crime
2019	160	65	-	95	13	70	11	1
2018	106	78	1	28	8	20	4	-
2017	150	140	14	10	10	-	-	-
2016	128	113	-	15	4	11	-	-

Expulsions	Total	Enforced	Italian organised crime	Terrorism	Enforcement not possible
2019	4	3	2	1	1
2018	5	2	-	2	3
2017	13	11	-	11	2
2016	1	-	-	-	1
Total	23	16	2	14	7

Departure southwards: In 2019 fedpol expelled, for the first time, several persons suspected of belonging to Italian mafia groups.

Cross-border crime During an international investigation, fedpol worked with Europol and national and international partners to deliver a masterstroke: the arrest of a drug lord and the seizure of 603kg of cocaine delivered by private jet. The crackdown was successful thanks to high-level co-ordination and a swift, flexible and efficient response.

A stash of cocaine

The scene is surreal, like something from a police drama series. On 16 May 2019 at 17:26, a private jet from Latin America travelling via Nice lands on the runway at EuroAirport Basel Mulhouse Freiburg. So far, nothing out of the ordinary. The jet moves onto the private tarmac on the border between France and Switzerland. The air stewardess, pilot and co-pilot disembark. The pilot goes to pick up a first hire car – a Smart car – and then a van. The private jet staff then start to-ing and fro-ing as they hastily load 21 suitcases into the van. In total, 603kg of cocaine is stashed in the baggage. The delivery is destined for a vast Balkan criminal network. At this point, the three partners in crime are unaware that they are being filmed by surveillance cameras. fedpol patiently observes the scene alongside its French, Serbian, Croatian and Czech counterparts.













Acting fast

For the fedpol investigators, the tension is palpable. On the ground, they are ready to intervene at any moment, with a command post overseeing the operation from Lausanne in collaboration with national partners – including the Basel-Stadt cantonal police – and international partners. They have not had long to get organised. Less than forty-eight hours earlier, on the evening of 14 May, fedpol received a tip-off from the Croatian police saying that a significant shipment of drugs was set to arrive in Basel in two days and that France, Croatia and the Czech Republic were involved. Switzerland's mission was to coordinate with French police to seize the cocaine delivery without compromising the ongoing investigation known as Operation Familia, co-ordinated by Europol.

This shipment was in fact just the tip of the iceberg. Beneath it lay large-scale cocaine trafficking from Latin America to Europe via Asia, organised by a Balkan cartel that used private jets to transport its precious cargo around the world. Operation Familia, led by Croatia, Serbia and the Czech Republic, involved around twenty countries.

Big boss in Switzerland

According to the Croatian police, the network's big boss – the main target of the international operation – is to meet the pilot at EuroAirport to pay him in cash and will then leave immediately. At 17:42, the boss arrives at the airport. He meets the pilot and the pair talk in a café. Meanwhile, the command post in Lausanne follows what is happening closely. Things then start to happen very quickly. Once



the shipment is loaded into the van, things take an unexpected turn: the boss gets in the van with the cocaine. The air stewardess and the pilot then make a getaway in the hire car. They leave the airport. But which route will the convoy take? fedpol's watchword is flexibility. The strategy has to be coordinated with all partners. On the police side, the plan is for the convoy to be stopped for a random routine check by Basel police as soon as it is on Swiss soil. Almost too straightforward to be true.

Emergency intervention in a car park

The convoy leaves EuroAirport and crosses the Swiss border. A few metres further on it enters the city, where the vehicle checks are to take place. When the van and the hire car arrive on the main road, they change their minds and suddenly veer




left, driving into an underground car park. fedpol investigators then only have a few seconds to decide to change their strategy. The police command in Lausanne gives the green light to the police in Basel-Stadt. The Basel police officers, who are armed and wearing bulletproof vests, enter the car park. They are prepared to come face to face with violent criminals; the threat of a shoot-out is all too real. In the car park, they encounter the co-pilot, the network's top dog and another individual: the right-hand man of the network's second-in-command. Within seconds the criminals are arrested, 603kg of cocaine is seized and Switzerland's mission is accomplished.

An international impact

In the following days, the Croatian police get their hands on the network's sec-

ond-in-command. The air stewardess and the pilot are arrested on their way back to the Czech Republic. And there ends the Swiss episode of Operation Familia, which sees a total of 16 arrests: 11 in Europe and 5 in Hong Kong. In the other countries involved – Croatia, Serbia and the Czech Republic – two million euros in cash are seized, as well as luxury goods, watches, handguns and vehicles.

Like every episode inspired by a good police drama, the criminals end up behind bars. Except that there's nothing fictional about this story, and the twists and turns weren't written in advance. The coordination efforts between Europol, fedpol and all the police forces involved, the rapid response and the flexibility of the national partners on the ground all contributed to this step forward in combating transnational crime.



Cross-border crime A gang of experienced French armed robbers arranges to meet on a forest road with the aim of attacking a security van carrying precious metals on the other side of the border. Thanks to collaboration between the French and Swiss authorities, police neutralise the criminals in the forest. We look back at an operation that shows the importance of being proactive.

An arrest in the middle of a forest

It is 7am on 31 October 2019 in the woods near the French town of Collonges, close to the Swiss border. The sun is just rising on a remote forest road. Eight men are waiting next to their vehicles. The tension is palpable. It is their last meeting before they stage the planned attack. Their aim is to hijack a van carrying precious metals just a few kilometres away, on the other side of the border. Everything is ready for the heist: Kalashnikovs, explosives, bulletproof vests and balaclavas.

Switzerland – a target for robbers of cash-in-transit vans

Switzerland is attracting an increasing number of experienced organised crime gangs. These teams are ultra-professional, highly trained, heavily armed and not afraid to get their hands dirty. Their operations usually involve hefty sums: for example, on 24 May 2017 in Nyon, a gang targeted a van containing almost 40 million Swiss francs. This type of raid is one of the only ways that 'traditional' criminals can get their hands on loot of several million francs in one go.

The phenomenon has become more frequent in recent years, with more than half of the 19 cases registered by fedpol since 2010 taking place between 2017 and 2019. The intensity of the attacks has also increased. From Kalashnikovs and ram raids to explosives, these criminals are equipped with real weapons of war.

For the time being, there is an invisible linguistic divide when it comes to organised crime, with French gangs mainly targeting French-speaking Switzerland and Italian perpetrators focusing on Ticino. This is not set in stone, however, and criminal gangs have been known to move outside of their comfort zones. For example, a number of gangs from Lyon have targeted the German-speaking part of Switzerland in the past. The number of successful heists in recent years is likely to encourage further attacks.

Working together to thwart the thieves

Back to the forest in Collonges. The operation is due to start in a few minutes. But just as the gang members smoke one

last cigarette, the elite French special intervention units RAID and BRI sweep in.

For several weeks, investigators from the French and Geneva police forces have been working together closely. fedpol is also involved, facilitating coordination between the partners. The attack involves substantial preparations, and this leaves the perpetrators vulnerable. Because they frequently exchange information, investigators from the joint operation are able to monitor the planning of the attack and track the robbers while they are scouting the area around Geneva, and identify where the gang will meet just before the attack.

All eight robbers have a background in organised crime. They form what is known as a multi-skilled team, whose members have been specially recruited for the heist based on their skills. One specialises in reconnaissance, the other in explosives: everyone has a clearly defined role to play. They are not afraid of anything and are extremely dangerous. In some cases, it is not their first attempt: a few years earlier,



one of the perpetrators attempted to carry out a bomb robbery on a bureau de change in Thônex in the canton of Geneva. He was hit by a bullet in the town centre while being chased by police. And here he is again, in the middle of the forest, on 31 October 2019.

The keys to a successful operation

To successfully combat attacks on cash-in-transit vehicles, efficient dissemination of information and close collaboration between the various national players are crucial. fedpol is the single point of contact for the exchange of information between France and Switzerland. Centralising information is important in order to be able to cross-check details, spot connections between cases and highlight networks.

There are several tools and platforms for exchanging information with the cantons. And police cooperation is in fedpol's DNA. Its Armed Jewellery Robberies (AJR) project already implements proven methods to combat armed jewellery robberies. Since February 2020,

as part of AJR+, fedpol has set up initial coordination between cantonal partners and partners abroad to exchange information. fedpol then analyses the situation to identify the criminals and to work out which networks they belong to. On the basis of this analysis work, an operational strategy is drawn up between cantonal police forces, the French authorities and fedpol. The aim of such efforts is to be able to launch an investigation rapidly.

The private sector should not be overlooked as a player either. Essential information is passed on by security couriers; the security firms screen this information and pass on the most relevant details to fedpol. fedpol is then able to draw up an alert system with different levels: orange means there is a concrete risk of attack. It is then the company's responsibility to increase the security level or change the vehicle's route. When the level is red, the high-risk convoy is immediately diverted from its final destination. The ultimate goal is to get the armoured vehicles out the way before it's too late.

Checkmate

On 31 October 2019, the criminal gang's intentions didn't stand a chance: within seconds, they were surrounded in the middle of the forest and saw their loot disappear before their eyes. There was nothing they could do. They were instantly taken into custody for criminal association at the judicial police station in Lyon. Checkmate for the eight robbers who never even made it to Switzerland.

***Cross-border crime** A visit to the bank with a payment slip and cash? That's a thing of the past. Today there is online banking. But, as on the streets, there are criminals in virtual space too and they are after people's money. Global computer networks allow them to target hundreds of people with little effort and from just about anywhere. So a criminal complaint made in Zurich can lead to arrests in Rotterdam.*

Caught in the phishing net

Noah* stands at the counter of the cantonal police station, his forehead glistening with beads of sweat. He wants just one thing: to wake up from this nightmare! Instead, he has to recount his story to the police officer.

It starts with a crime reported in Zurich...

Noah receives an email from his Swiss bank informing him about new security standards available for online banking. It only takes a few minutes to install the software. One click on the attached link and Noah is on the website of the bank. He submits his contact details and online banking access data.

A short time later his mobile phone rings. A customer service adviser wants to complete the security update and says she will send Noah a security code. Noah follows her instructions and confirms receipt of the code by reading it out aloud over the phone. After further, detailed explanations the friendly customer service adviser says goodbye and hangs up.

Not until Noah logs into a new online banking session and checks his account balance does everything suddenly become clear: someone has gained unauthorised access to his bank account and withdrawn all the money. The alleged update was one

big scam. The email? Fake! The bank website? Fake! The customer service advisor and her instructions? That was all fake too! But the financial damage is deadly earnest.

Thinking and acting beyond cantonal borders

Experience from past cases like this one has shown that fraudsters not only try to phish their victims' access data, they also cast their nets wide by sending out a flood of unsolicited emails. This means that numerous cantons are automatically involved in the same case.

This presents a challenge for the federally structured Swiss law enforcement services. In order to avoid duplication and to investigate efficiently, cases involving multiple cantons require close coordination and one agency to take the lead, whether that is a cantonal public prosecution service or the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland. In Noah's case, it is the latter.

Which trail is the right one?

It quickly becomes apparent that Noah is not the only person who has reported the scam. The investigation ultimately involves more than 100 incidents in over

17 cantons. With each case reported, the investigators at fedpol gain a better understanding of how the fraudsters operate. And each incident contains digital and analog trails that could lead to the culprit.

Trail 1:

The phishing email

This leads to nothing. The email does not provide enough useful information.

... and ends with arrests made in Rotterdam

About two years after Noah files the criminal complaint with the Zurich cantonal police, and after extensive investigations, the day has finally come: the suspects are arrested in the Dutch seaport of Rotterdam and are brought to justice. And the two million or so Swiss francs they obtained by fraud? It is never found.

*Name changed

Trail 5:

The customer service adviser's telephone calls

The customer service adviser calls her victims anonymously, but investigators succeed in identifying the ever-changing telephone numbers behind the calls. They appear to come from the Netherlands. Suspicions are confirmed when the customer service adviser unwittingly conducts a phone conversation with an undercover investigator. Eureka! At once fedpol contacts the Dutch police on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General. Working closely together, investigators from both countries pinpoint the area from where the calls are being made. The Dutch investigators narrow down the field to a district in Rotterdam, where they are able to identify the newspaper kiosk that sells the SIM cards used for the telephone calls by the customer service adviser.

Trail 4:

The money flow

Together with the bank, investigators identify the initial transactions made from the victims' accounts. The money has been transferred to accounts abroad. But investigators become concerned when they realise that these initial transactions are just the first step. So-called **money mules** have transferred the money on to further accounts. And this continues until the money flow becomes difficult to trace.

Trail 2:

The phishing website

This leads to a dead end. Although investigators work collaboratively with MELANI (Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Assurance) to track down details regarding an email address, this does not yield an IP address or any information about how the fraudster accessed the system.

Trail 3:

E-banking access


The same applies to the online banking system. To conceal their IP address, fraudsters use specific devices such as proxy servers – a type of intermediary station that interrupts the direct connection between the fraudster's computer and the website in question.

Money Mules

Criminals recruit 'money mules' over online platforms, social media or through newspaper advertisements. Once recruited, the mules' bank accounts are used to move around money they have obtained by criminal means. The advertisements promise a near-perfect job opportunity and frequently attract people who

are in search of work or in financial difficulty. The 'job' consists of the mules receiving money into their personal bank account, withdrawing it and then sending it by post, money transfer or other means to a location abroad. Often, the criminals demand that the assets be converted into a crypto currency such as bitcoin.

In return, the money mule gets to keep a commission. But this is where caution is advised; anyone who becomes a money mule is in breach of the law. The money nearly always comes from crimes such as drug trafficking, human trafficking or cybercrime.



Cross-border crime *Someone in Eastern Europe buys a share for a bargain price and later sells it on at a profit. Someone else in Switzerland builds a network of bank accounts in Switzerland and abroad. How is this done? fedpol follows the money trail.*

A low-budget idea

Summer 2019. The country is blanketed in heat. Economic prospects in Eastern Europe are poor. Under the trees beside the city's alleyways dogs are dozing in the shade. Not far away, in a small house with a front garden, sits a man called Nicolai. He is the owner of a small company and has just had a brilliant idea. What if money grew on trees? What if he sold something that wasn't actually of any value but would ultimately make him rich? And, even better, what if he organised things so he can sit back and watch it all happen? The idea of investment fraud is born. All he has to do is get the ball rolling. And find people to work for him.

Nicolai commissions a call centre in a neighbouring country to find customers who are willing to buy shares in a small-time company. The shares are worth practically nothing, but the customers do not know that of course. Instead, talk is of big-time profits, of an imminent breakthrough, of fast money and of the ultimate dream. The customers buy the story – and the shares. Nicolai knows that the more customers who buy the shares, the more their value increases. The moment the worthless shares reach a

peak in value, he begins selling them and makes a profit. His plan works. But soon he faces a problem. What should he do with all the money? This is where Bernard comes in.

System with guarantee

Bernhard, a self-employed fiduciary in his mid-fifties from a provincial town in Switzerland, is seated in his office, perspiring. Bernhard is adept at keeping other people's accounts and at managing their money. He is also skillful at keeping certain transactions from attracting attention. Bernhard is a pro. When Nicolai asks him one afternoon to manage his money and accounts, Bernhard willingly agrees.


Bernhard creates a network of money transactions that is so complex that it is nearly impossible to pinpoint where the money is coming from and where it is going to. As Nicolai's customers buy shares from somewhere in Europe, their money flows into the accounts that Bernhard manages from Switzerland on Nicolai's behalf. Bernhard then transfers it on, sometimes to accounts abroad, sometimes to the accounts of other people in Swit-

zerland, sometimes to his own accounts. Everything runs smoothly; the plan works.

Payday

At some point Bernhard becomes careless. The amount of money becomes too large too quickly. He no longer knows what to do with such vast sums. On repeated occasions he pays large amounts into his own account – as a salary. He also transfers a considerable amount back to Nicolai's company abroad. Huge transactions pass through Bernhard's company accounts. And then he makes a mistake: he withdraws several thousand francs in cash from various ATMs in the same town on the same day.

Late summer 2019. The din of traffic floats through the window, standing slightly ajar, of an office in a Swiss city centre. Laura, a bank clerk in her early thirties who works at the bank where Bernhard has his company accounts, notices Bernhard's transactions and becomes suspicious. She knows that money does not accumulate as easily as that and that convoluted transactions like these rarely bode well. Something about the transactions is odd. She notices that



many of the payments made into Bernhard's account have similar payment references. She also observes that the money in question often flows into accounts abroad and sometimes into Bernhard's own accounts. She has a strange feeling that something is genuinely not right.

Laura reports Bernhard's private and company bank accounts to the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland (MROS) and fedpol swings into action.

Money trails never lie

MROS analyses the network of transactions, documents the money flows into and out of Switzerland and examines the cash withdrawals. The bank statements are endless: Bernhard's system is convoluted and well disguised. But a money trail never lies. With the help of a request to the Financial Intelligence Unit in the foreign country involved, fedpol obtains information about the overseas bank account. The transactions have attracted attention there too. A clear picture begins to emerge; fedpol sends a detailed analysis of the money flows to the cantonal prosecution authorities and learns that

Bernhard is already known to them, having been in their sights on several occasions for document forgery and mismanagement.

The story finishes with Bernhard's arrest. Not only has he systematically laundered the criminal proceeds from Nicolai's sale of shares and reintroduced the money back into legal circulation, he has also misappropriated the money. He has made a handsome profit from Nicolai's brilliant idea, and Nicolai has established a profitable business based on Bernhard's ingenious plan. And the money flow has led fedpol right to its target.

Nicolai, Bernhard, Laura...they could be anyone. Our story is illustrative and therefore the names of those involved are illustrative too.


Analog past – digital future

The story of Nicolai and Bernhard is just one example from the 7,705 reports that fedpol received from financial intermediaries in 2019. These reports are essential for detecting and prosecuting money laundering cases, and allow fedpol to draw up a comprehensive analysis aimed at better understanding criminals' *modi operandi* and at spotting potential money laundering cases more quickly. Banks and their staff can also be better trained in spotting cases of money laundering.

Up to the end of 2019 fedpol received all bank statements required for its transaction analyses in analog form. Each case could easily involve several thousands of pages of statements, which had to be subsequently typed out by hand and digitised. This procedure resulted in 3,631 pending cases in 2019 alone.

In the future, financial intermediaries will submit their reports digitally. This will enable fedpol to prioritise them more effectively, evaluate them more efficiently and work through pending cases more rapidly.





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Every minute counts

International cooperation *To enhance security, information sharing needs to be as rapid and comprehensive as possible. The aim is for the right information to reach the right people at the right time so they can make the best possible decisions. This is the objective of several international cooperation projects.*

One night in 2019, in the sleepy village of Münchenstein in the canton of Basel-Stadt, two criminals gain entry to a house while the occupants are asleep. They search several rooms looking for valuables. One of the occupants – an elderly man – suffers a heavy blow to the head and sustains facial lacerations. He later dies from his injuries.

The perpetrators flee the scene but leave behind several items of jewellery. Forensic experts then look for clues – in particular fingerprints and DNA. Two traces of DNA are taken from a key and a bottle. The cantonal police pass them on to fedpol for comparison with the national database (CODIS). There are no matches. In a case

like this, an international search can then be carried out via INTERPOL. A request is sent to each country individually but there is no guarantee that the countries possess the relevant information and no guarantee how long they will take to respond.

This time fedpol is in luck: the French authorities confirm that the DNA traces match two profiles in their database. This news is a real step forward for the investigation. Around one month after the crime is committed the two perpetrators, who are Romanian nationals, are arrested in France and subsequently extradited to Switzerland. However, it takes several days for fedpol to discover that the French police have infor-


mation on the two criminals. And several days can be a matter of life or death: in a police investigation every minute counts.

Prüm – the standard channel

Within the European Union, a network of connected information systems guarantees police forces prompt access to information on fingerprints and DNA profiles. This is known as Prüm cooperation and is the standard channel through which information is exchanged. This means that requests submitted through other channels (including those from Switzerland) are not processed as rapidly. In order to remedy the situation, Switzerland is looking to



Genome sequencing card, chromosome architecture and genetic sequencing diagram.



join the Prüm Convention, and a project is currently under way to achieve this. Being a member of the network would allow Switzerland to locate and identify criminals more quickly. And this would benefit investigations into numerous international cases, for example into attacks on armoured vehicles and drug trafficking.

Another example: In France in July 2016 there is an altercation between several homeless people. One man is drowned. When those involved in the altercation are arrested, they reveal the identity of the presumed murderer, who is on the run. During the investigation, fingerprints are taken.

February 2018: On the basis of these fingerprints, INTERPOL France launches an international request as it has not found any information in national and European databases.

fedpol receives the request for Switzerland. It conducts a search in its information systems and bingo! The individual is known as H.Z. and is in custody in the canton of Neuchâtel. The information is passed on to the French authorities just before the inmate is due to be released. It was that close. If the information systems were interconnected, the individual could have been identified much sooner.

This is why Switzerland is keen to join the Prüm Convention – to access information in real time.

Getting systems to communicate

Accessing an information system is one thing, but if the systems are not interconnected some criminals manage to slip through the net – like the perpetrator of the Berlin attack in December 2016, Anis Amri, who had registered as an asylum seeker under fourteen different aliases in different municipal districts in Germany. The same Anis Amri was found under five different identities in police databases. How do we establish a link between these identities?

At European level, police, customs officers and migration authorities have access to numerous information systems: the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa

Information System (VIS), Eurodac (fingerprint database for identifying asylum seekers).

And more systems are set to be added in the future.

In the current setup, these systems are not interlinked but must be consulted separately. In the future, an IT solution known as interoperability will allow these systems to communicate with each other. Having all the relevant information at the touch of a button is the aim of interoperability, which seeks to ensure that the police, customs officers and migration authorities receive the right information at the right time, throughout the Schengen area. This will provide authorities with a more complete picture of the individuals they check and will allow them to better identify individuals who pose a security threat or who provide false identity details. In a case like that of Anis Amri, the migration authorities and police would be able to cross-check the different identities and establish that it was the same person using different aliases.

A challenge in Switzerland, too

The permeability of the different cantonal information systems is also a challenge in Switzerland. Take the Strasbourg terror attack in December 2018, for example. After Cherif Chekatt opens fire at the Christmas market at 8pm, French authorities immediately start looking for as much information as they can find on the suspect. Experts at fedpol work through the night to clarify the information they have. They consult numerous databases. The suspect is registered in no fewer than seven different cantons.

But each cantonal police force has to be consulted individually to obtain detailed information. This is set to change in future: a project is under way to accelerate the exchange of information by establishing a national platform allowing access to information contained in all the databases.

More than ever in our globalised, digital and interconnected world, exchanging information is crucial. For it to be effective, we have to be able to rely on intelligent IT solutions that provide the right information at the right place in real time.

Glossary

Eichenberger

Corina Eichenberger-Walther was an FDP National Councillor until 2019. On 14 June 2018, she submitted a motion calling on the Federal Council to create a centralised national police database or a platform linking up the existing cantonal police databases. Her motion was adopted by the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly. The national database query platform will allow cantonal police forces and fedpol to directly consult police data on individuals and their past history.

Interoperability

Interoperability is the ability of IT systems to adapt so they can work with other independent systems to create a network and facilitate the communication of more comprehensive data.

Prüm

Prüm is a town in Germany, located in Rhineland Palatinate. On 27 March 2005, a treaty was signed in the town by seven EU member states: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria. It provides for the exchange of data on genetic material and fingerprints to enhance the fight against terrorism and organised crime. A significant portion of the treaty was subsequently transposed into EU law.

PNRs

Passenger Name Records (PNRs) are data supplied by air passengers when they book a flight with an airline or travel agent. This data can help in the fight against terrorism and crime. Twenty-four European countries have already established the necessary units required to process this data. Switzerland is currently reviewing the possibility of implementing such a system.

SIS

The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the essential tool for information exchange between police forces and migration authorities in the Schengen area. Every day, Swiss security authorities make nearly 300,000 search requests in the SIS. The database contains information on wanted or missing persons and persons subject to a ban on entry, as well as alerts on stolen or missing vehicles, objects and weapons. A project is underway to develop this system, notably through the mandatory reporting of potential terrorists and people subject to entry bans.

Victim identification *A terrorist attack in Sri Lanka leaves three Swiss dead. fedpol staff travel to the scene of the crime to identify the victims and ensure the safe transport of the relevant DNA samples.*

A right to certainty

Easter Sunday. Prayer time for Christians around the world, and in Sri Lanka too. Then the devastating attacks occur. Several suicide bombers detonate their explosives in quick succession in several churches and hotels. More than 250 people die and around 500 are injured. According to the first media reports, three Swiss are among the victims. Investigations by Sri Lanka's Criminal Investigation Department (CID) indicate possible links to Switzerland. The Office of the Attorney General opens criminal proceedings.

fedpol launches a criminal investigation in Switzerland and dispatches a team to Sri Lanka to identify the Swiss victims and provide support to the Swiss embassy.

Eerie silence

The two fedpol specialists fly to Colombo in an almost empty aircraft. When they arrive in the capital, the usually vibrant city is unrecognisable. An eerie silence hangs over the abandoned streets. The Sri Lankan authorities fear further attacks and have imposed a curfew. No one really knows what is going on.

It soon becomes apparent that only three of the five victims from Switzerland – father, mother and daughter – were indeed Swiss citizens. The forensic experts at the scene have already taken blood samples from all the presumed foreign victims. In order to identify the Swiss victims according to Swiss, i.e. INTERPOL, standards, fedpol performs an additional DNA analysis in consulta-

tion with the local authorities. A forensic expert takes a buccal swab and a blood sample from each victim in the presence of the fedpol officers. The samples are carefully sealed and prepared for transportation to Switzerland. The fedpol officers oversee each step of the procedure.

The TIGER unit takes over

Further administrative hurdles must be overcome before the package containing the samples arrives at the Zurich Institute of Forensic Medicine (IRM UZH). Time and energy are required to deal with the necessary formalities. The Swiss are not the only ones who are waiting for clearance for the bodies. The fedpol team requires

powers of attorney and attestations for their role as official representatives of the Swiss authorities and of the victims' relatives – a procedure that is unusual in Sri Lanka. Translators are required and official documents must be obtained. The Swiss embassy assists where possible.

Just before the next Swiss aircraft leaves Sri Lanka for Zurich, the fedpol team hands over the DNA samples to two Swiss air marshals from the so-called TIGER unit. This is a special fedpol unit responsible for security on board Swiss aircraft and at certain airports overseas. The TIGER officers will ensure the safe transport of the unusual consignment, a further crucial link in the identification chain.

Respectful final act

Meanwhile, the victims' personal belongings are taken to the Swiss embassy from the hotel where not only the Swiss family tragically died, but many other guests too. Clothes, souvenirs, soft toys – some

of these belongings will be brought back to Switzerland. Then there is a last act of reverence: the two federal police officers attend the cremation of the victims, as agreed with the relatives. As official witnesses, they confirm that this final act has taken place properly and respectfully.

Mission accomplished

Zurich airport. The Zurich cantonal police take receipt of the DNA samples from the TIGER officers at the terminal gate and convey them straight to the IRM UZH for analysis. A comparison of the samples with available biological material from the deceased before their death – so-called ante mortem data – turns up a positive match and confirms the identity of the three victims.

Ten days after their departure from Switzerland, the fedpol officers return home.

Mission accomplished.

Emotional effects and legal implications

The authorities may only confirm a person's death once the identity of the deceased has been clearly established. Until that happens, the relatives of the deceased can encounter certain difficulties – including financial ones. For example, they may have to continue paying bills on behalf of the deceased. In addition, they cannot access survivors' pensions or a potential inheritance. Above all, however, relatives face an emotionally stressful situation because they cannot bury or bid farewell to their loved one.

A heavy toll. More than 250 lives were lost in the untold destruction caused by suicide bombers in the Sri Lankan capital Colombo in August 2019.






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Criminal Analysis *In days gone by, a police investigation would start with a small amount of physical evidence. These days, digital forensics specialists have a vast amount of information at their fingertips. How do they keep track of it all?*

Taming the beast of big data

In an extensive terrorism investigation, the sheer volume of information seized by fedpol investigators is impressive: 9 iPhones and iPads, 3 Android smartphones, 1 'basic' mobile phone, 5 Mac computers, 2 PCs, 18 hard drives and flashdrives, 1 SIM card, 1 action camera and 1 cloud-based account. In total, 3.6 terabytes of data containing 3,439 audio files, 64,206 images and 1,267 videos. The aim of the investigation is to demonstrate that the suspect has contravened the Federal Act on the Proscription of the Groups Al-Qaeda and Islamic State and Associated Organisations. To do so, investigators need to determine whether the suspect knows persons involved in the Islamist scene, or if they have been in contact or held meetings. This promises

to be a herculean task – and the investigators do not know whether attacks are already being planned and lives put at risk.


What do police officers do with all the data they collect? Where do they start? In the past, they would often start with following up a handful of leads in order to try and reconstruct a suspect's actions. These days, technology has completely transformed the work of criminal prosecutors. From the outset, digital forensics specialists have a vast amount of data. It is then up to them to find the needle in the haystack.

The machines' initial task

"All the computer data are first poured into a huge pot," explains a digital forensics

investigator from fedpol. "The initial aim is to order the data, to sort it, and to reduce the volume of files, without missing important elements." Initially, it is the machines that do the work. In order to work quickly, the whole volume of data is spread across several servers that work simultaneously when a request is launched. "Because with big data we have a volume of data in no particular order, our processing is not linear or categorised," the investigator explains.

The machines are capable of carrying out a number of tasks themselves. For example, emails are no longer displayed individually, but are reconstructed in chains. Artificial intelligence can also cross-check information appearing in several photos or videos. several photos or videos.



The four V's of big data

Volume: the scale of the data – a single database is not enough.

Variety: the different forms of data – we talk about poly-structured data.

Veracity: the uncertainty regarding the quality of the data.

Velocity: the importance of being able to decrypt the information in real time – or almost.

Diverse sources

“The computer can, for example, detect and group together videos that contain weapons, or those that feature the Islamic State symbol,” the investigator continues. Similarly, it can define whether a keyword systematically crops up in conversations between two people, or if the emails classified as ‘highly confidential’ relate to similar topics.

“The challenge and the whole point of our work involves identifying the right information and cross-checking information from very diverse sources: whether databases, transcripts, or XML data from phone tapping,” the investigator explains. “But the analysis of big data only makes sense if we know what we’re looking for.”

Machines and humans complement each other

This initial screening process drastically reduces the volume of data to be analysed. The investigators and analysts then proceed by targeting topics and word clusters. In an economic crime investigation, 25 million files harvested from 85 email accounts, 85 network storage devices and numerous other pieces of documentary evidence are whittled down to 16 thematic packages containing 2,000 documents – an altogether more manageable volume of data for investigators to analyse in detail.

Crime is evolving in the same way as society: it is digital, mobile and connected. This is resulting in new challenges for criminal prosecution authorities, such as data

protection, encryption of communications and the storage of data abroad. “Sometimes data is stored in the cloud, which means on servers located abroad,” the investigator says. “This data can be used as evidence. But sometimes defendants do not consent to their data being accessed and we then have to resort to mutual legal assistance procedures, which are complex, lengthy and time consuming.” Meanwhile, terrorists and criminals are taking full advantage of the benefits that new technologies have to offer.

This is why it is crucial that criminal prosecution authorities have modern tools and appropriate resources at their disposal, as well as technologically neutral legal bases.

Security Every year the World Economic Forum (WEF) Annual Meeting attracts heads of state, ministers and other high-ranking government officials from across the globe to Davos. This event poses a challenge for security services all over Switzerland, and is one at which fedpol plays a key role. From risk assessments in the run-up to the conference and arranging security measures or helicopter flights, to organising short-notice arrivals or providing directions on the ground – fedpol is in the thick of it.

No time to catch breath



Footprints in the snow at Davos: US president, Donald Trump, visited the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting again in 2020.

* Helicopter or motorcade?

For security reasons high-risk persons are transported to Davos whenever possible by helicopter. However, sometimes the weather upsets these plans. The decision to go ahead with a helicopter flight is taken around three hours before scheduled departure.

This is an important moment for fedpol's police officers. If flying conditions are not favourable the police must organise a

motorcade, applying the security measures that have previously been defined.

This is exactly what happened when the US president was scheduled to return to Zurich from Davos. The Swiss police, together with the authorities of the transit cantons and the Swiss Armed Forces, responded to the challenge by organising the longest trip by motorcade Donald Trump had ever undertaken as president.

The headlights of the passing cars light up his dark-coloured winter boots at regular intervals. A seemingly endless convoy of large black vehicles winds its way past. The constant din reminds him of city traffic.

A fedpol police officer is standing on the main street in Davos in the biting cold. He is speaking loudly and clearly into his mobile phone, his breath creating wisps of condensation. He is guiding the security staff of the Congolese delegation through the nocturnal confusion to the accreditation centre of the WEF Annual Meeting.

From South America to the Alps of Switzerland

In the midst of it all fedpol takes up position. Its officers will be there for around a week, ready at all times. Their phones ring non-stop, but they have no way of knowing in advance what each ring will bring or where it will take them.

Early in the day, they receive a telephone call informing them that Juan Guaidó will be attending the conference. Suddenly the domestic turmoil in Venezuela casts its shadow over sunny Davos. How serious is the threat to Guaidó, – elected president of Venezuela's national assembly on the one hand, self-appointed interim president and leader of the opposition on the other?

From global to regional politics

The fedpol officers face these and numerous other questions. Within a short space of time they must compile an in-depth risk assessment, taking into account geopolitical aspects such as the fact that around 50 nations have recognised Guaidó as Venezuela's legitimate head of state, and regional circumstances including the possibility of anti-Guaidó protests in Switzerland.

Based on this assessment fedpol defines the appropriate protection measures. Direct contact with Guaidó's delegation requires diplomatic skill. Then it is time to implement the plan on the ground. The fedpol officer contacts the Graubünden cantonal police and soon contingency plans for Guaidó's every move are in place. In a situation like this it is imperative to keep calm, even though the Annual Meeting's opening address is less than 24 hours away.

From Zurich to Davos

On the banks of the frozen Lake Davos things begin to rotate. Helicopter upon helicopter lands in the high-security zone before taking off again a short time later to Zurich airport, where most of the WEF guests will be arriving.

On Tuesday morning, all seven landing strips are occupied. The president of the United States – POTUS, for short – has just touched down in Zurich. It only became clear shortly before Air Force One arrived in Switzerland whether the president's helicopter can take off for Davos. It can. The weather forecast* is good. Marine One, which is carrying the president, is escorted by further US helicopters and by Super Puma helicopters of the Swiss Armed Forces. Besides special units from the Swiss police, a fedpol officer is also on board the presidential helicopter.

Details outside

As soon as Donald Trump steps onto the snow in Davos, a particularly critical phase begins. The president is driven to the hotel in a motorcade. Everything has been meticulously planned, from hotel security and the number of bodyguards, down to the formation of the convoy and eventualities

such as roadblocks.

As is usual for visits by heads of state, a fedpol officer has spent the last few weeks coordinating every last detail with Swiss police officers and foreign security staff. Everything goes according to plan. There are no incidents on the drive to the hotel and POTUS arrives in his hotel room punctually.

Details inside

Back at the accreditation centre there is tension in the room beside the fedpol bureau. Security staff from the Pakistan delegation confer with police officers and with fedpol's police analyst. Close protection officers from various cantonal police services are also present.

The Pakistan security staff listen to the analyst's report. A group from Geneva is calling on people via social media to protest against the visit to Davos by the Pakistani prime minister and foreign minister. The Swiss police are prepared for possible protest actions.

Once again, the fedpol officers display skill and sensitivity, assuring the foreign security staff of everyone's cooperation. They discuss the agenda items and the transport routes of the two high-level guests with their bodyguards, as well as other security-related aspects.

Until the next call

It is evening by the time everything has been arranged. The Congolese delegation has long since been accredited and everything is in place for Guaidó's visit. Outside, the two fedpol officers breathe a sigh of relief. But, before the condensation of their breath vanishes completely in the cold air, a mobile phone rings again.

On the ground in Davos, Chur and Zurich


For the 2020 World Economic Forum Annual Meeting fedpol carried out 289 person-related risk assessments and defined appropriate security measures on this basis. The

measures were implemented successfully under the lead of the Graubünden cantonal police and based on the various police agreements, and also with the support of further cantonal police services and the Zurich

municipal police.

During the WEF week, fedpol analysts also work collaboratively with the Graubünden cantonal police to assess the general security situation in Switzerland. It forwards this and other information to the

National Police Command of the Conference of Cantonal Police Commanders, thus ensuring the flow of information between the federal and cantonal authorities.






fedpol, more than just police

In Switzerland, law and order are primarily the responsibility of the cantons. In our globalised world, however, crime knows no borders. Indeed, crime is becoming increasingly complex, often affecting several cantons and frequently assuming an international dimension.

Against this backdrop, fedpol, as Switzerland's national police agency, plays a key role. It coordinates, analyses and investigates complex cases involving serious crime. And it provides vital infrastructures. Hence, fedpol is at the heart of policing in Switzerland and is the nexus to the country's international partners.

Our mission:



Our values:

1
EXEMPLARY –
WE LEAD BY EXAMPLE.

2
COMMITTED –
PASSION IS THE TRADEMARK
OF OUR WORK.

3
TOGETHER –
DIVERSITY IS OUR STRENGTH.

4
RELIABLE –
YOU CAN DEPEND ON US.

5
DYNAMIC –
WE FIND ANSWERS.

6
RESPONSIBLE –
WE MAKE THE RIGHT DECISIONS
AT THE RIGHT LEVEL.


Our figures:

Budget

266

million francs

Male: 615 (63.2 %)
Female: 358 (36.8 %)



Employees

973

Language distribution in %:

German	74.6
French	18.6
Italian	6.6
Romansh	0.2



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fedpol

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