




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Federal Department of Justice and Police FDJP
Federal Office of Police fedpol

annual report fedpol 2018





A game of cat and mouse

Have you ever Googled yourself? Are you aware of the digital footprints you leave behind? We're all the same – glued to our mobiles, replying to WhatsApp messages from our teenagers between meetings, lost without GPS, and glad to be able to pay our bills from the comfort of our living rooms without having to go to the post office or bank like we used to.

Our world is digital, and this benefits everyone, including criminals. They take advantage of the digital world to rip us off, to communicate with one another using encrypted messaging services, to traffic arms, drugs and other goods, to launder the illegal proceeds of their criminal activities, and to finance terrorism.

And like us, they leave tracks. To such an extent in fact that digital traces now constitute the vast majority of evidence in our investigations. And this is fundamentally changing policing. From accessing digital information, collecting and analysing vast

quantities of data and managing it in an integrated manner in order to manage risk and define tactical priorities, to collaborating with police forces across the globe – the digital world flouts the territoriality principle specific to law enforcement.

In this game of cat and mouse, the necessary responses require staff, technical and financial resources, and new working methods. In terms of our federalist mindset, this means recognising that Switzerland is a single crime area without any cantonal borders and responding accordingly. And in our territorial way of thinking it means taking account of the fact that crime is becoming more international and that co-operation and the exchange of information also require the interoperability of IT systems.

Whether the leads are digital or conventional, police work always treads a fine line between protecting privacy and gathering information. How can we protect our privacy while providing the police with the means to

crack down on criminals? People reproach the police when they are unable to intervene in time to prevent terror attacks, like the one that occurred in Strasbourg before Christmas. Yet the myth of an all-knowing police force keeping tabs on the public like Big Brother persists, to the extent that people sometimes forget that the police are only interested in criminals and that their work is tightly regulated and monitored. Unlike private companies, which know much more about us thanks to the digital footprints we leave behind when using credit cards and loyalty cards or doing online searches.

So it's up to us to explain the work we do, to point out what we require, to ask for the necessary resources and to hire the right people so that we can continue to fight crime effectively – for the benefit of the whole of Switzerland.

Wishing you an enjoyable read.

Nicoletta della Valle, Director





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Carte blanche for Eva Rust

Instead of illustrating animals, plants and ghosts in the usual style of children's books, the illustrator, Eva Rust, has transformed our carte blanche into a nebulous search for clues on six double pages. Often digital, frequently abstract, sometimes doubtful, and only seldom obvious at first sight – like our cases before we set out on the scent. In our Annual Report you can follow the tracks of those who leave behind a trail and those who search for clues, using the same sophisticated means as the criminals themselves.

<http://www.evarust.ch/>



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Terrorism *A petty criminal opens fire at a Christmas market in Strasbourg, killing five people and seriously injuring eleven. How can we identify a person who has been radicalised? How do we deal with the threat these people pose? How do we prevent such a person from carrying out a terrorist act? This is the current challenge facing Swiss and European authorities – a challenge that is growing in view of the possible return of jihad fighters and their families.*

From petty criminal to terrorist

It is Tuesday evening when we receive the news. A man has fired into the crowd at a Christmas market in Strasbourg before fleeing the scene. The police rapidly establish his identity and trigger an alert throughout the Schengen area. Enquiries in Switzerland into his identity confirm that he is known to the Swiss police; not for being radicalised, but for multiple cases of petty crime, such as theft, burglary, damage to property and common assault. Besides a string of convictions in several cantons, he is also known to the German authorities for the same reasons. A

veritable career as a petty criminal, trying out different criminal activities but with one constant throughout: violence.

What could have led this repeat offender, with his rather unspectacular background, to become radicalised, to embrace a deadly ideology, and to fire on people at a Christmas market before ultimately being shot in the street by police?

The path of the young offender from Strasbourg is typical of many who become radicalised. And it raises questions for the authorities in all countries. What factors trigger radicalisation? How can

we identify it early on? What measures can we take to prevent radicalisation or rehabilitate those already radicalised?

Responding to this problem requires a multifaceted approach involving actors from all areas, such as the security services, the migration authorities and socio-educational services, at both cantonal and federal level. Various instruments already exist, others are in planning.

People who pose a threat to Switzerland

Switzerland follows a strict policy regarding foreign nationals who pose

| Entry bans | | | |
|------------|--------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| | Number | Terrorist related | Non-terrorist related |
| 2018 | 106 | 78 | 28 |
| 2017 | 150 | 140 | 10 |
| 2016 | 128 | 113 | 15 |
| Total | 384 | 331 | 53 |

| Expulsions (all terrorist related) | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------|----------|--------------------------|
| | Number | Enforced | Enforcement not possible |
| 2018 | 5 | 3 | 2 |
| 2017 | 13 | 11 | 2 |
| 2016 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Total | 19 | 14 | 5 |

Swiss jihad travellers under scrutiny

Who are the Swiss jihad travellers in the terrorist-related cases handled by fedpol?

Fedpol keeps a constant eye on each one. As investigations progress and information becomes available, the answer varies, but the

analysis reveals a few tendencies. Here is a snapshot of the Swiss jihad traveller.

13 December 2018 in Strasbourg: French soldiers patrol the closed-down Christmas market following a terrorist attack.



a threat to national security: if they are already in Switzerland they are expelled, if they are outside the country they are banned from entering. Fedpol makes consistent use of these possibilities.

But for Swiss nationals or people whose expulsion cannot be enforced because

there is a risk of their being killed or tortured on return to their country of origin (this has applied to five people since 2016, all Iraqi nationals), questions remain. How can Switzerland respond to the threat posed by their radicalisation? Can they be rehabilitated? How can we deal with the problem?

Addressing these issues becomes all the more urgent in view of the situation in Syria and Iraq. 'Islamic State' is losing ground, and many of its fighters and their families – including a few Swiss nationals and their children – are imprisoned in camps, some controlled by Iraqi or Syrian

forces, others by Kurdish rebels. If these people return to Switzerland, we have to deal with them too, in addition to the ones who have been radicalised but never left.

Hence the importance of having adequate measures and resources in place. Switzerland has a National Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (NAP). In addition to the NAP, legislation is being drafted on administrative police measures (see box) and will be submitted to Parliament in the course of 2019. And the Swiss Criminal Code is being revised to tighten penal provisions. These measures together make up a set of instruments that enable the authorities to respond appropriately on a case-by-case basis.

And because each case is different and requires an individual response, monitoring these people is an immense challenge for cantonal and federal law enforcement.

Who are they?

The analysis covers people involved in jihad-related police investigations or criminal investigations between May 2012 and the end of 2018. It concerns jihadists who travelled or wanted to travel to a conflict region, usually Syria or Iraq. Not all the cases analysed involved fighters; some involved people who accompanied fighters or who wanted to support 'Islamic State' or Al Qaeda in other ways (ideologically, logistically, etc.). Some involved people who never left Switzerland or who left and came back. Others cases again involved people who have probably been killed, are still fighting or are imprisoned in the battle zone.

From all over Switzerland

The first thing we discover is that jihad travellers come from all over Switzerland. The geographical distribution of those analysed corresponds more or less to the linguistic distribution of the population: nearly two-thirds come from the German-speaking part of the country, more than one-third comes from the French-speaking part, and

the rest come from the Italian-speaking part. The number of jihad travellers from urban centres and their agglomerations is significantly higher than from rural areas.

Age and gender

The overwhelming majority of jihad travellers from Switzerland are men (over 80%) between the ages of 20 and 54, whereby approximately one-quarter of these are younger than 25. The average age is 32.

Half are Swiss

Nearly one-half of the cases analysed involved Swiss nationals, whereby one-half of these were people with dual citizenship. Sixty percent of the cases analysed involved people who had been born abroad (first-generation immigrants). The information available indicated that most jihad travellers from this first-generation category had been radicalised in Switzerland.

Level of education

The level of education of those analysed was not always known. Among those for whom data is available, nearly one-fifth had received mandatory schooling only, some not even completing it. More than two-thirds had started an apprenticeship or had attended a vocational school, although half had not completed their training. A small proportion had studied at university; only two people had completed their bachelor degree, the rest had given up their studies.

At the time of their departure, around one-half of those analysed had either no work or no training.

Confession

In the cases analysed, nearly one-quarter of jihad travellers were converts to Islam, the rest had been Muslims since birth. The large majority had attended a religious place of worship (e.g. mosque, association).

Defining event and criminal history

At least one-half of those analysed had experienced a defining event in their life, including health problems, job loss, prema-

ture or abrupt end to their training, difficult family relationship, death in the family, serious accident or war in the country of origin.

At least one-third had a criminal record, especially for property offences, sex offences, drug offences or violent crime (bodily harm, domestic violence, aggravated theft, etc.).

Terrorism *In our connected world, criminals are no different from us in using digital technology. And just like us, they leave a trail behind – so much so that, nowadays, most of the evidence in any enquiry is digital in nature. Evaluating the enormous volume of data by means of targeted, integrated analysis is becoming a key challenge. Welcome to the world of ‘intelligence-led policing’.*

Terrorist propaganda amid big data

This is the case of a rather talkative internet user going on about his affinity for jihadist ideology. He likes sharing ‘Islamic State’ propaganda, including sermons and videos of prisoner executions. The Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) reports on the case at a meeting of TETRA CASE task force, a group founded by the FIS, the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland (OAG), cantonal police forces, and fedpol. The group meets weekly to discuss cases of jihadism in Switzerland. In the above case, the OAG decides to instigate criminal proceedings, and fedpol begins its enquiries. In the course of raids connected with the case, fedpol seizes a variety of digital material. Its computer forensics experts extract the data (emails, contacts, call logs, text messages, social network exchanges, etc.) and transmit it to the investigators and analysts concerned for examination. Hyper-connected criminals always try to cover their tracks by using a multitude of channels. To get some idea about the size of data involved: If eight electronic devices (mobile phones and tablets) are seized and eleven Facebook accounts

secured, they yield an enormous volume of data which must be analysed:

- 850 chats, or 130,000 lines in Excel
- 6,900 audio discussions
- 6,500 connections

This data will help the enquiry. The analysts will sift through it, classify it and analyse it with a primary objective in mind: to gather specific evidence that will corroborate the guilt of the suspect.

Big picture

Meanwhile, there is another analysis going on, following what is known as the intelligence-led policing approach. Based on the case described above, it aims to link the information that has been gathered with that obtained in other cases. The objective here is broader in scope. It is to uncover possible connections between the individuals who are the subject of ongoing enquiries, to identify possible networks, to find out whether or not the suspect has joined any jihadist group, and to pinpoint other potential persons of interest from a security perspective.

Switzerland is no island

In addition to this inter-operational analysis, information is regularly shared with Europol. Through fedpol liaison officers based at Europol, the data extracted by fedpol’s analysts can be added to that transmitted by other European police forces. These international contacts and networks are very valuable, because data collection does not stop at Switzerland’s borders. By exchanging information and conducting an integrated analysis, law enforcement authorities are able to understand the big picture. This type of analysis is based on the recognition that, nowadays, the police hold such a large volume of information that it is no longer possible to process it manually or individually. Combining data brings networks to light, enables the police to identify links between key figures, and permits a broader and fuller understanding of events. This comprehensive, integrated view gives rise to avenues of enquiry and tactical strategies which may enable early identification of a threat.

A rather full address book

In our case, the inter-operational analysis reveals that our amateur propaganda suspect is, indeed, involved in the jihadist scene. He is also in contact with some 20 individuals with links to other terrorist cases, at least four of whom are principal subjects in criminal proceedings. Some of these have also been connected with terrorist attacks. Such individuals move within jihadist circles in Switzerland and abroad. Thanks to this analysis, if they re-appear in connection with other cases, the security authorities will already be aware of their network and the key people around them, and will quickly be able to take the necessary action. This comprehensive analysis gives all of the partners concerned, from the OAG to the FIS and the cantons, the contextualised information they need to combat the terrorist threat more effectively.

Terrorism While some substances that can be bought off the shelf, such as acetone, hydrogen peroxide and nitrates, may seem harmless, for terrorists they are important pieces of kit. The bomb attacks carried out in Europe in recent years show the violence they can be used to unleash. The legislation that aims to restrict access to such substances by members of the general public will soon be debated in Parliament. Efforts to raise awareness among actors are paying off, and vendors are being extra vigilant to prevent such substances falling into the wrong hands.

Off-the-shelf bombs

When an unfamiliar male customer walks into a Graubünden pharmacy near the Austrian border asking for 1.5 litres of hydrogen peroxide at a concentration of 35%, the manager of the pharmacy does the right thing. She asks him some specific questions about the use of the substance and takes his contact details. The man in question, a German national, has come to Switzerland especially to buy the product, which is banned from sale in his home country. The man plausibly explains that he is a hunter and needs it to whiten horns. The pharmacist sells him the product but contacts fedpol shortly afterwards to report the transaction, so that all the necessary checks can be made. As it happens, the case turns out not to be an issue.

Growing awareness among actors involved

Although anecdotal, this case is symbolic as Switzerland is currently an attractive market for these types of substances, some of which are banned in neighbouring

countries but still available over the counter in Swiss stores. The European Union regulated the use and sale of such substances back in 2014. Known as explosives precursors, they can be found in everyday products. Since there is a very real risk that Switzerland could become the place where terrorists come to stock up, the Federal Council opened a consultation on a draft bill to restrict access to precursors for individuals in late 2017 (see box).

At the same time, efforts have been made to raise awareness among industrial players about the possibility of reporting suspicious transactions or the loss or theft of explosives precursors to fedpol. Implementing these immediate measures allows pragmatic action to be taken. The sectors concerned – pharmacists, chemists, vendors in specialist shops – are now being extra vigilant.

And it is working. By the end of 2018, fedpol had received a total of 48 reports of suspicious transactions since the

immediate measures were implemented in 2016. Over a third of these required in-depth verification. Collaboration between fedpol and its partners – the cantonal police, the Federal Customs Administration and international authorities – has been stepped up.

In the case of the pharmacy in Graubünden, the pharmacist decided, following this suspicious transaction, to only sell such substances to her regular customers in future and to continue to inform fedpol of any suspicious purchasing requests.



Results of the consultation

The impact of regulation can already be seen in the European Union, starting with a change in manufacturers' products. Some manufacturers now make products that contain lower concen-

trations of explosive substances – which make them less attractive to terrorists. Another key factor is online sales: for example, a major supplier has reprogrammed its algorithms to prevent bomb makers from obtaining the perfect

ingredients to make explosives, and is working more closely with police authorities.

Between December 2017 and the end of March 2018, the Federal Council opened a consultation on a bill to restrict access to

explosives precursors by individuals. The consultation was well received, with 80% of those who responded in favour of the regulation. The Federal Council plans to submit a dispatch to Parliament during the course of 2019.





Criminal organisations Recent events – the arrest and extradition to Italy of a pair of masterminds in Ticino and the conviction of a mafia member by the Federal Criminal Court – have shown that the mafia are well and truly present in Switzerland. Improving the fight against criminal organisations requires an integrated approach that includes prevention work.

An organised network

It's mid-September 2018. The Italian Guardia di Finanza is finalising a three-year investigation involving 59 individuals and 92 companies throughout Italy. At the centre of the investigation are two brothers. The evidence against the pair is weighty. They are suspected of heading up a vast criminal organisation that engages in tax fraud through fictitious loans. Their activities have resulted in ill-gotten gains totalling 16 million Swiss francs. An arrest warrant is issued.

The Guardia di Finanza contacts fedpol for operational support as Italian police have established that the brothers have been staying in the canton of Ticino since July. On 20 September, their telephone calls are intercepted. There is talk of an imminent change of apartment. They also mention a code during these conversations: 2909. But what is it for? To unlock something?

The investigators set about identifying the person whose number received the phone call. It is registered to an apartment letting agency. The next day, there is

another conversation. The investigators are able to narrow down the perimeter where the apartment may be located. The focus is now on four buildings.

A field investigation

Field investigations reveal what the code 2909 is for. It is not to unlock a door, but to open a small safe behind a letterbox. The safe contains the keys to an apartment, which have yet to be collected. Surveillance is set up in the neighbourhood. A few minutes later, a man enters the building. His physical characteristics – in particular his 1.9 metre frame – specifically match the profile of one of the brothers. Fedpol passes all the information on to the cantonal police in Ticino.

On 22 September, police officers arrest the two brothers. When raiding their apartment, they seize around twenty smartphones, bank account numbers, credit cards and various bank documents. On 25 September, the brothers are extradited

to Italy. The co-operation between the Italian and Swiss authorities on the one hand, and between the federal and cantonal authorities on the other is exemplary. This joint approach helps to strengthen the fight against organised crime involving bosses who operate across national borders.

'Ndrangheta operating in Switzerland

Fighting organised crime is a priority for fedpol. Its strategy is based on three pillars, one of which is co-operation. It also requires investigative work. This is the second pillar in fedpol's strategy.

In November 2018, the Federal Criminal Court sentenced an Italian national living in the canton of Bern. The individual in question, a close associate of 'Ndrangheta clan bosses from the Milan region, was charged with organising the guarding of vast cannabis plantations on behalf of a Swiss trafficker – a business operation worth over a million Swiss francs. Because of repeated attempts by thieves to steal the



RUSSIAN MAFIA
 Money laundering

BALKAN MAFIA
 Albanian-speaking groups: **Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro**
 Trafficking of drugs, humans and arms
 Slavic groups: **Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina**
 Drug trafficking, property crimes (robberies, e.g. Pink Panthers), cigarette trafficking, possession of stolen goods, contract killing)

ITALIAN MAFIA
 Calabria
'Ndrangheta
 Campania
Camorra
 Sicily
Cosa Nostra
 Puglia
Various clans
 Drug trafficking, money laundering, arms trafficking, extortion, murder, sex trafficking, logistical support for criminals and their families.

merchandise, people were hired to secure the plantation. Among them were two armed members of the Calabrian mafia. This had caused unease in the region.

A number of arrests had already been made in connection with this case back in November 2007. In 2009, the trafficker was sentenced to two years in prison. But the evidence continued to mount and led investigators back to the individual who hired the armed men to oversee the plantation. The individual in question, a member of the 'Ndrangheta, had held frequent meetings with senior figures in the organisation to smuggle arms. During its investigations for the Office of the Attorney General, fedpol amassed evidence that eventually resulted in his conviction for involvement in and assisting a criminal organisation.

As with all forms of crime, cracking down on criminal organisations means nothing if it is not backed up by preventive action. This is the third pillar in fedpol's strategy.

It is 1pm on 13 November 2018 in a classroom at the offices of FEDRO – the Federal Roads Office – in Ittigen near Bern. "Does everyone have a price?", a crime prevention officer from fedpol asks. In front of him, a group of around ten employees involved in awarding public contracts are taking part in a course on ethics and corruption in awarding public tenders. This is a course that fedpol has given at several offices within the Federal Administration. It uses real-life, anonymised examples to raise awareness of the issues at stake.

'A victimless crime'

When criminal organisations infiltrate government structures, the results can be devastating. "It's a crime without

victims ... apart from the people who pay their taxes," says one participant. Corruption obviously results in a loss of public money and hinders innovation, but more than that, it destroys confidence in the rule of law and public institutions. It creeps up stealthily, using as bait little gifts without consideration. Sooner or later something is expected from the recipient in return. It is only then that the victim becomes the criminal, opening the floodgates to nepotism and cronyism.

"In 2004 it was estimated that a trillion dollars a year were paid in bribes and corruption across the world," the fedpol officer explains. "That's twice Switzerland's GDP, or enough to fund the International Committee of the Red Cross for a millennium. Or the equivalent of NATO's annual military spending. And we can assume that figure has increased since."

It's an insidious phenomenon based on trust. "After a few years, if an employee does a good job, their boss might stop looking so closely at what they're doing," the officer explains. "A certain relationship can then develop between the person awarding public contracts and the person who frequently provides services."

The participants are therefore encouraged to think about their own responsibilities. "I've been invited on a ski weekend with my former company," one participant explains. "This company often receives contracts from FEDRO. But I'm paying for the weekend out of my own pocket. Is that a problem?" In this case, the participant should inform her line manager. In fighting corruption, transparency and double checking are two of the best lines of defence.

The three pillars of fedpol's strategy to tackle criminal organisations

PREVENTION

- › Recognise through strategic analyses
- › Raise awareness through training
- › Prevent through administrative police measures

CO-OPERATION

- › Obtain, evaluate and exchange information
- › Implement new legal instruments

REPRESSION

- › Analyse hierarchies, structures, roles and synergies
- › Investigate
- › Systematically prosecute

Economic crime *As the motto of every police force goes: crime mustn't pay. Especially when large sums of money are involved. From real estate and luxury cars to business investments – fedpol tracks down the assets of foreign criminals in Switzerland. Working with the CARIN network, it helps prosecutors in Switzerland and abroad trace the proceeds of crime.*

A flashy lifestyle in the south

A man in his mid-forties with blonde, shoulder-length hair, and a short-haired man in his mid-twenties. The former is a man of independent means, the latter an entrepreneur. Two colleagues from a Baltic state looking to make a fortune in nearby Scandinavia. The unlikely pair set up various companies in the far north and, using a falsified banking licence from their home country, embark on an investment fraud scheme. The victims are easy to find, and the assets are siphoned off and sent abroad. But the police in both countries quickly become wise to their plan. In fact, the story could almost have ended there. But a key question remains unanswered: where have they hidden all that money?

At fedpol a new email pops up: a CARIN request from the Baltic country in question

(see box 1). The request explains that the pair are accused of fraud for commercial gain and money laundering. It asks fedpol to ascertain what assets they hold in Switzerland. Only one thing is clear so far: the two suspects have settled in Ticino. The search for clues begins.

Chasing the sun

It stands to reason that not only do the pair live in sunny Ticino, they must also have used their financial cushion to acquire a property or plot of land there. So have they? This is the first question that fedpol investigators set out to answer. From fedpol's headquarters they send out requests for administrative mutual assistance to various land registers in Sottoceneri. With over 300 throughout Switzerland and no

central registry, this requires research and experienced investigators to select and contact the right one. And there is still a risk of missing something. But the search is successful: the two suspects own four properties – high-end apartments, penthouses and a condominium at a top location.

Asset tracing is a team effort and co-operation with our partners is indispensable. The documents from one of the property sales reveal that the younger man hired a fiduciary. Is she acting as a front? On this point the input from our colleagues from the cantonal police in Ticino is once again worth its weight in gold. They have new evidence that can shed light on the case, and it turns out that the woman has no criminal record.

Fedpol investigators then start searching for the suspects' companies. Online



searches and the commercial register deliver two matches: the older man holds shares in an investment firm and in a café. And what does every fraudster have as well as a nice house? A nice car. Which means the next stop for fedpol is the cantonal driver and vehicle licensing office. Again, the search is successful: two luxury cars are registered under the names of the two suspects. But criminals aren't exactly known for registering all their property by the book. So for fedpol the initial computer work is done. Now it's time for the investigators to head down to Ticino and see for themselves.

Trust is good, but control is better

The investigators take a look around the home of the two suspects for further indications of wealth. And they find more luxury cars that are registered to a foreign firm belonging to the suspects. But the assets are not the only thing the investigators are interested in. They also want to know where the pair are, whom they are meeting and the circles they are moving in. Meanwhile, a new figure enters the scene: the father of the younger suspect. But he seems mainly to be chasing the sun and is not involved in any illegal business. So the work of the fedpol investigators on the southern side of the Alps is done for now on and they can make their way back to Bern.

Back in Bern, the investigators analyse the extensive enquiries. The assets of the two suspects officially total just under three and a half million euros. But unofficially the figure is almost twice that as the investigators are not allowed to pass on everything they find to their Baltic counterparts, only what is legally permissible. For example, the suspects' bank account details remain concealed; the only way to shed some light on this is through mutual legal assistance (see box 2). Fedpol passes on the other findings to the requesting authority in the Baltic.

Fedpol's work is done. Now it's the turn of the judiciary. Proceedings against the two suspects for money laundering and fraud for commercial gain are under way in their home country.

Successful asset hunting

Unlike the other police channels, the Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network (CARIN) is an informal network that has brought together law enforcement and judicial practitioners and specialists in asset recovery since 2004. Switzerland has been a member since the beginning and helps ensure that assets from economic crime can be traced more effectively thanks to improved networking and co-operation. CARIN has 54 member states and is linked to five other asset recovery networks (ARINs) all over the world. It allows over 150 countries and organisations worldwide to share information about criminal assets and proceeds of crime, and uses this information to prepare requests for mutual legal assistance and other measures.

The single point of contact (SPOC) for CARIN in Switzerland is fedpol. The three-member team at fedpol handles requests from other countries and sends requests to other countries on behalf of the cantons.

Asset recovery in a roundabout way

The fedpol investigators are not allowed to pass on all the information they find to the authorities of the requesting state. This includes bank account details and tax information. If the requesting authorities want access to such information, they must submit a request for mutual legal assistance. The same applies to asset freezing, seizure, confiscation or repatriation. Such proceedings usually take several years.

Counterfeit money In a dimly lit bar or under the feeble light in a taxi, a counterfeit 50-franc note can easily go unnoticed. These are just two ways in which counterfeit banknotes may come into circulation. Their journey from purse to wallet is sometimes a long one. An observant bank clerk will seize a counterfeit and send it to fedpol. The search is then on for the forger.

Counterfeits in the basement

This is the story of the largest **counterfeit money** scam in Switzerland in recent years. It begins with the discovery of a forged 200-franc note in the branch office of a bank in the canton of Vaud.

The trail gets warmer

The case really gains momentum when the cantonal police of Valais arrest a man

suspected of uttering forged 50-franc and 200-franc notes. The counterfeits in question fit a string of forgeries that have appeared repeatedly throughout the French-speaking part of Switzerland in the preceding months – the first time around 18 months previously in the said branch office of the aforementioned bank in the canton of Vaud.

When the cantonal police of Valais spring into action fedpol has already established a '**counterfeit class**'. This is where seized counterfeits are classified according to the same forged features, such as serial numbers or other specific **security features**. In the case above, specialists from fedpol's Counterfeit Currency Central Office have to date attributed 1,412 spec-



imens with a face value of 182,660 Swiss francs to the same class. At this point in our story, however, little is known about the origin of the counterfeit notes; those questioned seldom remembered how they came into their possession. But the arrest in Valais gives the investigators a lead.

A colour copy machine in the basement

The man who is arrested reveals information about a certain person who is forging bank notes in the basement of a building. Based on his statements and further police inquiries, the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland decides to open criminal proceedings against the main suspect for manufacturing and uttering counterfeit money. Federal and cantonal investigators close in on a petty criminal who besides being involved in drugs trafficking is apparently also engaged in another illegal activity to finance his lifestyle.

The main suspect repeatedly utters forged banknotes that fit the same class of forgeries. He is also in regular contact with two people who help him manufacture and, in particular, put into circulation the counterfeits. Their use of code words during telephone calls leaves the investigators and the Attorney General's Office in no doubt about what they are up to. The Attorney General's Office orders a house search, and the main suspect is arrested and questioned. During a search of the prem-

ises, officers find in the basement a copy machine, a stamp, tweezers, suspicious bottles and powder, and specimen banknotes.

Trace DNA as evidence

Specialists from the University Center of Legal Medicine in Lausanne discover trace DNA from the main suspect under the Kinegram®* of some of the counterfeits seized over the preceding months. During questioning the suspect fights back in vain against the overwhelming evidence. One of his accomplices, on the other hand, co-operates with the investigators, invariably refuting the suspect's testimony: for example, he states that paper the suspect purchased was not intended for compiling CVs, but explicitly for manufacturing counterfeit money. The Federal Supreme Court ultimately convicts the main suspect to a custodial sentence of 52 months.

*The Kinegram® is positioned in the middle of the 100-franc note. It is a two-dimensional, foil-based security feature illustrating the value of the banknote.

Counterfeit money extremely rare in Switzerland

In comparison to other countries, counterfeit Swiss banknotes are extremely rare. This is because they are forgery-proof and the market for Swiss francs is small. Forging euros or US dollars, on the other hand, is much more attractive for counterfeiters because the market for these two currencies is much larger.

The value of counterfeit money circulating in Switzerland each year has remained more or less stable since 2006. The sum of all currencies is 4-5 million francs, and half a million Swiss francs. This is a moderate amount compared with a total of 72 billion francs in circulation as a whole.

Security features

Swiss banknotes are very secure against forgery. You can find out more about the security features of the current eighth and ninth banknote series on the website of the Swiss National Bank (www.snb.ch). The latest series of Swiss banknotes contains 16 security features.

Counterfeit class

Forged banknotes from the same source, i.e. the same counterfeiter, can be attributed to a particular 'counterfeit class'. Classification is based on an analysis of the forgery techniques used, and the reproduction of specific features of the genuine bank note (e.g. serial number), which the forger uses as a template.

Cybercrime Money making scams have been around forever, but due to the internet they are no longer limited to a certain geographical area. Fraudsters can reach countless victims in just a few clicks. This poses fresh challenges for law enforcement. The only way to tackle these challenges is through national and international co-operation. Any resemblance to real-life cases is not coincidental.



Caught in a web



1

Philippe is not as careful as he should be. On a dating site he is contacted by a stunning brunette. Admittedly there are some spelling mistakes and inconsistencies in what she says ... but he is touched by her story. And he's simply blown away by her photos!

2

She tells him she loves him, that he's her only hope. His heart is racing and he believes her.
She sends him intimate photos and he sends her some back.
She asks him to send her 2,000 francs.
He transfers the money and she asks for more. And more again.
"If you don't, I'll send your photos to all your contacts!"
Philippe panics and pays up.

3

A bit too late, Philippe looks for information online.
From what he reads on police prevention sites he realises he has been the victim of a scam.
There are many different types of scams: fake online shops, advance fee fraud on property or vehicles, fake requests for help ...
He is encouraged by the websites: "Have you been the victim of a scam? There's no need to be embarrassed! Contact your nearest police station!"



4

So Philippe goes to his nearest police station to report the case and provide the police with all the information they need.
Despite the investigation, he'll probably never see his money again.
But by reporting the crime, he is helping the police advance their investigations.



5



The police officer conducts a preliminary inquiry and draws up a report. Police and public prosecutors from all over Switzerland meet regularly and share their findings. All the data are compiled and analysed with

the help of a computer-based tool. The aim is to identify links between different offences and hence to understand the modus operandi behind them. Philippe is not the only one to have fallen into the clutches of the beautiful brunette....from

Geneva and Neuchâtel to Fribourg, Lucerne and Lugano: police discover a common modus operandi in a whole spate of cases reported throughout Switzerland.



MINI CYBER GLOSSARY

Cyber prevention

Cyber prevention encompasses all the awareness-raising measures aimed at the public, small and medium-sized enterprises and critical infrastructures to protect against cyber threats. Cyber prevention activities are carried out by MELANI, the cantonal police forces and Swiss Crime Prevention (SCP).

Cyber security

Cyber security covers all the technologies, processes and good practices that are designed to protect networks, computers and data from attacks, damage and unauthorised access. When cyber security fails, cyber threats can arise and crimes can be committed.

Cyber crime

Cyber crime is a form of crime that uses digital instruments to achieve its goals. It covers offences committed with the aid of internet technologies (technical component, e.g. malware, Trojan horses) and offences that use the internet as a means of communicating or storing illicit content (social component, e.g. scams).

Cyber defence

Cyber defence is the use of information and communication technologies in armed conflicts between states. In Switzerland it falls under the jurisdiction of the army and primarily comprises the protection of military infrastructure.

Cyber intelligence

Cyber intelligence aims to identify the cyber threats to a country's critical infrastructure. In Switzerland it is carried out by the Federal Intelligence Service (FIS).

Fedpol passes on the result of these analyses to Europol via its police attaché in The Hague who specialises in cybercrime. The data are combined with data from other European countries and analysed during the weekly JCAT (Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce) meeting.

Bingo! Victims similar to Philippe are identified in Belgium, France, Germany and Denmark. In each case, the modus operandi is the same. And in each case the source of the crime is the same.


6



As the case involves several countries, a joint investigation team is set up by all the police forces in the countries concerned so that the investigations can be co-ordinated effectively. The police report the offending dating site to the web hosting company so that it can take measures to remove it. Thanks to the information pooled from all the countries involved, the Danish team is able to technically identify the IP addresses of several criminals suspected of being part of the same network. The source is traced to Sofia. The Bulgarian police join the investigation team and thanks to information sharing are able to locate and arrest the culprits. Philippe won't get his money back but the network is dismantled.



7



Humantrafficking Like many victims of human trafficking in Switzerland, Leila*, who was sexually exploited, might have remained invisible. Yet her tragic story took a turn that allowed her to be recognised and protected. She is now in a safe place, but she hopes that one day her abusers will pay for what they put her through. The story of a young woman representative of too many in Switzerland.

The great escape

Leila hugs her two-year-old son close. She has not been able to hold his innocent little body for several months. She feels a love and affection that she had forgotten, having had to hand her own body over to strangers, like a commodity. A prostitute, she left Hungary to work in Switzerland, where she thought she would find a better quality of life and be able to earn more money. In a corner of the room where she is meeting her son is the man who watches her constantly. It is the same man who, a few months earlier, had promised her things were better in Switzerland and convinced her to leave her son in Hungary with relatives until she had established a new life. The penny dropped a week after Leila arrived in Basel. She was trapped. The

man who was supposed to help and protect her began to abuse her. He now decides everything for her – her hours, how much time she should spend with a client, the services she should offer, her price and her place of work. And he collects the money she earns. He also decides if and when she can see her son. And yet she could barely imagine the ordeal that was still to come.

Escape for survival

Leila lives in hell for several months, prostituting herself on the street in Switzerland under the close eye of her pimp. Each and every act or gesture is spied upon, day and night. Leila is able to see her son, however, as her pimp arranges for her to return home for a few days. Was it this brief interlude

which gave her the strength to get out of her situation? Upon returning to Switzerland, Leila flees to what seems like a safer place – a bar in another canton where she is able to work freely. But the respite is short-lived.

"A man has been attacked in the street. He was accompanied by a woman known as Leila T. She has been abducted in a Swiss-registered vehicle belonging to a man called C.D." This initial brief report from the Basel cantonal police marks the start of fedpol's co-ordination work in this case. The car owner is known to the police in both Switzerland and Austria. The cantonal police forces concerned are contacted so that key information can be shared. The police attaché in Prague, who holds accreditation for Hungary, is

also alerted. He contacts the various foreign authorities. They have one aim – to find Leila.

Abducted and drugged against her will

A few days after escaping her pimp, Leila is contacted via Facebook by a young woman she had worked with in Basel, who says that she, too, wants to escape and join her. The bar owner is willing to employ Leila's old colleague. All three of them are to meet at the nearby railway station. On the way there, Leila and the bar owner are violently attacked. Despite the owner's shouts of warning as he lies on the ground, three men drag Leila into a vehicle and flee the scene. Drugged against her will, Leila loses consciousness. They drive to a brothel, where the three men carry Leila to a room and rape her.

Finding the son

When the police find Leila at the brothel, the perpetrators are already on the run, leaving the vehicle behind. Hearing Leila's story, the police realise that her child must be found urgently. He is being held with relatives of the pimp, and there is a genuine risk that the suspects will use him to exert pressure on Leila, or even harm him. Via its police attaché, fedpol briefs the Hungarian authorities about the child and shares information about the fugitive perpetrators. The third suspect is identified. Several days after Leila's abduction, her son is located, but he is still with the perpetrators' family. At fedpol's insistence, via the police attaché, the child is taken to a secure location. Meanwhile, fedpol is co-ordinating contact between the cantonal judicial authorities and FIZ, a non-governmental organisation. The role of an NGO like FIZ, which provides advocacy and support for migrant women and victims of trafficking, is to take care of the victim, protect her, and help her to return to a sta-

ble life. The victim is then able to exercise her rights and say if she wishes to testify against her abusers. Based on her statement, the police will be able to investigate and to arrest the perpetrators, who will be prosecuted and convicted. That is why close co-operation between the police and the NGO is so important.

A reality in Switzerland

This tragic story has a name: human trafficking. It is a reality in Switzerland. Confronted by cross-border crime, co-operation between authorities is vital. Fedpol (see box), the cantonal police forces, the judicial authorities and non-governmental organisations collaborate closely between each other within Switzerland, as well as internationally via police attachés, Europol and INTERPOL. The greatest challenge that the authorities face is to identify the victims. These women – most of whom originate from Eastern Europe, although some also come from countries such as Nigeria, China or Thailand – are recruited by criminals with the false promise of a better life. They live a life in fear of reprisals, and are exploited, threatened and extorted. They dare not speak out or make any formal complaint. They lose all powers of self-determination and remain invisible in our society.

In Leila's tragic case, intensive co-operation work, and the ties between fedpol and victim support organisations and foreign authorities, were able to give Leila an identity and a dignity, at least to some extent. Her abuser and his accomplices are still on the run, for now. They are flagged in the SIS for human trafficking. The third individual, who was involved in the abduction, the attack on the bar owner and Leila's rape, has been arrested and convicted. Fedpol continues to pursue the case. Now in a safe place, Leila will be able

gradually to rebuild her life while remaining protected. She has been able to speak by phone to her son, who is also in a safe location. Perhaps, one day soon, she will be able to hug him close once again.

*Name changed

The work of fedpol

Fedpol is committed to combating human trafficking, offering a pragmatic, multi-disciplinary response to this form of cross-border crime. It liaises between the actors concerned, and ensures co-ordination and a plan of action aimed at identifying and protecting the victims, and prosecuting the perpetrators. During 2018, fedpol joined Europol and cantonal police partners in three European action weeks targeting sexual exploitation, forced labour and child trafficking. Since 1 July 2018, the Special Unit to Combat Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling (HTMS) has been part of fedpol's National Crime Prevention Division, which allows law enforcement to harness synergies and respond flexibly to trafficking.






International co-operation *Cross-referencing important information that different countries hold about dangerous criminals should really be child's play. The reality for Europe's police forces is rather more complicated. At present, a police officer looking for information must consult several individual systems. In the future, interoperability will mean that the police can expose criminals with multiple identities with just the click of a mouse.*

Catching criminals by mouse click



1 Alexandre B. is currently in Switzerland. He commits several crimes. His criminal record includes drug dealing.



2 Alexandre has committed his crimes in a number of cantons and is known to various police forces. He also has an entry in the national RIPOL database.



3 As a Nigerian national, he must return to his home country. He is the subject of an entry ban that Switzerland has entered in the Schengen Information System (SIS), a database containing information on persons who are wanted, missing or undesirable, as well as on vehicles and property being sought throughout the Schengen Area. He is not permitted to return to Switzerland, or to enter the Schengen Area at all.



4 A few weeks later, an individual by the name of Robert T. applies for a Schengen visa at the Finnish embassy in Nigeria.

In the future, with interoperability, Robert T. will be recognised as Alexandre B. He will be identified as a dangerous criminal who is banned from entering the Schengen Area because of the various crimes he has committed.

Interoperability tightens the security net

Interoperability connects a number of different information systems, so that the shared European Search Portal (ESP) can be used to cross-reference crucial information. In addition to the SIS and VIS, the portal will also connect to Eurodac, a

central database containing the fingerprints of asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants.

In the future, immigration authorities will be able to access even more systems. The EES (Entry-Exit System) will provide Schengen states with precise information on where and when a third-country national enters and leaves the

Schengen Area. And the ETIAS (European Travel Information and Authorisation System) will be used to issue entry permits for the Schengen Area to those third-country nationals who do not require a visa. It works along the same lines as the US ESTA system.



The officer at the Finnish embassy enters Robert T.'s identity and his fingerprints in the Visa Information System (VIS), a database containing information about visas issued by Schengen states, which enables them to share data about short-term visas.



There is no particular flag about Robert T. in the VIS database. He thus receives his visa and takes a flight to Finland.



Having arrived in Finland, Robert T. is able to move freely around the Schengen Area. He travels to France, close to the Swiss border, where he meets a man who also has a record of drug-dealing.

Today, the story ends here. The police will never discover that Robert T. is, in reality, Alexandre B. Despite being banned from entering Switzerland and the Schengen Area, this criminal has slipped through the security net.



The officer at the Finnish embassy enters Robert T.'s identity and his fingerprints in the VIS database.



With a few clicks in the shared search portal made possible by interoperability, the officer at the Finnish embassy checks all the available information systems, including the VIS and the SIS. He gets a match.



Thanks to his fingerprints, the individual is unmasked as someone banned by Switzerland from entering the Schengen Area. In reality, Robert T. is Alexandre B.



The Finnish embassy refuses to issue a visa. The individual, Alexandre B., is not able to travel to the Schengen Area.

Co-operation *Swiss police have had access to the Schengen Information System (SIS) for more than 10 years. Schengen has revolutionised police co-operation. Today, it is faster, more direct and more efficient. The figures speak for themselves: 19,000 matches in 2018 alone.*

Police without frontiers

The French police officer is astonished when he opens the boot of a black Mitsubishi at a petrol station in Paris and discovers 30 chainsaws inside. He enters the Swiss registration number into the Schengen Information System (SIS) and learns that the car was reported stolen and an international alert issued three hours earlier. A business in the canton of Obwalden specialising in vehicle construction and forestry equipment has been burgled in the night, and the burglars have also stolen a car from the same neighbourhood. This is just one of thousands of SIS matches since Switzerland has had access to the system.

Swiss security services consult the database more than 300,000 times every day, whether during investigations, a routine police check, or an identity check at the airport or border, or when searching for a missing person or an object, issuing a visa or processing an asylum request.

Preventing a child abduction and apprehending a killer

Checks at airports turn up numerous matches, as the following case illustrates:

The air tickets have been purchased and the luggage has been packed. But the journey ends at Munich airport's passport control. The previous evening a father has taken his two daughters from the apartment where they are living; he hints that he is taking them away and will not be returning. The children's mother notifies the cantonal police, who enter an alert in the SIS. Less than 12 hours later the father is arrested at Munich airport, shortly before leaving for Canada. The case is an impressive example of how fast and efficient searches throughout the Schengen area have become. Before the advent of Schengen, disseminating information took much longer. Today, thanks to the SIS, information reaches the right people on the ground fast. Without it, the man from Aargau would have departed for Canada with his daughters.


The SIS is not only indispensable for Swiss alerts abroad, but also for international alerts in Switzerland. For example, following the rape and murder of an au pair girl, the Austrian police enter an alert for a man they are searching for in connection with the crime. The SIS turns

up a match when, days after the murder, the man submits a request for asylum at the reception and procedure centre in Kreuzlingen. Or the case near the Lake of Geneva where, during a routine check, police officers catch a man wanted for rape: the man, a Belgian national, had settled in Switzerland shortly before.

Common European search area

Successful international searches, like those illustrated above, are not unusual these days. Since 14 August 2008, Switzerland has been part of a common European search area that stretches from the North Pole to Sicily. Once an alert is entered in the SIS database, the search is on through the whole of Europe.

Numerous Swiss authorities, including the cantonal police, the Border Guard, airport police and the migration authorities, can access the SIS directly and regardless of where they are, whether in the office or on patrol. The SIS is the heart of European police co-operation. Ten years of the Schengen Information System – a veritable success story.



What makes the SIS unique

The Swiss police use various police channels, such as INTERPOL or Europol. The SIS is not only the fastest and most direct channel, it also contains two categories of alerts that are unique: entry bans and covert surveillance. Three-quarters of all matches in 2018 concerned these two categories. They are especially useful in the fight against terrorism and illegal migration. What kind of cases are these categories used for?

Entry bans

A young man from the USA must leave Switzerland because he has committed an offence. He wants to go to Italy but he can't, because as a third-state national with an entry ban for Switzerland he is not permitted to enter any country in the Schengen area. In 2018, the SIS registered 5,455 matches in Europe concerning Swiss entry bans.

Covert surveillance

Where does the suspected terrorist go when he leaves France at the weekend, and who accompanies him? Answers to these questions help to further investigations. The number of matches concerning covert surveillance has risen significantly since the terrorist threat in Europe has increased. In 2018, Switzerland registered 4,129 matches with alerts issued by its international partners.





CSI fedpol Each person's DNA is unique and allows their unequivocal identification. This provides a real benefit for criminal prosecution. For more than 30 years, DNA analysis has been used to fight crime. Using it effectively depends on well-established procedures between fedpol, the cantonal criminal prosecution authorities and the DNA laboratories. But what does a DNA analysis look like?

The genetic trail

Working at the crime scene ...

Hair, fingernails, tissues or discarded cigarettes. Forensic officers arrive at the crime scene and seize any item that may contain DNA.

... or taking a DNA sample

The police order a buccal swab.

The analysis laboratory

The public prosecutor's office hands over the DNA sample to a DNA laboratory to compile a profile. In doing so, it hopes to identify the person who has left behind traces at the crime scene.

The analysis laboratory forwards the DNA profile to the Co-ordination Unit.

Co-ordination Unit

The Co-ordination Unit works on behalf of the Confederation and is located at the IFM Zurich. Here, DNA profiles are entered into the DNA database in anonymised form. The Co-ordination Unit compares new DNA samples with those already in the database and passes on the results of these comparisons to fedpol.

Who has left the traces?

- Trace DNA found at a crime scene does not necessarily belong to the person who has committed the crime. Trace DNA does not constitute evidence. It only shows that the person to whom it belongs has been in contact with an object at the scene of a crime. That is why until more is known about how a crime happened, law enforcement talks about 'a person who leaves behind a trace'.

The following Swiss-based analysis laboratories are recognised by the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP) and work collaboratively with law enforcement:

- Institute of Forensic Medicine Aarau
- Institute of Forensic Medicine Basel
- Institute of Forensic Medicine Bern
- Institute of Forensic Medicine St. Gallen
- Institute of Forensic Medicine Zurich
- University Center of Legal Medicine, Lausanne-Geneva (CURML)
- Laboratory of Molecular Diagnostics (LDM) in Ticino

DNA database

- The DNA Profiling Act has been in force since 2005. It regulates the use of DNA profiles in criminal proceedings and for identifying missing or unidentified persons. The profiles are stored in a national DNA database called CODIS, which is operated by the Co-ordination Unit. Information on the people or cases behind the DNA profiles is not contained in the same database. Only when there is a match can fedpol link the profile to the person or case.



Trace material is examined for DNA.

DNA – The human genome

Every human cell contains DNA, which is packaged in so-called chromosomes. A human being usually has 23 pairs of chromosomes, making 46 chromosomes in total. The pair of chromosomes determining gender comprises two X chromosomes in women, and an X and a Y chromosome in men. Maternal and paternal genetic material is contained in the 23 chromosome pairs of the nuclei. The random combination of nuclei therefore results in each person having their own unique genetic material. The exception to this are identical twins. A person's DNA profile is a specific combination of letters and numbers, extracted from the DNA using molecular biological techniques.

Familial search

If the law enforcement authorities do not find an exact match with a DNA sample, they can order a familial search. This means that they look in the database for genetic information indicating a close relative (parents, siblings, children, etc.) in the hope of identifying the perpetrator. The procedure is not regulated by the DNA Profiling Act, but has been carried out since October 2015 based on a court ruling.

The threads come together at fedpol

Match or no match? That is the question for fedpol. If a new DNA profile matches one already in the database, fedpol links the anonymised result to the respective person and case, and sends a report to the relevant police service or public prosecutor's office.

Investigation work

Police and public prosecutors compare the results of the DNA analysis with other findings (fingerprints, witness statements, interrogation records, etc.).

Four match combinations are possible:

- Trace–Person: the DNA profile of a sample taken from a crime scene is identical to the DNA profile of a person already registered in the database.
- Person–Trace: the DNA profile of a person matches a DNA profile already contained in the database.
- Trace–Trace: a DNA sample matches one found at another crime scene.
- Person–Person: two people registered in the database have the same DNA. This combination is only possible in the case of identical twins.

The future of DNA analysis Cases repeatedly come up in Switzerland where a DNA sample is taken from the scene of a crime but it does not bring law enforcement authorities any further in their search for the perpetrator of a crime. Thanks to a new scientific method, more than just a profile – and more than has been legally possible to date – can now be extracted from a DNA sample. Swiss policy makers want law enforcement to be able to use so-called ‘phenotyping’ in the future.

Does the culprit have green or blue eyes?

Emmen, Switzerland, 2015. On 21 July, a man drags a 26 year-old woman off her bicycle near Emmen on the River Reuss and rapes her. The victim suffers serious injuries and is left paralysed. Law enforcement officers find DNA traces of the suspect but no matches in the databases. Nor does a familial search turn up any leads. The law enforcement authorities of the canton of Lucerne summon 371 men to take a DNA test. To date, all efforts to find the culprit have come to nothing and the case remains unsolved. In January 2018, the public prosecutor’s office announced that all investigative approaches had been exhausted and work on the case was to be suspended for the time being.

Friesland, Netherlands, 1999. The 16 year-old Dutch girl, Marianne Vaatstra, doesn’t return home after a party. Her body is found the following day; before being killed she has been raped. Many people are quick to sus-

pect the occupants of a nearby asylum centre, and attacks on asylum seekers ensue. The public prosecutor orders phenotyping from the DNA sample. This is a method whereby the physical features of a person can be deduced from a sample of their DNA. The procedure shows that the perpetrator of the crime is a white, European male. Further clues lead the police to arrest the culprit – a Dutch farmer living near the scene of the crime. Following this case, the Netherlands pass a law explicitly allowing phenotyping and become a pioneer in the field.

The Swiss Parliament would like law enforcement authorities in Switzerland to be able to use phenotyping too. Current legislation does not provide a statutory basis for the method, however. The only visible feature that may be extracted from a DNA sample found at the scene of a crime is the person’s gender. After

the incident in Emmen, Albert Vitali, a national councillor from the canton of Lucerne, submitted a motion on phenotyping. The motion was accepted by Parliament and the Federal Council.

Genes reveal a person’s appearance

Determining a person’s gender is relatively easy through the presence or absence of the Y chromosome. The genetic composition determining the colour of a person’s hair or eyes is more complex however. For this reason, certain external features can only be determined with a more or less ascertainable probability.

If, in future, police and public prosecutors knew in all probability what the physical features of a wanted person were, their investigations and particularly the search for the culprit could be more focused. But how reliable are phenotype predictions?

Hair colour:

Prediction accuracy is 87 per cent for black hair and 75 per cent for other hair colours.

Skin colour:


Predictions are reliable for white or black skin, but less accurate for intermediate colours.

Eye colour:

Predictions on blue or dark-brown eyes are correct in 95–98 per cent of all cases, but less accurate for intermediate colours, such as light-brown, green or grey.

Status of legislative work

Fedpol is preparing a draft consultation paper on behalf of the FDJP and gathering information based on the experience of other countries that already use phenotyping in law enforcement. Switzerland is particularly interested in learning if and how other countries use the procedure, how reliable the various analysis methods are, and what the long-term benefits and costs of phenotyping are. At present, statutory provisions on phenotyping exist in the Netherlands, France and some US states.



A laboratory assistant examines the DNA profile of a suspect.

Age:

As we grow older the activity of certain genes changes. For the 20–60 age group, prediction accuracy has a mean deviation of 4–5 years. For younger or older people deviation is higher due to biological processes within the body.

Biogeographical ancestry:

The differences in the biogeographical ancestry of global populations are a consequence of mutation and selection. The result is that DNA contains characteristic features that can only be found in a specific region, or that occur very frequently in one region and very rarely in another. Reliable predictions are only possible for seven major regions (corresponding approximately to the continents).

Co-operation *A JU-AIR plane crashes in the canton of Graubünden at the beginning of August, killing 20 people. Numerous emergency services are deployed to deal with the disaster. Fedpol included.*

Operation Piz Segnas

It is an exhausting summer week for everyone, including fedpol's Operations Organisation. It begins with a serious incident involving a group of cyclists that has been attacked in Tajikistan. Four tourists, including a Swiss man, are killed. Then two further reports come in on the Saturday. Within hours of each other, two planes have crashed in Switzerland. The first crash involves a small plane near Hergiswil and claims four victims. A few hours later, 20 people die when a JU-52 comes down in the canton of Graubünden.

Chronicle of events

The message from the cantonal police of Graubünden reaches fedpol's Operations Centre at 5:58pm: a plane, probably a JU-52, has crashed near Piz Segnas. Emergency services, including several REGA and Swiss Air Force helicopters, are already on their way to the crash site. It is not known at this point how many casualties are involved. The cantonal police request a temporary flying restriction over the crash site.

Fedpol informs the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) and arranges the closure of airspace with the Federal Office for Civil Aviation (FOCA).

It is not yet clear whether any foreign passengers were aboard. As a precautionary measure, fedpol notifies the consular service of the Federal Department of

Foreign Affairs (FDFA) about the incident. Meanwhile, the cantonal police of Graubünden has its hands full. The name of the operation: Piz Segnas.

Fedpol contacts Skyguide and the airspace closure is communicated. The Italian police attaché enquires whether any Italians are involved in the accidents. But fedpol has no details as yet.

Ninety minutes after the first message, the cantonal police of Graubünden announces that there are no survivors. According to the passenger list, 17 passengers and 3 crew members were on board. It seems the aircraft was on its way to Dübendorf from Locarno. The cause of the crash is unclear.

The federal prosecutor responsible decides to visit the crash site on the following day. He is assisted by the on-call investigator from fedpol, who is on his way back from questioning a survivor of the Tajikistan attack. Meanwhile, rescue services at the scene have retired for the night.

Three Austrians are believed to have been on board. Fedpol notifies the Austrian police via INTERPOL and offers the head of operations from the cantonal police of Graubünden its support. In the same night, the Austrian authorities confirm the identities of the suspected Austrian victims and undertake to send fedpol the ante-mortem data.

Sunday morning, 6:45am. The fedpol investigator is on his way to Flims. The cantonal police of Graubünden request assistance from the DVI team (see box). Fedpol helps to mobilise the team swiftly.

A crisis centre is set up in Flims. It is agreed that fedpol is to be the sole liaison with the Austrian authorities.

The recovery of the victims is underway. The cantonal police of Graubünden is in touch with the victims' families. Fedpol collects the biometric data of the Swiss victims and carries out a quality control of the Austrian data, before transmitting them to the authorities in Graubünden. The remnants of the plane and items of luggage found at the scene are transported to a facility in Graubünden's Rhine Valley.

Sunday morning. The fedpol investigator and the federal prosecutor are on their way to the crash site by helicopter. A care team is on stand-by in Flims. There are several witnesses to the crash. The OAG, the cantonal prosecutor of Graubünden, and the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB) co-ordinate the investigation.

2pm. A large press conference takes place in Flims. Several countries ask fedpol about the identity of the victims. The Operations Centre discloses their nationalities.

'I was very grateful for fedpol's offer to liaise with the Austrian police and the Austrian Consulate in Switzerland. It is always much appreciated if a partner service proactively offers their support in such situations and takes care of one aspect of the operation. That means one less problem for me.'

Andreas Tobler, Head of Operations, Cantonal Police Graubünden



Identifying victims

The Swiss DVI team (Disaster Victim Identification) identifies the bodies of disaster victims. The team is deployed in Switzerland and abroad in particular if there is a high number of fatalities or if the human remains are difficult to identify (e.g. the coach crash in Siders in 2012, or the tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean in 2004). DVI Switzerland provides disaster relief organisations with criminal, medical and dental forensic specialists, and with investigators from municipal and cantonal police services as well as from fedpol. Fedpol crisis response and international identification officers are members of DVI Switzerland's core team. In the event of a disaster abroad with a link to Switzerland, fedpol assumes the management and co-ordination of all police tasks that ensue. The decision regarding deployment of the DVI team is taken in consultation with the DVI Switzerland Executive Board, located at the cantonal police of Bern.

DVI Switzerland collects data from victims, such as fingerprints, DNA samples, dental information, or details of scars or tattoos. These data, gathered after the victim's death (post-mortem data), are compared with data from before their death (ante-mortem data), such as fingerprints from biometric passports, DNA samples from relatives or dental records obtained from the victim's dentist. Dental records belong to the more enduring sets of data because they can provide invaluable information even in the event of a major disaster involving widespread devastation. And since more and more people today have a biometric passport, victims can be identified faster through their fingerprints. The unequivocal identification of victims is extremely important to relatives, who wish to have certainty about the fate of their loved ones as quickly as possible.





National co-operation *Football fans: within the ground, their singing and choreographed moves create a goose bump atmosphere. Yet outside, some of them literally run riot, directing violence against the police, opposing fans, and public buildings. Security services have instituted a new reporting system to analyse in detail the thin line between good and bad.*

Never walk alone

The arrival of the special train from Basel at 14:21 marks the start of the critical phase for the security forces in Lucerne. Around 600 FC Basel fans are planning to walk from the station to where the action really is – the Swissporarena, home ground of FC Luzern.

Recognised on the Kappel Bridge

Spotters – police officers familiar with the fan communities of both clubs – are watching events from some way away. Despite the biting cold, they are warm, having just been for a little walk around town.

It was prompted by a radio message just before the Basel train arrived. A restaurant manager has his doubts about a group of customers. When the Basel spotter sees the young men in the distance on the Kappel Bridge, he alerts his Lucerne counterpart. They are, indeed, Basel hooligans, and for the last three away games they've been identified in town ahead of the arrival of the special train. In Lucerne, as on other match days, they conduct themselves quietly

before joining the other fans a short time later for the walk to the ground.

Between the fronts

The crowd moves off in response to a signal that is lost among the noise. Almost immediately, the Basel fans spot the 'Zone5' Lucerne fan pub behind a line of police. Even on this cold Sunday morning, this brief glimpse of the 'opponent' becomes a source of tension. In Switzerland, this is the closest that opposing football camps ever get to each other. On this occasion, verbal sparring is as far as it goes. Stationed literally between the two hostile fronts, the police breathe a sigh of relief.

A 45-minute walk later, the fans reach the ground and enter without trouble. They are early at their allocated sector, and celebrate with choreographed moves as the players run out. During the 90 minutes of the match itself, they follow events on the frozen pitch intently. FC Luzern's security officer, the spotters and senior police officers retire to the warm control room

and use the break to sum up events so far and discuss the plan for the post-match phase.

Half-time discussions

When the half-time whistle blows, Lucerne's head spotter has already been outside for a while. He's meeting up with Fanarbeit Luzern, which provides services to the home team's supporters. Its representatives greet fans at the entrance to the home sector and provide them with important information – primarily the planned route that FCL fans will walk after the match. They also discuss the pre-match phase. The spotter explains that positioning the water cannon in front of the 'Zone5' pub was intended to have a preventative effect.

It's a worthwhile chat. After a fair 1:1 draw, the home fans walk the agreed route back to their favourite pub, where the rest of the evening passes off without incident. Meanwhile, the special train back to Basel passes by around 50 metres away, and disappears into a tunnel.



Co-operation

Take a look at the situation on the ground and one thing is very clear: security surrounding a match like this demands co-ordination between many different parties. This co-operation between authorities and the private sector at local, national and international level has been lent even greater weight by the new Council of Europe convention against violence at sporting events. The Federal Council adopted the revised convention in June 2018. It sets out a framework to enable the responsible cantonal and municipal authorities and private-sector bodies, such as sports clubs and transport firms, to prevent violence at sporting events more effectively.

In Lucerne, there is a visible police presence only at potential flashpoints such as the 'Zone5' fan pub. Otherwise, fans and security forces barely see each other. That is deliberate. The new convention rests on the three pillars of safety, security and service. Where the latter element is concerned, fans should feel welcome when attending an away match, not as though they are being treated as serious criminals. Entry into the ground follows the same principles, meaning that thorough searches of all spectators – and the long turnstile queues that result – are a thing of the past.

Reporting

In the days following the Lucerne–Basel match, fedpol receives reports from the Lucerne police hooliganism unit, Swiss Federal Railways (SBB) (including the transport police), and the Swiss Football League (SFL). All of these reports serve as a basis for a consolidated evaluation of the match, which then forms part of retrospective reporting on the overall situation in Swiss sport ('GSLS' reporting). Fedpol joined forces with the police sports coordination platform, PKPS, to launch this new tool for analysing violence at sporting events. It reflects the requirements of the revised convention, with the broad information it collates offering a comprehensive overview that is published once a year. The list of sporting events drawn from GSLS reporting is maintained within a fedpol IT application and replaces

the previous fedpol event list. The latter covered only those events that had been marred by violence, and was limited to the police evaluation alone.

The meeting between Lucerne and Basel on 25 November 2018 had been classified as a high-risk match, but was subsequently reported as a 'green' game in the statistics under the new system. In addition to events at the ground, the new assessment approach factors in what happens en route to the match, as well as the situation immediately outside the ground. It also considers that fan violence is increasingly spreading beyond the football ground itself into public spaces. Matches are classified as green, amber or red on the basis of a carefully balanced scoring system to avoid a general assessment.

Federal law enforcement Preparations for the move to Guisanplatz 1 in Bern are in full swing. But New Guisan is no ordinary administrative headquarters. In the form of fedpol, it will be home to a very special police force – an operational law enforcement authority which interviews suspects, processes sensitive data, and is on duty round the clock.

Under one roof

Constructed in a number of phases, Guisanplatz 1 is the federal government's largest construction project to date. Ultimately housing a workforce of 4,000, the first occupants – some 2,000 staff from fedpol, the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland (OAG), the Federal Office for Defence Procurement (armasuisse), and the Federal Office for Civil Protection (FOCP) – will move into three buildings from mid-2019 onwards. The project is being overseen by the Federal Office for Buildings and Logistics (FOBL). Most of the current fedpol premises in Bern will be vacated. Fedpol and the (OAG) will then move in to the same building, bringing the federal government's law enforcement authorities in Bern under the same roof for the first time.

Out of the ordinary

The lights never go out here. Even while the surrounding neighbourhood sleeps, fedpol continues to keep Switzerland safe. That's because fedpol is a police force – the federal government's police force. It is a police force which investigates crime, protects people and buildings, questions suspects, and operates police systems. It is in constant contact with other police forces at home and abroad. And it has its own armed personnel, shift schedules, and official vehicles.

The particular work of fedpol demands the very special sort of premises that are being built at Guisanplatz in Bern. Stringent security requirements are a particular point of focus that are reflected not only in the architecture and interior fittings, but also in the complex's regimented access controls. All of the networks and databases, with their sensitive content, as well as staff who handle the most serious of crimes, require special protection in the interests of the cases they are investigating.

Failsafe

The Breitenrain district of Bern will be at the heart of national and international police work in Switzerland. The new administrative centre will become the headquarters of the federal police, equipped with an operations centre, interview rooms, and cells. It is here that specialists will analyse DNA and fingerprints, as computer forensic experts and cyber investigators work on devices seized in police raids. The new centre will also be where evidence secured in criminal proceedings is stored, where matches from European searches come in, and where there are special control and operations rooms that are on hand 24/7 to deal with emergencies.

It is a complex system that has to work. Around the clock. And it must be failsafe.

Black box?

New Guisan is not your average workplace. Strict security requirements mean that the complex cannot be opened to the public. So

does that make New Guisan something of a forbidding black box? The local population expressed concern, so the four organisations that will use the site in future offered them a look inside. At an open day held while construction was in progress, fedpol showed interested residents how the federal government's police force works, and why security has to be so tight.

Meanwhile, fedpol is doing all it can to ensure a smooth move. It is a huge logistical challenge to achieve a seamless transition and to create optimum working conditions for staff in their new, multi-space workplace. After all, the place also has to work for them because they, ultimately, are fedpol.



Accessibility versus security

Could you imagine seeing a federal councillor doing a little lunchtime shopping in a Bern department store, entirely unaccompanied? It's quite possible in Switzerland. Thanks to a pragmatic approach to security, government officials mix with ordinary people. It's just the way the country is. For the time being, at least. There's no place for naïveté, however, because there is no such thing as absolute security. Whether Oslo, London or even here in Zug, govern-

ment staff and parliament buildings have repeatedly come under terrorist attack in the past.

For fedpol, ensuring the security of individuals and buildings means continually re-evaluating the possible risks. The situation determines the action that is taken. The fact is that the risk of terrorist attack in Europe remains elevated. Increasing numbers of foreign dignitaries are visiting Switzerland, and more and more Swiss citizens want to visit the Federal Palace.

Fedpol is therefore proposing better security for the parliament building. With this in mind, a new, secured area is being created on the southern side at the visitor desk and at the fedpol security officers' desk, in the interests of both visitor and fedpol staff security. In addition, the Federal Office for Buildings and Logistics (FOBL), fedpol and the City of Bern are together considering physical measures to increase security on the northern side of the Federal Palace, to prevent vehicle-based attacks, for example.



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
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fedpol, more than just police

In Switzerland, law and order are primarily the responsibility of the cantons. In our globalised world, however, crime knows no borders. Indeed, crime is becoming increasingly complex, often affecting several cantons and frequently assuming an international dimension.

Against this backdrop, fedpol, as Switzerland's national police agency, plays a key role. It coordinates, analyses and investigates complex cases involving serious crime. And it provides vital infrastructures. Hence, fedpol is at the heart of policing in Switzerland and is the nexus to the country's international partners.

Our mission:



Our values:

1
EXEMPLARY –
WE LEAD BY EXAMPLE.

2
COMMITTED –
PASSION IS THE TRADEMARK
OF OUR WORK.

3
TOGETHER –
DIVERSITY IS OUR STRENGTH.

4
RELIABLE –
YOU CAN DEPEND ON US.

5
DYNAMIC –
WE FIND ANSWERS.

6
RESPONSIBLE –
WE MAKE THE RIGHT DECISIONS
AT THE RIGHT LEVEL.


Our figures:

Budget

260

million francs

Male: 603 (63.9 %)
Female: 341 (36.1 %)



Employees

945



Language distribution:

| | |
|---------|------|
| German | 74.2 |
| French | 18.9 |
| Italian | 6.6 |
| Romansh | 0.3 |

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