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Federal Department of Justice and Police DFJP
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annual report fedpol 2016



A world falling apart

What is going through a young man's head when he enters a church one summer morning and, without appearing to hesitate for a single second, cold-bloodedly kills a priest during mass? And what about people smugglers who, in pursuit of their lucrative operations, unscrupulously exploit the vulnerability of desperate men, women and children? Or a sexual predator who persuades a young boy to follow him to another country?

From fedpol's perspective, 2016 presented a bleak picture. The year evoked the ugly side of human nature, the dark side of the world; a world that is occasionally out of sync and violent. It is a harsh fact, which at times is beyond our understanding.

Police services throughout the world are confronted with this reality every day. To meet the challenge they must join forces, because only by working together can we combat crime. Cooperation is a daily reality at fedpol. Be it in the fight against terrorism, cybercrime or human trafficking, we always work at international level and police cooperation with our partners in Switzerland and abroad is crucial. Fedpol cooperates through numerous channels with police services from all over the world. In 2016, the network of police attachés was adapted in order to respond more effectively to the terrorist threat, and synergies were established with the border guard.

The terrorist attacks of 2016 illustrated how important police cooperation is. Without the constant exchange of information between countries we would be powerless in the face of this continuing threat. Switzerland is a member of the Schengen area, which is a great benefit to our security. Membership allows us quick and easy access to police information from all over Europe, and access to the Schengen Information System assists us with, amongst other things, our daily investigative work.

TETRA continues to play a pivotal role in fighting terrorism. TETRA is our cooperation platform, which has proven not only successful but also indispensable. Via TETRA we share information and experience with our partners at federal and cantonal level: we learn from each other, strive to improve ourselves and seek solutions together.

Although numerous legal instruments to combat terrorism already exist, there is work still to be done – be it statutory provisions on extra-procedural police measures or on the exchange of information with foreign FIUs on suspected terrorist financing.

Cooperation is in our DNA and we are proud of it. In June 2016, we were able to assist the cantonal police of Solothurn in locating an abducted child. The case is a fine example of successful police cooperation: thanks to outstanding teamwork between fedpol and the cantonal police, together with partners from abroad, the missing child was found safe.

I wish you an enjoyable read.

Nicoletta della Valle, Director

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Carte blanche for Johanna Schaible
Nice, Brussels and Berlin were the scenes of horrific terror attacks in 2016. Europe is changing; one may even say that the world is falling apart. The Bernese artist, Johanna Schaible, was asked to illustrate fedpol's annual report according to this bleak conclusion. She has done an excellent job: her illustrations subtly reflect the current sense of oppressiveness.

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fedpol is at the heart of policing in Switzerland and the link to its international partners. A portrait.

Terrorism *The young man was barely 24 years old. At the end of 2016 he took to the wheel of an articulated lorry and ploughed it into the crowd at a Christmas market in the heart of Berlin, killing 12 people and injuring many more. Then he fled. He eventually ended up in Milan, where he was killed in a routine police check. Another young man was 19. France had barely recovered from the attack in Nice when he cut the throat of a priest in a church in a Normandy village while under court supervision. He was shot by special forces.*

Terror on the cheap

With few resources and seemingly minimal planning, the low-cost terrorism perpetrated by Islamic State can strike anywhere, anytime and anyone. It might be the airport, the entrance to an underground station, a Bastille Day parade, a music festival, a church, a Christmas market or a discotheque. Ending with an attack on an exclusive club in Istanbul, it is a long list for just one year.

Switzerland's counter-terrorism task force, TETRA, led by fedpol, continues to work unrelentingly in the face of this threat, which the Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) has classified as 'heightened' for many months now. Switzerland remains vigilant. At the end of 2016 there were more than 480 people on the FIS radar. And fedpol was investigating more than 70 cases, around 60 of which are the subject of criminal proceedings conducted by the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland.

A complex problem with no easy answers

The task is a challenging one. What can be done to counter this unpredictable threat? How do we respond to these determined young people, brainwashed by deadly propaganda and resolved to die? How do we stop them becoming radicalised, and destroy the propaganda put out by so-called Islamic State? There are no easy answers to this complex problem, no miracle cures or foolproof recipes. It requires action on the part of all the authorities concerned, and a solid package of measures. The chart on page 8 outlines the different stages of radicalisation, identifies the authorities concerned and highlights the instruments they can deploy. It shows how, in most cases, the problem goes beyond the scope of action of the criminal prosecution authorities, and involves all of society. It also sets out the many challenges still to be faced.

Prevention is better than cure

TETRA provides a forum for inter-agency cooperation, experience-sharing and solution-finding. Published in 2016, TETRA's second report highlighted the importance of the authorities acting beyond the criminal justice system in an attempt to tackle radicalisation at its source. The Delegate for the Swiss Security Network (SSN), working alongside various conferences of cantonal directors, was tasked with producing a situational analysis of measures to prevent jihadist radicalisation. The report forms the basis of a National Action Plan that was launched in the autumn of 2016 and will be released in the spring of 2017 (see chart on page 8). The aim is to network the knowledge and expertise that already exists at cantonal and municipal level, facilitate dialogue and take practical action to counter radicalisation as soon as it begins.

Preventive action, consistent implementation

Prevention is better than cure. Once a person becomes radicalised to the point at which they are a danger to national security, the threat is more difficult to counter. Where preventive policing is concerned, there are instruments in place for foreign nationals returning from abroad, such as a ban on entering Swiss territory or expulsion. fedpol makes decisive and consistent use of these legal options. For example, in 2016 fedpol issued 39 orders banning jihadist sympathisers from entering Swiss territory on the grounds of security. There were 17 such orders in 2015. These entry bans were issued in consultation with the FIS.

A further specific example was the decision to deport an Iraqi man, convicted of supporting Islamic State, after he had served his sentence. When he left prison, fedpol and the FIS together judged that he was still a danger to Switzerland and ordered his expulsion. The man appealed, but his appeal was rejected by the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP). This example is just one of many.

Shortcomings identified

While preventive policing measures exist for foreign returnees, there are no effective instruments against Swiss nationals outside the scope of criminal proceedings. In 2016, the Federal Council acknowledged these shortcomings and instructed the FDJP to prepare a bill to strengthen measures by the end of 2017.

fedpol is working on a package of measures to complement criminal prosecution. The measures include the withdrawal of identity documents and the duty to report to a police station, as well as the possibility of fedpol conducting discreet surveillance and registering suspects in police information systems. The possibility of detaining a foreign returnee pending their expulsion on security grounds is also being examined.

Helping those who have been radicalised

While preventive policing is important, it can only be part of the response. There remains the question of how to help someone who has become radicalised. It is one that arises at all stages: when the person is on the FIS radar but not yet in the hands of the criminal prosecution authorities, when they are under investigation but not in custody and able to move around freely, when they are in prison (whether remanded in custody or serving a sentence) and, finally, when they are discharged from prison. What danger does a radicalised person pose? Did the period in prison reinforce or accelerate their radicalisation process? How can they be reintegrated into society? Do they want to reintegrate?

TETRA – the catalyst for solutions

The TETRA members spent a great deal of time in 2016 examining these issues. They will be incorporated into the National Action Plan, along with thoughts on support measures for individuals who are radicalised but able to move around freely. Meanwhile, targeted solutions have been adopted in response to specific cases, such as the young Geneva man under investigation by the Office of the Attorney General (see chart on page 8), or the Iraqi released from prison who appealed against his expulsion order and remained in the country until his appeal had been decided. Thanks to TETRA, it is possible to find solutions in a closely collaborative process involving stakeholders at all levels.

TETRA has also been working with the penal enforcement authorities on the situation in Switzerland's prisons, in order to identify any shortcomings in the system. Once a criminal is serving their sentence, the prosecution authorities lose track of them: often they do not know the convict's whereabouts, whether the person has been moved to another institution, or what their conduct is like while in prison. Yet this information is crucial, particularly in evaluating the potential threat posed by a radicalised person who has been released back into society. Here, too, TETRA identifies apparent problems and instigates the search for solutions. The penal enforcement authorities have made it clear that they wish to optimise the existing system. This work will continue throughout 2017.

Everyone has a part to play in combating terrorism. Radicalisation begins long before the security services come onto the scene. This chart illustrates the various stages of radicalisation using the example of a fictitious young man. It highlights the role of various services and the instruments both currently at their disposal and in the planning. It also shows how complex the challenge is and makes clear that only a multifaceted, interdisciplinary and consistent response can be effective in combating the jihadist threat.



1

The beginning of radicalisation

Radicalisation often begins subtly or casually, like in the fictitious case of our young man. He is feeling disorientated; perhaps he has given up his apprenticeship or studies, his girlfriend has left him, he feels alone and misunderstood. He goes through a period of aimlessness, feels excluded from society and is looking for answers: just a young man, going through a difficult time and questioning his purpose in life. He gradually begins to change. At this point he is not yet on the radar of the police or intelligence service. It is up to local structures and services to detect the young man's budding radicalisation and intervene.

Zoom in on ...
the National Action Plan to Prevent Radicalisation

A national action plan to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism is currently being drafted. Its primary aims are to foster the exchange of existing knowhow in the cantons and towns, promote the exchange of experience and establish best practices in order to counter radicalisation right from its onset. The National Action Plan also focuses on the end of the cycle, when a radicalised person has finished serving their sentence but still has radical views and returns to society. Here, too, supportive measures are necessary, and the various authorities must work together.

Services responsible:
Cantonal and communal authorities and services (education department, social welfare services), public institutions (victim assistance and violence prevention services), civil society organisations (counselling services, street-level social workers, youth workers, etc.)

Examples of existing instruments:
Local prevention programmes

Examples of instruments in the planning:
National Action Plan to Prevent Radicalisation



2

Coming to the attention of the Federal Intelligence Service (FIS)

Our young man becomes increasingly radicalised. He becomes active on social networking websites, posts favourable comments on Islamic State and reads jihadist propaganda. By doing so, he expresses admiration for those fighting in Syria or carrying out attacks. It is at this point he comes to the attention of the FIS. If the young man is an asylum seeker, the cantonal migration authorities and the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) can provide helpful information on his radicalisation.

Services responsible:
FIS and cantonal intelligence services, SEM

Examples of existing instruments:
Internet monitoring for jihadist activities

Examples of instruments in the planning:
Intelligence Service Act



3

First police intervention and inquiries

The young man becomes more and more radicalised. Ultimately, the FIS suspects him of committing a criminal offence. At this point, the FIS hands over the case to fedpol. Criminal proceedings have not yet been opened, but fedpol begins initial police inquiries.

Services responsible:
fedpol

Examples of existing instruments:
Police inquiries

Examples of instruments in the planning:
New extra-procedural police measures

4a

4a

Criminal proceedings and charges

There is sufficient indication that our young man has committed a criminal offence. The Office of the Attorney General (OAG) opens criminal proceedings. This sets the wheels of the Criminal Procedure Code in motion. The FIS can submit an official report to the OAG.

Services responsible:
OAG with investigations by fedpol
Compulsory measures court
Federal Office of Justice (FOJ)

Examples of existing instruments:
Criminal Procedure Code

Example of instruments in the planning:
Amendment of statutory provisions on criminal organisations and extension of IS ban, carried over into legislation for an unlimited period

Zoom in on ...
a young jihadist returnee

The case involving a young man from Geneva is symbolic. He is suspected of having joined jihad and returns to Switzerland in June 2016. Criminal proceedings are opened and he is taken into pre-trial detention. After a time, the judge substitutes pre-trial detention with alternative measures, which are coordinated with the OAG and the canton of Geneva. In this way, a range of instruments are available to the police and social services until the young man goes to trial.

Zoom in on ...
a conviction for trying to join Islamic State

One afternoon in April 2015, a young man with dual citizenship is arrested at Zurich airport while about to board a plane to Istanbul. The authorities suspect him of wanting to join Islamic State. By being on the point of boarding the aircraft, he has already started to implement his agenda, hence confirming his intentions. The OAG opens a criminal investigation on the young man the same day. Its findings corroborate suspicions that he is supporting a terrorist organisation. The OAG subsequently charges the man and the case comes up in front of the Federal Criminal Court. There is sufficient evidence to show that the accused was intending to travel to the conflict region in Syria. The court therefore finds him guilty of violating Article 2 paragraph 1 of the Federal Act on the Prohibition of Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and Associated Organisations, and sentences him to an 18-month suspended sentence with a probationary period of two years. The judge also orders the young man to undergo probationary service, which includes various rules of behaviour and surveillance for the duration of the probationary period.

4b

Conviction

The charges brought against the young man by the OAG lead to his conviction by the Federal Criminal Court (FCC). He may appeal against the verdict. The Federal Supreme Court (FSC) can either uphold or overrule the judgement.

Services responsible:
FCC, FSC

Examples of existing instruments:
Custodial sentence

5

Enforcement of sentence

Our young man has been convicted. He will serve his (remaining) sentence in a Swiss prison.

Services responsible:
Authorities charged with enforcing sentences and measures

Examples of existing instruments:
Enforcement of custodial sentence in a penal institution

Examples of instruments in the planning:
Optimise the exchange of information

6

After completion of sentence

Our young man has completed his sentence. He has come full circle. The judicial authorities consider him a free man. But is he still radicalised and violent? Is he still dedicated to jihadist propaganda and does he wish to continue killing? Or has he renounced his former convictions and does he want to reintegrate into society?

Services responsible:
Authorities charged with enforcing sentences and measures, migration authorities, social services, cantonal and municipal police, FIS, SEM, fedpol

Examples of existing instruments:
Deportation (if a foreign national)

Examples of instruments in the planning:
National Action Plan to Prevent Radicalisation and Violent Extremism

Reporting of suspicious incidents

Registration above certain concentrations

Explosives precursors *TATP is a white crystalline substance nicknamed 'Mother of Satan'. It was used by suicide bombers in both Paris and Brussels to blow themselves up. All they needed to make it were substances present in everyday products readily available in the shops. What can be done to prevent such substances from falling into the hands of terrorists? Germany ran an awareness campaign in the sectors concerned, with the result that a sales assistant likely foiled an attack.*

Home-made explosives

30 March 2015: a sales assistant at a DIY store close to Frankfurt never imagined that, in alerting police, she might have been preventing a bloody terrorist attack in Germany. Her customers were a couple – he bearded and she fully veiled – buying three litres of hydrogen peroxide, which they said was to clean their garden pond. The assistant was intrigued by their purchase – why such a large volume? As a precaution, she noted the customers' details on a list used to register all purchases of the chemical. She then reported it to the police as a suspicious transaction. The information was to prove crucial to the investigation.

One month later, during the night of 30 April 2015, the police raided the couple's home and questioned them. The information given by the couple was false, but images captured by the store's video surveillance cameras and fingerprints left at the checkout provided investigators with a vital clue. The couple was suspected of planning a terrorist bomb attack on a major popular cycling race that was to take place the following day. In their cellar investigators found weapons, ammunition and bomb-making chemicals, including the three litres of hydrogen peroxide, which could have been used to manufacture a bomb.

Raising awareness rather than criminalising

In both the Paris and Brussels attack the terrorists used the hydrogen peroxide-based explosive TATP, which had devastating human consequences. To make these substances more difficult for terrorists to access, Germany and other EU countries have issued new regulations and decided to raise awareness of the problem among sector stakeholders, retailers and sales personnel. The example given above illustrates the success of this approach.

Switzerland remains vigilant. Working closely with the sectors concerned, fedpol worked on a proposal in 2016 to restrict access to certain everyday substances that can be used to make explosives. Known as explosives precursors, these substances – such as hydrogen peroxide, acetone and nitrates – are found in freely available, everyday products such as pool cleaning agents, solvents and fertilisers.

At the end of 2016, the Federal Council formally acknowledged the fedpol proposal and decided that access to explosives precursors should be regulated. A bill is to be submitted to the Federal Council by the end of 2017. Switzerland favours a pragmatic approach to regulation that places more emphasis on raising awareness within the sector than on criminalisation, and that provides for access to certain products to be limited for private individuals. The principle is that the more concentrated the dangerous substance is, the stricter regulation should be. Thus, no restrictions are planned for products with low concentrations, but where they are higher their purchase would have to be registered and certain information (such as the type of substance, quantity, the purpose of the purchase and the details of the purchaser) sent to the competent authorities via a web application. This registration requirement would affect around one hundred products, or the equivalent of between 20,000 and 40,000 purchases annually. At very high concentrations, the purchase of such explosives precursors would be subject to licence. This would affect around 25 products in Switzerland.

Regulation in line with reality

fedpol depends on the cooperation of those in the sector to comply with these measures when selling substances to private individuals. This places a particular onus on specialist stores, such as drugstores and pharmacies, and DIY and swimming pool maintenance outlets. By contrast, retailers such as the Coop and Migros supermarket chains sell products in which concentrations are too low to warrant regulation.

Industrial, professional and agricultural customers are not affected by the new rules. Like the German superstore sales assistant, we can all remain vigilant at all times and report each suspicious incident or theft to fedpol on a voluntary basis, without obligation. There is no doubt that the information supplied by the assistant averted the worst. While the tip-off was not enough for charges to be pressed on the grounds of planning a terrorist attack, the courts sentenced the man in July 2016 to two-and-a-half years in prison for being in illegal possession of weapons and explosives.

Three principal measures

Authorisation for high concentrations

The explosive known as 'Mother of Satan ' is manufactured using everyday household products; acetone, hydrogen peroxide and acidic agents.

Immediate action

Pending the implementation of the new regulations, fedpol has taken immediate action to increase vigilance in the field. In September 2016, it organised a roundtable meeting with the sectors concerned to discuss the feasibility of regulation and to notify them of immediate action. It also circulated information material among retailers, specifically drugstores and pharmacies, to enable them to recognise and report all problematic sales.

The public and those working within the sectors concerned can report any suspicious incident (purchase, theft, loss or disappearance of explosives precursors) directly to fedpol, by telephone on +41 58 460 52 10 (24-hour hotline), or by e-mail to chemicals@fedpol.admin.ch).

Organised crime *On 8 and 16 November 2016, the Federal Criminal Court in Bellinzona convicted two men from Georgia of supporting a criminal organisation. The verdicts were the result of an investigation lasting several years into the criminal organisation 'thieves-in-law', which originated in the Soviet Union and is mainly rooted in Georgia.*

Thieves at second glance

In January 2010, a 23 year-old man entered a department store in a popular shopping centre in central Switzerland and stole a pair of designer jeans worth CHF 199. Just eight days later he took perfumes worth CHF 266. As a member of the criminal organisation 'thieves-in-law', paying for the goods was out of the question.

A living as a thief

According to the thieves' ideology, members are not allowed to earn money from legitimate work. Someone can only call themself a 'thieves-in-law' once they have been crowned. At least five 'thieves-in-law' must be present at a crowning. Time spent in jail is looked upon favourably, and members should have served at least three jail terms.

Investigations into the 'thieves-in-law' go back several years. In 2009 and 2010, there was a wave of thefts and burglaries committed by Georgian nationals throughout Switzerland. In other western European countries, too, a striking number of Georgians were suddenly found guilty of theft and handling stolen goods. Thanks to in-depth information sharing between fedpol and the cantons and via INTERPOL, parallels were drawn between the individual crimes.

For example, the perpetrators mainly pilfered designer clothes and electronic devices, which they would subsequently sell on.

As part of an international operation in 2010, the mastermind of the 'thieves-in-law' for Western Europe was arrested in Spain. The work of the Spanish police revealed a great deal about the way the organisation functions, which also benefitted fedpol's investigations.

Switzerland works differently

Like other criminal organisations, 'thieves-in-law' is organised hierarchically. The crowned thieves are at the top of the hierarchy. Below them are the 'boys', also known as 'soldiers', who commit the actual thefts – including the two men convicted in 2016.

Criminal organisations divide up the areas in which they operate. In the same way, Switzerland is split based on the logic of the 'thieves-in-law': besides the French-speaking region of Switzerland and the canton of Ticino, there is Central Switzerland around Bern and Eastern Switzerland around Zurich.

While the younger of the two convicts was operating along the Swiss Plateau, the 29 year-old was active in the canton of Ticino, where he stole Gucci, Dolce & Gabbana and Armani sunglasses from department stores.

Wall of silence

All 'thieves-in-law' members have to pay a portion of their loot into a central fund. The money flows analysed by fedpol as part of its investigations showed that the two convicted men were also doing this.

The organisation is critical of the state. According to its ideology, under no circumstances must its members cooperate with the authorities. The two men stayed resolutely silent when questioned by fedpol and denied knowing the leaders. However, their silence worked against them in court and suggested that they supported the criminal organisation and its ideology through their criminal activities.

The evidence started to mount when the investigators looked through the two men's telephone contacts. They had regularly been in contact with previously-convicted men and the leaders of the organisation.

On the basis of all this evidence, the court found the pair guilty and convicted them under Article 260ter of the Swiss Criminal Code – two of the rare convictions in Switzerland.



Mark Bullen has recently published a book called 'Thieves-in-law'. In it, the British police officer explains the meaning of Russian prison tattoos by reference to numerous photographs.

Extradition rather than prosecution

On 8 March 2016, as part of a coordinated mission in Zurich, Valais and Thurgau, a total of 15 presumed members of the Calabrian mafia 'Ndrangheta were arrested. The detention order from the Federal Office of Justice was based on extradition requests from the Italian authorities. The Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland also investigated these individuals for supporting a criminal organisation. It prioritised extradition, as the level of culpability for an offence is higher in Switzerland and sentences are shorter.

Criminal law provision to be adapted

A working group made up of representatives of the prosecution authorities and cantons wants a tightening of Article 260ter of the Swiss Criminal Code on criminal organisations. In principle, terrorist organisations also fall under this category. In addition, the emergency Federal Act on the Prohibition of Al-Qaida and IS has been in place in Switzerland since 2015, although it is time-limited until the end of 2018. The provisions of this act are also to be transferred into a new criminal law provision on criminal organisations. The initial draft legislation for the new provision is expected in the first half of 2017.

International cooperation *June 2016, a village in the canton of Solothurn. A bicycle and a child who is no longer at the playground. The child's parents search for him in vain. Has he run away or been abducted? The question preoccupies the authorities. The initial clues indicate that the child has possibly been abducted and taken to Germany. This begins a period of close international cooperation. The child's computer will provide the key to the mystery.*

Close police cooperation to locate a child

The cantonal police of Solothurn raised the alarm. The missing person's report gave the description of a young boy. Police inquiries were opened quickly, but the exact circumstances remained unclear. Had the boy run away or had he been abducted? One thing was certain – the authorities had to act fast. The discovery of the victim's bicycle after a few days of intense searching gave the investigators an additional lead. Inquiries by the police suggested that the boy was in the company of a man and that they had probably taken the train to Germany, thus confirming suspicions that the child had been abducted. The cantonal police asked fedpol to submit an urgent request for international cooperation to Germany. In response, fedpol's Operations Centre contacted the German INTERPOL bureau.

35 checks between Switzerland and Germany

How could the abductor be tracked down and the child recovered safe and sound? Such cases are more than simply a manhunt. International and national cooperation sets in motion a complex system of cogs: cantonal police forces, fedpol, the Swiss and foreign judiciary, the German police, INTERPOL, police attachés abroad and the FBI were all mobilised, joining forces to trace the abductor, arrest him, and recover the child alive.

fedpol established the links between Switzerland and Germany and provided support to the cantonal police. Two fedpol officers were dispatched to provide support to the cantonal investigative unit, handling all the unit's operational needs and liaising with the authorities abroad. During the operation the German police conducted no fewer than 35 checks on behalf of Switzerland.

Unhelpful leads

What, exactly, happened? Who was the abductor? Was the child still alive? The list of unanswered questions became longer and longer. No lead or piece of information could be ignored. The most probable motive for abducting a child is sexual abuse, and the risk of not finding a child alive rises exponentially with each day that passes.

Nowadays, everyone has a mobile phone or a computer, and the internet has become part of everyday life. The investigators took advantage of this fact; the child's computer was examined thoroughly by specialists from the canton concerned and from fedpol. This provided a new and crucial clue: a picture of a man was found in the recycle bin of the child's computer. With this image, investigators were able to find the surname, first name and place of residence of the abductor. Before they did, however, their work was complicated by a number of false leads.

Avatars and chats

The child's computer revealed that he played in online games networks and chatted with a large number of other users. The child had many different avatars that he used to chat with other players. An automatic search was conducted of the 120,000 chat messages, targeting words related to the police inquiries. They came up in chats with various avatars. Was the abductor one of them?

One early line of investigation discovered that the name of a German national was behind one the avatars. According to his Facebook account, he had just travelled to Thailand. fedpol mobilised its police attaché there to obtain the man's passport details and a recent photograph. These checks showed that investigators were on the wrong track, however.

At the same time, officers compared the photograph found in the computer's recycle bin with the images held in INTERPOL's International Child Sexual Exploitation Database (ICSE). This is a specific collection of images from around the world covering the sexual abuse of children. Its aim is to facilitate the identification of the victims and perpetrators of child abuse. In Switzerland, fedpol has direct access to the ICSE. There, too, no image matched that of the victim or of the suspect.



Abductor's identity revealed by online chat and social networks

Finally, cantonal investigators came across an avatar that had been making inappropriate comments during chats with the child. fedpol's forensic specialists discovered the abductor's name and some images of him on the internet. A comparison of the images with the photo found on the child's computer was positive.

A quick search of social networks found that the man also maintained other accounts. fedpol therefore submitted requests to the companies concerned in the United States. As it was now a matter of life and death, the requests were treated with absolute priority, and fedpol received a response within minutes. Sources were cross-checked and confirmed both the man's identity and his place of residence. Other photographs were found that corresponded to the one on the child's computer. Close liaison between the cantonal crisis unit and the German police also confirmed that the suspect did indeed live at the address given. All of the clues were converging, and the net was closing around the suspect.

The next step was to see if the suspect was at home. This required close collaboration with the FBI and some clever computer work to confirm that the suspect was currently gaming online at the address in question. The police could therefore intervene.

The cantonal public prosecutor's office had already asked the Federal Office of Justice (FOJ) to submit a request for mutual assistance in criminal matters to Germany, enabling the German police to intervene immediately and arrest the suspect at his home. The child was found at the same address – alive.

Close national and international cooperation

This incident clearly illustrates the reality of investigations in the modern world. Without the enormous efforts of the cantonal police force concerned, and the support of a whole range of other actors – fedpol, the German police, the police attachés, the FBI, the FOJ and others – it would have been impossible to solve the case. It demanded close police cooperation at both national and international level. Furthermore, as is often the case nowadays, computer forensics and cyber investigations played a key role in bringing the case to a successful conclusion.

International cooperation *The case described in the previous section is a typical one (see page 18). In a globalised world, crime transcends borders, and most investigations have an international dimension. With this in mind, cooperation between police forces is absolutely vital. fedpol provides the principal point of contact in Switzerland for police forces around the world. Every day, hundreds of communications are received in Switzerland or are sent abroad – information that is sorted, verified and forwarded by fedpol. National and international cooperation is therefore key to our work. There are multiple complementary channels in use here.*

Collaborative policing

Bilateral cooperation
Switzerland has concluded a number of bilateral agreements with countries such as France, Italy, Germany, Austria and Liechtenstein. A new bilateral police and customs cooperation agreement between Switzerland and Italy entered into force in 2016. It enhances cross-border collaboration and now enables the two countries to set up mixed patrols, thus strengthening the fight against people-smugglers. fedpol is also able to call upon its police attachés (see chart) and on the police and customs cooperation centres (PCCC) at Geneva-Cointrin airport and in Chiasso, which facilitate cross-border cooperation with France and Italy.

European police cooperation
fedpol works closely with its European partners at bilateral and multilateral level. By virtue of the Schengen Agreement, fedpol is able to access the Schengen Information System (SIS) to help locate wanted persons or stolen objects. Switzerland also has an operational agreement with Europol. fedpol has three local liaison officers, and helps to coordinate international operations and analyse the security situation, in particular with regard to the fight against terrorism, cybercrime, migrant smuggling and human trafficking.

The SIS database is a vital tool for the Swiss police, and fedpol also has access to other databases. For example, Switzerland is currently negotiating its accession to the Prüm Convention, which facilitates the exchange of police information between European countries, especially on DNA profiles, fingerprints, vehicle registration numbers and vehicle owners. In a further example, Switzerland is seeking access to the Europol Information System (EIS), which contains information on police investigations such as those linked to terrorism.

Global police cooperation
At the global level, fedpol cooperates with INTERPOL and the UN. It has access to various INTERPOL databases containing, for example, records on wanted persons or missing items of property such as identity documents, arms and vehicles.

Police attachés are vital players in international cooperation. Seconded to key countries, they serve as facilitators and advisors for the Swiss law enforcement services and for the states to which they are accredited. They draw on trusted local networks, provide assistance on the ground and ensure the swift and secure exchange of information with their partners in Switzerland.

fedpol reviewed its attaché network in 2016, posting a police attaché to Turkey, with plans to second another to Tunisia, with responsibility for Algeria, in April 2017. These changes are justified by the growing threat of terrorism and the need to work more closely with the countries concerned. Finally, 2016 saw the start of a new form of collaboration between fedpol's police attachés and the liaison officers of the Federal Customs Administration (FCA), enabling each to place their networks of attachés at each other's disposal. From 1 January 2017, all officers stationed abroad have also been required to handle enquiries from national and international police and customs authorities for both services. This partnership makes for a more economical and effective use of resources, while expanding the network of liaison officers.

International police co-operation – shared external network

International police cooperation

CSI fedpol *Fingerprints, blood stains and hairs left behind at crime scenes help solve crimes. Switzerland's national databases of fingerprints and DNA profiles are located at fedpol. This is also where individual fingerprints and DNA profiles are matched – for example in the quadruple murder case in Rupperswil.*

Silent witnesses

A horrific scene awaited the fire service when they arrived at a house in the town of Rupperswil in Aargau just before Christmas 2015. But what at first glance appeared to be a standard fire in a family home turned out to be an appalling crime. The fire service discovered the bodies of a mother, her two sons and the older son's girlfriend. But the fire was not the cause of death and all the signs pointed to a serious crime.

The perpetrator had killed four people and set the house on fire to cover his tracks. The fire made the search for forensic evidence very difficult, as the Aargau authorities told the media in February 2016. But the investigators nevertheless managed to secure the perpetrator's fingerprints and DNA.

Following intensive investigative work by the cantonal police and the Aargau public prosecutor, a suspect was arrested on 12 May 2016. The 33 year-old local student was not previously known to police, which meant there were no matches in the databases. But his fingerprints and DNA profile were compared with the traces from the crime scene and, sure enough, they matched.

DNA leads to the perpetrator of 12 sex offences

The analysis of fingerprints and DNA traces is an indispensable part of day-to-day police work. And sometimes it reveals more than it seems at first glance.

In a co-ordinated mission, Europol compiled lists of individuals who had been viewing and distributing child pornography across Europe, including 46 Swiss nationals in 14 cantons. A fedpol officer became suspicious after reading through one of the suspect's chat records. The way he expressed himself made the fedpol officer think that he had probably gone a step further and already met up with children. But the individual was not known to police.

The officer informed the appropriate cantonal police service of her suspicions. They then ordered DNA testing. The results backed up the officer's suspicions: the suspect's DNA matched an unsolved rape case dating back over 10 years. Further investigations uncovered 11 more sex offences, including relations with minors and two cases of sexual assault of minors.

The DNA sample also matched a rape case and two cases of sexual assault involving adults. The man is in custody awaiting trial; criminal proceedings are under way.

Law to be adapted

In Switzerland, the 'non-coding' strands of DNA material found at crime scenes can be analysed. This means that the police are only allowed to ascertain the gender of the perpetrator.

Since the DNA Profiling Act came into force in January 2005, science has made huge steps forward in DNA analysis. An increasing number of gene variants are known. Thanks to new methods, a DNA sample can now also reveal skin, hair and eye colour, approximate age and geographical origin with a high level of accuracy. In countries such as the United States, France and the Netherlands, the analysis of these characteristics is already permitted under certain conditions.

Calls for these methods to be used in Switzerland first came about following the rape of a 26-year-old woman in Emmen near Lucerne in September 2015. The woman was dragged off her bicycle and brutally raped, leaving her paralysed from the neck down. In this case DNA material was found, but the databases failed to deliver any matches. The quadruple murder case in Rupperswil a few months later further fuelled the debate about DNA analysis in Switzerland.

The Swiss Parliament would now like the law enforcement services in Switzerland to be able to make use of these new scientific methods. Particularly in cases of serious crime, analysing 'coding' DNA strands in combination with witness statements would help focus investigations and would therefore make it easier to identify perpetrators.

fedpol has been tasked with preparing the relevant amendment to the DNA Profiling Act and submitting a proposal to the Federal Council by the end of 2017.

Unique and unchangeable

Fingerprint matching is older than DNA analysis. Fingerprints were first used to convict a murderer and exonerate the main suspect in Argentina in 1892. Fingerprint matching has been used in Switzerland for over 100 years. Time, therefore, to ask: is it still relevant?

Yes, because fingerprints remain the most reliable, fastest and cheapest method of identifying a person. The papillary ridge patterns on the palms of the hands and soles of the feet are unique and unchangeable in every individual. Even identical twins have different fingerprints. This is not the case with DNA profiles.

Fingerprints are directly left behind by one person – for example on a door handle. In the case of DNA traces, the police cannot rule out the possibility that they may, theoretically, have been brought to the crime scene by someone else. But with our fingers and hands, we leave traces on objects we touch – similar to a stamp. The sweat that reaches the surface via the pores of the skin is the stamp ink. People whose fingerprints are already registered in police identification records can therefore be identified with certainty as the source of a trace at a crime scene. But beware: Just because someone's fingerprints are found at a crime scene does not prove they are the perpetrator. It merely proves that they were at the crime scene at some point.

Because of their uniqueness, fingerprints lend themselves to the identification of individuals beyond the scope of criminal proceedings. People who refuse to identify themselves or who provide false information about their identities can be reliably and quickly recognised from many fingerprints stored on file. For example, the perpetrator of the Berlin Christmas market attack used several identities. But the only way to prove with certainty that he was the man shot down by Italian police near Milan was through his fingerprints.

An illustration from Henry Faulds' 'Guide to Fingerprint Identification' from 1905. The Scottish missionary and physician was one of the first scientists to analyse fingerprints. He was convinced that the ridges found on the fingertips were unique to each person. Faulds described several characteristic features, such as the loops, whirls and arches pictured here. His research was not taken up by the judiciary because Faulds – wrongly – assumed that prints from all ten fingers were necessary for identification.

Serving our partners

fedpol operates the central fingerprint database, which is also used by other partners, such as the Swiss Border Guard (SBG), the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) and the Swiss diplomatic missions abroad.

fedpol is fast and reliable: for example, the comparison of a 2-print set of fingerprints takes just three minutes on average. A comparison of a 10-print set of fingerprints is carried out within an hour.

Careful and responsible handling of biometric, forensic and personal data is essential for fedpol. Employees bear a great deal of responsibility as a match may mean that a person is strongly suspected of committing murder or rape.

Despite technological advances, the analysis of fingerprints is still a task primarily carried out by people. Every fingerprint that fedpol receives is therefore checked by at least two people. Employees are trained to recognise the specific characteristics of fingerprints. The new-generation AFIS database, in use since 2016, offers partners a more efficient and faster system.

Detailled figures on person identification are available at www.fedpol.ch

Money laundering and terrorist financing *Complex cases, increased awareness on the part of financial intermediaries and new legal provisions: the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland (MROS) at fedpol received a record number of SARs in 2016. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) evaluated MROS and praised it in many areas. One criticism was the limited international cooperation, though in itself good and efficient. However, MROS is restricted by the law in this regard.*

Reports of money laundering hit record levels

A man working for the permanent representation of a foreign state at an international organisation wanted to transfer money to family members in his home country, so he contacted a payment services provider. As the amount that he wanted to transfer exceeded the maximum limit for cash transactions, the provider became suspicious. As is usual practice, the provider asked the man to produce his payslips and account statements from the last three months. These revealed that the man had allegedly been paid money by the representation which was meant for sanitary fittings in the home country. But, in reality, this money had ended up with a politically exposed person in the man's home country and other individuals, as the investigations of the bank involved also showed. MROS analysed the SAR, deemed it to be well-founded and therefore passed it on to the public prosecutor.

2016 was a record year for MROS. More SARs were received in the first ten months of the year than in the entire previous year. At the end of 2016, this figure stood at 2,909 SARs, an increase of 23 per cent over the previous year. Topping the list of reported predicate offences to money laundering was fraud, followed by corruption. MROS received 25 reports related to terrorist financing, compared to 38 the previous year.

This repeated rise in the number of SARs is partly due to MROS's awareness-raising activities for financial intermediaries. In addition, various major case clusters occupied the reporting office in 2016, such as the Petrobras affair. These high-profile cases continue to generate a large number of SARs from financial intermediaries, and are the subject of ongoing investigations by the Office of the Attorney General.

A range of legal amendments aimed at combating money laundering came into force in 2016: the maximum cash limit for merchants, the new Federal Act on the Freezing and Restitution of Illicit Assets held by Politically Exposed Persons (FIAA) and the aggravated tax misdemeanour as a predicate offence for money laundering.

The new legal provisions are not yet reflected in the SARs received by MROS. No reports were received from merchants in 2016 and only a very small number of reports concerned aggravated tax misdemeanours and the FIAA.

FATF recognises the strengths of the Swiss prosecution authorities

The FATF published its fourth country report on Switzerland in December 2016, in which it also analysed the work of the Swiss prosecution authorities and MROS. The report's conclusions were positive on the whole and acknowledge the quality of Switzerland's mechanisms for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

Concerning the work of MROS, the FATF highlighted various points as particularly positive. The report underscored the good understanding of money laundering and the risks of terrorist financing in Switzerland. The quality of the analysis of financial information by MROS and its appropriate use in criminal proceedings were also rated positively. The FATF report explicitly stated that MROS provides crucial support to the work of the prosecution authorities. The report also considered effective the work of the prosecution authorities on cases of money laundering and terrorist financing. The quality of the first report on the national assessment of terrorist financing risks from June 2015 was also singled out for praise.

International cooperation: limited opportunities for MROS

The FATF voiced criticism of the legal limitations on MROS's opportunities for international cooperation, however. While MROS constantly shares information with money laundering reporting offices in 151 countries through the Egmont Group, it is not permitted by law to respond to requests from foreign reporting offices and to procure information from Swiss financial intermediaries if no SAR has been filed in Switzerland in relation to the case in question.

MROS generally receives a large number of requests from partner offices abroad. In 2016, this number was 4,165. This is not surprising given the international focus of Switzerland's financial centre. Some 80 per cent of SARs filed with MROS have a link to another country.

Around 60 per cent of these requests from abroad could not be investigated by MROS because no SAR had been filed in Switzerland. Many of these cases concerned corruption, but also terrorist financing.

Key evidence of terrorist financing may be missing

The following example illustrates the potential impact of this loophole in the fight against terrorist financing:

MROS received a request relating to two Swiss bank accounts from a foreign partner office. According to the partner office, the accounts were thought to belong to a charitable organisation run by an individual who featured on the UN terrorist list.

At this point, MROS had not received a SAR from a Swiss financial intermediary in connection with the charitable organisation. For this reason, MROS was unable to file a request with the Swiss bank concerned in order to obtain information about the two accounts in question. Consequently, MROS could not respond to the request from the partner office abroad.

Although MROS had important information about possible terrorist financing, it was not allowed to pass it on. It could not make enquiries with the Swiss bank or pass the information on to the public prosecutor.

Despite this, fighting terrorism remains a priority for fedpol, and international cooperation is an essential part of that fight.

Terrorist financing: no duty to report for merchants

The amounts concerned in terrorist financing are usually small. Switzerland has no maximum amount above which a SAR has to be filed in connection with money laundering or terrorist financing.

Merchants are an exception to this. Since 2016, they have had a duty to report if they accept more than CHF 100,000 in cash. However, they are not obliged to file a SAR if they suspect terrorist financing.

The following case illustrates the impact of this regulation. An art dealer bought works of art and antiques from associations whose purpose was to support children in war-torn regions, particularly in Iraq and Syria. A media report revealed that these associations were using their money to buy weapons and other military equipment for terrorist organisations.

The art dealer did not have to report this case to MROS. The question of whether the provision for merchants should be amended therefore also needs to be reviewed.

Predicate offences to money laundering

Money laundering is always preceded by a criminal act. The funds obtained from illegal activities are then put into circulation in the legal economy to disguise their origin.
These crimes are known as predicate offences and include organised crime, corruption and human trafficking. The term money laundering dates back to Al Capone, as the American gangster primarily invested the proceeds of his crimes in laundromats.

Reporting volume



The fight against money laundering

From a bank's initial suspicion and the analysis by MROS, to the opening of criminal proceedings and conviction, the fight against money laundering comprises different phases. The Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland (MROS) at fedpol acts as a link between the financial centre and the public prosecutor.

1 Financial centre

Suspicion by financial intermediary: A client acquires money from criminal activities and wants to integrate it in the legal economy (launder).

No minimum sum (except for merchants); suspicious behaviour is sufficient.

Mandatory SAR: Where there are reasonable grounds for suspicion, financial intermediaries must file a SAR, otherwise this is a breach of due diligence.

Voluntary SAR: In the case of mere suspicion, financial intermediaries can file a report, but are not obliged to.

Ongoing: Awareness-raising activities by MROS, training of financial intermediaries by MROS, international information-sharing with other FIUs (Financial Intelligence Units)

2 MROS: receives a SAR and conducts an analysis

Queries in various databases: fedpol, other information sources, administrative assistance in Switzerland (FIS, police), international administrative assistance with 151 countries worldwide (Egmont Group), additional information from financial intermediaries.

Analysis: MROS has 20 days to carry out checks to confirm suspicions of money laundering.

The account is not frozen.

3 MROS: closes the case or forwards it to the public prosecutor

Two possible scenarios:

MROS abandons the case because the reported suspicion is unfounded. In 2016, this was the case for 28.7% of SARs.

MROS forwards the SAR and analysis report to the public prosecutor. At this point, the financial intermediary **freezes** the account.

4 Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland (OAG) / office of the public prosecutor

The **Office of the Attorney General** or the **cantonal public prosecutor's office** initiate criminal proceedings on the basis of the SARs and analysis reports by MROS.

5 Federal Criminal Court or cantonal courts

The level of sanction in the event of a conviction for money laundering in Switzerland is a custodial sentence of up to three years or a monetary penalty.

In serious cases, the sanction can be extended to a custodial sentence of five years.

Cyber world *While there is much talk of cyber crime in the modern world, it is often forgotten that the offences committed by cyber criminals are nothing new. Exploiting peoples' naivety or ignorance, and gaining their confidence to ultimately rob them, are techniques that are as old as time. Today, the perpetrators simply make the most of the opportunities offered by the cyber world.*

Cyber police

"Congratulations, you've won thousands of francs on the lottery! All you have to do is give your account details, pay the administrative charges, and the money is yours!"

Too good to be true – obviously. But many people still fall victim to tricks like this one. That's why scams are rife on the internet, and they pay off in a big way. In fact, cybercrime has become a fully-fledged business segment for organised crime, on the same level as drugs or arms trafficking. Indeed, in some cases the return on investment is higher than in conventional trafficking operations.

More professional, more authentic, more credible ...

Internet scams are becoming more professional. In the past, e-mails were full of spelling mistakes and often seemed barely credible. Now, however, they have become much more sophisticated. The perpetrators research their targets and come up with scams that look authentic. They might, for example, have read up about their target company, found its bank details and copied the bank's logo, looked up the name of the head of finance and used this information to construct a credible scam containing plausible information.

The problem is us ...

... and our tendency to fall into the trap. We believe the scam and we pay. We give out our bank or personal details without a second thought. We click on the bad link and, all of a sudden, the data on our computers or on the company's servers is encrypted. There was a sharp rise in this type of scam in 2016 (see chart).

A highly lucrative, borderless business

You don't need to be a geek to become a cyber criminal. Today you can simply go out and buy a variety of services which enable you to set up a scam: malware from one specialist service provider, mail customisation from another, and financial intermediary services from a bitcoin provider on the darknet. This means that behind a scam run by a lone individual in a Swiss mountain village there might be a global criminal organisation earning money from 'service providers' in a number of different countries.

In such cases, criminal prosecution would be impossible without international cooperation. Rather than investigating each scam individually, it is better to attack the system as a whole, pooling information that can be cross-referenced to catch the big fish. Europol has made cyber crime a priority. fedpol plays an active part in the relevant working groups and these efforts are bearing fruit. Operation 'Daylight', conducted in 2016, is one example of this (see box).

Cyber police

Cyber crime is not limited to internet scams alone, however. It benefits all types of crime. Jihadist propaganda, for example, is largely dependent on the internet to spread its deadly message. Terrorists communicate with each other in complete discretion by means of encrypted messages. Sexual predators prey on their victims in online forums (see section on page 34). There is hardly a single fedpol investigation that does not have a cyber dimension. This poses numerous challenges to investigators, not just because of the technology itself, but also on account of the volume of data. One mobile phone alone might contain thousands of lines of chat, which must all be analysed. It is often said that the police search for evidence is like looking for a needle in a haystack. New technologies mean that, while the needle is the same, the haystack is now ten times bigger.

In order to respond to these new challenges effectively, fedpol and Switzerland's cantonal police forces must act prudently. Strengthening synergies, rethinking general police training and training top specialists are all areas on which fedpol is working in association with the Conference of Cantonal Police Commanders of Switzerland.

TRUE LOVE OR TRUE LIES

These days here is nothing unusual about finding a relationship or having a casual flirt via the internet. Cyber criminals know that too. They will spend weeks or months faking an online relationship. And then they start asking for money. The excuse is that their aunt is dying and needs surgery. They themselves are out of town and can't access their money right now. These 'loans' are never repaid, and what was thought to be true love turns out to be a major disappointment. The victims of these romance scams are usually women.

Men, meanwhile, are more likely to fall prey to sextortion. In these cases, the perpetrators are mostly men, posing as women on social media or in chatrooms, and posting the pictures you might expect. They ask for intimate pictures and videos of their victims in return. Once received, they waste no time: if the money is not forthcoming, the pictures and videos will be sent to the victim's boss or wife. In 2016, fedpol received 161 reports from the victims of sextortion, and 140 reports of romance scams. **Do not transfer** any money, and refuse to be blackmailed. **Be careful when** getting to know people on the internet. Check that the person really is who they say they are. **Be careful** arranging to meet people who you know only from online contact. Meet in a public place and/or take someone with you. **There is no need** to be embarrassed! Tell us your story so that we can analyse it for the future.

PHISHING

In 2016, attempts to elicit sensitive data from computer users – an act known as phishing – remained one of the most frequently-reported internet scams. fedpol received 2,342 reports of attempted phishing. Whether user names and passwords for online services, e-banking access details or credit card numbers, the theft of this data is highly lucrative for cyber criminals.

Phishing attempts generally take the form of an e-mail, and these are becoming increasingly professional. They contain few, if any, spelling mistakes, and they appear to have been sent by a familiar company such as Apple, by a bank or even by the police. Criminals use social engineering techniques to analyse how these bodies work, and then apply the findings to their scam mails. Victims either respond actively to the e-mail, or they click on a link and in doing so give the perpetrators access to their computer. **Do not click** on any links or open any attachments in e-mails from addresses you do not know or which make you suspicious. **Never disclose** confidential information such as passwords, user names or credit card numbers by e-mail. **Check your bank** and credit card statements for irregularities. **Send the e-mails** to fedpol for analysis.

FAKE INVOICES ARE A MANAGEMENT MATTER

You're familiar with a company but you don't immediately remember the outstanding invoice that you've been reminded to pay. The amount looks plausible and isn't too high. It may well be that you have simply forgotten the bill, so you transfer the sum the company is asking for because you don't want to be seen as a credit risk.

In 2016, fedpol received 177 reports from Swiss companies that had been sent fake invoices like this. Looking back, a number of them wondered why they had not spotted the fraud immediately. And yet these scam mails are not so obvious. Thanks to sources in the public domain, cyber criminals find out information about a company and then copy its style. This can go as far as imitating the CEO's particular way with words, or even forging signatures. **Call the company** on its official number, which you will find on its official website and in the phone book **Check the e-mail** for spelling mistakes and unusual demands – such as a request to submit your credit card details by e-mail.
Do not pay the invoice. If you already have, report it to your local police. **Do not contact** the fraudsters. **Send fedpol** your information for analysis.

«5,330 ...»

2011

RANSOMS FOR ENCRYPTED DATA

The incidence of ransomware attacks rose in 2016, with fedpol receiving a total of 512 reports. As the name suggests, 'ransomware' is designed to demand a ransom for the release of data. It gets into the computer, encrypts the data and locks the device. The user is told that everything will work again as soon as they have paid the ransom. Not true! In the majority of cases, they lose both their money and their data.

When the wave of ransomware attacks began, the encryption algorithms were still very straightforward. Since then, they have become increasingly difficult to crack. And while ransomware attacks were predominantly random in the past, the number of targeted attacks on specific organisations is growing. Information from fedpol and Europol indicates that such attacks will continue to increase. **Take precautions:** make backups of your data. **Always keep your** computer software and operating system up to date. **Do not be blackmailed** and do not transfer any money. **Send a report** to fedpol for analysis. You can find out whether or not your data can be saved from www.nomoreransom.org.

«8,242 ...»

2012

«9,208 ...»

2013

FAKE WEBSHOPS

What an offer! An online shop is offering top brands at unbeatable prices. You have been wanting to treat yourself for ages to that longed-for designer bag and those great shoes. So you enter your credit card details and your address, and then wait for the postman. You can't wait!
And then what? At best, you'll get your parcel, but the goods will be fakes. At worst, you get nothing, and your money is also gone. This is topped only by those fake webshops which have been designed specifically to steal your personal details. The internet is teeming with scams like these, and they pop up everywhere, especially just before Christmas. After all, cyber crime also undergoes seasonal fluctuations, for example with a resurgence in fake hotel booking platforms during the holidays. In 2016, fedpol moved to block 666 sites selling fake products. At Europol, the figure was in excess of 6,000. **If an offer** is too good to be true, then it probably isn't true. Google reviews from other people. **Take a good look** at the layout of the site and pay particular attention to its returns policy, if it has one. **Do not touch** counterfeit goods, as you yourself will be committing an offence. **Report fake** webshops to fedpol so that we can take the necessary action to shut them down.

«10,214 ...»

2014

«11,575 ...»

2015

«14,033 ...»

2016

Reporting volume

The number of CySARs has risen in the last few years, However, the figures do not reflect the true extent of cybercrime. More than 80% of CySARs were of criminal relevance.

Human commodities *In 2016, Switzerland co-organised the fourth INTERPOL Global Conference on Human Trafficking in Lugano. The debates focused on protection for victims. One clear finding emerged: that NGOs and police require a common understanding of the signs of trafficking in order to identify victims more effectively.*

Giving victims a face

"Success in the fight against human trafficking is not measured by the number of criminal convictions alone. For law enforcement to truly protect victims, they must be given a face."
Nicoletta della Valle, Director of fedpol

The 'travel agent' has been in prison for more than two years now – to the relief of Sumalee* from Thailand, who was one of 80 victims of sexual exploitation identified by an extensive inquiry concluded by cantonal police forces and fedpol in 2016. Catapulted into six cantons in Switzerland, these women and transsexuals from Thailand found themselves hostages of a criminal network.

Sumalee left her home in northern Thailand to work in Bangkok, where circumstances forced her into prostitution. One day, an acquaintance told her of a woman who could arrange for her to travel to Switzerland with a work visa, and the promise of working in an establishment that would offer better conditions. The only requirement was that she had to be available seven days a week. Sumalee accepted. However, the minute she stepped onto Swiss soil, she found herself reduced to a sex slave, watched 24 hours a day, and 30,000 francs in debt. All of the money she earned was split 50:50 between debt repayments and the brothel owner.

The leads followed by the cantonal police and coordinated by fedpol took them to the 'travel agent', who was arrested at Zurich airport in 2014. International police cooperation was a crucial driver of this success. The Swiss police attaché in Thailand liaised closely with INTERPOL and the local authorities, exchanging key information that enabled the network to be identified. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also played a major part in the success of this work. The Zurich-based FIZ centre for advocacy and support for migrant women and victims of trafficking is worthy of particular mention, as it was here that victims such as Sumalee were able to meet in safety. Of the 80 identified victims, more than 20 have testified to what they have suffered. Investigators were then able to reconcile these statements with each other and arrest the 'travel agent', thought to be the head of the network, who will be sentenced in the near future. Sumalee has been living at the FIZ while the trial is in progress. Once justice has been done, she will have to make a decision: to stay in Switzerland or to return to Thailand. Whatever choice she makes, she can be certain that it marks the start of a new life.

Getting results while protecting victims

The experts meeting in Lugano between 19 and 21 October 2016 at the fourth INTERPOL Global Conference on Human Trafficking were only too familiar with cases like these. The debates at the conference, co-organised by fedpol and the cantonal police of Ticino, centred on the question of how victims of trafficking could be identified and protected. In her speech, fedpol director, Nicoletta della Valle, rightly pointed out that results are not everything.

If the perpetrators are to be arrested, victims must be prepared to testify. They are vulnerable, they do not speak the language of the country in which they are living, and are often there illegally. Their rights of self-determination are restricted as the result of coercion, having their passports confiscated, and being subjected to debt. They also fear that, if they testify to the authorities, there will be reprisals, primarily for themselves but also for their families at home.

The conference demonstrated how important it is for NGOs and the police to be aware of the indicators of trafficking so that they are able to identify victims and work together, making the most of their complementary roles.

NGOs are key

NGOs fulfil an important role in supporting victims, who often trust these organisations more than they trust the police. NGOs help victims to reintegrate socially after the trauma that they have experienced. This support involves helping victims to re-learn how to make their own decisions, to go out alone in public without fear, and to take language courses or receive training so that they can get a job. These efforts are intended to help them integrate in Switzerland and obtain a residence permit, or to support them with returning to their home countries and reintegrating there. As they regain this capacity to make their own decisions, victims may reach a point at which they are ready to testify. However, if they do not wish to collaborate with the authorities, their choice is respected.

Police forces and NGOs in Switzerland are working together to achieve a better common understanding of the signs of human trafficking. In its capacity as coordinator, fedpol works with a number of NGOs – such as the FIZ in Zurich, the *Cœur des grottes* refuge in Geneva and the *Astrée* support organisation in the French-speaking region of Switzerland – and engages in bridge-building with various stakeholders and local players. This close working relationship has enabled NGOs to be incorporated into police cooperation projects with Romania and Bulgaria. It also forms one of the strategic priorities of national action plans to fight human trafficking. The second National Action Plan to Fight Against Human Trafficking, covering the period from 2017 to 2020, was adopted on 30 November 2016.

In 2016, fedpol broadened its collaboration with a new NGO, ACT212. This association runs a national human trafficking hotline, allowing private individuals to report over the internet or by telephone exploitative situations of all types (e.g. sexual or labour exploitation). A number of cases have been referred to fedpol for verification and processing, and fedpol has passed information to the competent authorities in Switzerland, or abroad via INTERPOL, so that potential victims can be identified.

*Name changed

This picture was taken on 6 May 2013 on the Langstrasse in Zurich. Most of the prostitutes working in Zurich are from Hungary: many of them have grown up in underprivileged Romani families and originate from the town of *Nyíregyháza* and its surrounding area, in the north-east of the country.

Uncovering trafficking

Working alongside ACT212, trafficking situations have been uncovered thanks to reports from private individuals. This is an excerpt from one notable case: "It was about 3pm when a car arrived and parked in a space reserved for my company's customers. I saw the number plate and wanted to go out to tell the driver that the space was reserved, but the man, in black and with a woman with long blonde hair, dressed up and in full make-up, had gone. Around 35 minutes later, a delivery van parked next to the car. The man returned with the young woman, opened the back door of the van and the woman got inside. Then, he went to his car to get a passport which he threw onto the front passenger seat of the van. When I went out to tell them that the spaces were reserved, the driver didn't understand. The man translated what I said into a foreign language. The car and the van then drove off." The individual who reported the case to ACT212 made a note of the number plates which, after further inquiries, enabled a potential trafficking situation to be identified. The case was then referred to a foreign authority through fedpol. Proceedings are in progress.

The fight against smugglers *One night in November 2016, a young Eritrean man is hit by a regional train in northern Italy. He has been trying to board a freight car towards Germany to fulfil his dream of a better future. Like 90 per cent of migrants arriving in Europe, he was caught in the nets of the lucrative people smuggling business. He paid with his life.*

People smuggling – a shameless business

Bolzano railway station in Italy, 22 November 2016: the scene of a tragedy the previous night. Accompanied by three other migrants, a 17 year-old Eritrean was walking along the tracks. He aimed to climb on to a freight car that would take him first to Austria, and then to Germany, where he planned to meet his brother. As he was about to cross the tracks, he was hit by a regional train, and killed. Having left Libya on a simple boat in exchange for a large sum of money, he was rescued at sea. He arrived in Italy, but did not stay. Instead, like so many migrants in 2016, he embarked on a journey to northern Europe, risking his life on dangerous routes.

Fewer arrivals, more deaths

Human tragedies, like the one involving this young Eritrean, were a daily occurrence on the migrant route in 2016. According to figures released by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of migrants arriving in Europe by sea fell in 2016 to 361,709, from 1,015,078 in 2015. At the same time, there have never been so many deaths – more than 5,000 in 2016, an increase of 47%. The reason for this was the dangerous routes and modes of transport taken by these migrants, whether by sea in overloaded inflatable dinghies, or across 'green' borders – invisible zones where they can pass illegally from one country to another, such as along railway lines.

These vulnerable migrants have no other choice but to pay smugglers. According to Europol, 90 percent of the migrants who arrived in Europe in 2016 had to pay for the services of people smugglers.

North-South axis gained new relevance in 2016

The EU-Turkey Statement and border policing measures put in place in transit countries along the Balkan route changed migratory flows in 2016. The Balkan route was closed, and the sea crossing between Libya and Egypt and the Italian islands of Pantelleria, Lampedusa and Sicily reactivated. Migrants headed out of Italy towards northern Europe, turning Switzerland into the perfect transit country. Indeed, more than half of the migrants checked at the border wished to travel through Switzerland. The highest proportion of these came from Africa (Eritrea, Gambia, Nigeria, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia and Ethiopia).

Smuggler tactics changing all the time

On 30 August 2016, fedpol organised the second national conference on combatting people smuggling. All of the experts meeting in Bern – fedpol, the Swiss Border Guard, migration services, cantonal and municipal police forces, Swiss and foreign judicial authorities and Europol – came to the same conclusion: the way in which the smugglers work has become more complex, with a trend towards polycrime, i.e. involvement in different areas of crime.

Migrants passing by a crucifix at Bolzano station.

Maximising profit

In 2016, criminal networks expanded their activities and strengthened their methods of recruiting potential 'clients' whose travel to Europe these networks arrange. They also diversified their operations, branching out into areas such as human trafficking, drugs trafficking, arms trafficking, burglaries, robberies, extortion and even money laundering. These groups have offshoots in various countries, linked by their agent networks, or middlemen. By diversifying, they can become more profitable. Maximising profits while minimising risks – a hackneyed business slogan, but one which neatly summarises the smugglers' operations.

For example, smugglers no longer risk accompanying their 'clients', but use the internet and social networks to point out the route to take to reach the appropriate 'hotspot'. These are the key nodes in the organised networks, such as towns in Europe or registration centres where the agents can be found. The traffickers also try to justify the rise in prices since tougher border controls were announced, citing reasons such as higher costs for transport and for forged identity documents.

When a migrant is caught in the smugglers' net, they may have dealings with a number of agents along their route, travel by a variety of means of transport, and use different modes of payment. In many cases, this will involve a series of smaller amounts to a number of 'associates' (see chart on page 42). For example, the mobile phone of a trafficker arrested on the Serbia-Hungary border contained a message from a Swiss mobile number stating that money had been successfully transferred by a money transfer service to a third party in Kosovo.

Working alongside neighbouring countries

In Switzerland, the cantons are responsible for prosecuting migrant trafficking cases. fedpol takes on a coordinating role at national and international level. The multi-agency Gruppo Interforze Repressione Passatori (GIRP) was set up in Chiasso at the end of 2015 under the lead of the cantonal police of Ticino in order to improve the criminal prosecution of traffickers. Its aims are to fight proactively against smugglers, and to strengthen information-gathering and investigation in collaboration with a specially appointed cantonal prosecutor. This is further facilitated by cross-border cooperation with Italy, primarily, but also with Germany, France and Austria. The GIRP currently includes liaison officers from Italy and Germany, the Swiss Border Guard and the cantonal police of Ticino. Since its inception, the GIRP has conducted a number of operations, specifically 26 interviews and 19 checks. With the support of other cantonal police forces, this has allowed it to open five investigations, all of which are still in progress.

Various profiles, known operating patterns – in Switzerland as elsewhere

According to the cantonal criminal prosecution authorities and the Swiss Border Guard, smugglers working in Switzerland originate primarily from Kosovo, Eritrea, Serbia, Hungary, Syria, Macedonia and Switzerland itself. They take all sorts of forms, from organised groups with ties to networks involved in multiple areas of crime, as mentioned above, to earlier migrants living and working legally in Switzerland. Sharing the same language and culture, they make contact with relatives, point out the routes to take, and help them on their way to their destination country, for example with accommodation, undeclared work, or forged identity documents. There are also occasional smugglers who are not part of any network. Since 2015, these 'independents', who are unemployed or in difficult financial circumstances, have begun offering to carry migrants on short trips for small sums of money. This form of smuggling became more widespread in 2016.

If the young Eritrean man had indeed managed to climb aboard the freight car towards Germany, would he then have been free from the smugglers? He may have had to settle a debt or, as an unaccompanied minor, he might have been exploited further by criminal networks. There is no certainty that he would have been free to pursue his dreams.

Payment for people smuggling

Payments in connection with people smuggling are made by the refugee to the trafficker, and between the traffickers themselves. The majority of these payments are made in person in cash, or using the hawala system – a parallel payment system which ensures that no trace of the transaction remains. There are a number of typical scenarios:

- The migrant pays several amounts in cash, in stages: an initial payment upon departure, and then further instalments along the way until they arrive.
- For 'full package' trips, including transport, accommodation, information en route and forged identity documents, the money is deposited with an agency in the country of departure and is not released until the person arrives at their destination.

- The person pays in kind: once they have arrived in their destination country, or a transit country, they provide transport, logistical services or accommodation.
- The cost of travel is paid in person by the family remaining behind or family members who are already in the destination country.
- The cost of the trip is paid by forced labour on the part of the migrant or by sexual exploitation (rendering 'smuggling' equivalent to human trafficking). This exploitation may happen before departure, during the trip or once the migrant arrives at their destination.

The hawala system

Hawala is a trust-based system which relies on a network of people living in different countries and operating in different sectors. For example, a greengrocer in Switzerland might constitute a hawala branch. An insider in the network gives him a sum of money in cash and asks him to pay it to a family member in another country. The greengrocer informs an agent in the destination country by phone, e-mail or fax, and this person then pays the requested sum to the family member in question. The debt between the greengrocer in Switzerland and his agent is then set off against another transaction in the future.

Most hawala transactions are not linked to illegal activities. In many cases, it is the only way for those living abroad to send money home, perhaps because the banks only accept large amounts, or because no banking system exists.

That said, hawala is also used for criminal ends. It is the perfect system; there is no trace of transactions and no direct link between the client and the beneficiary. It is an informal system par excellence, difficult for prosecuting authorities to track.

What does a journey cost?

Smuggling costs vary, depending on the type of transport and the chosen route. One trend is clear, however: prices are rising. According to Europol, a journey to Europe at the end of summer 2015 cost between 2,000 and 5,000 euros. In 2016, the price had risen to 3,000 euros for just one part of the same route. Smuggling costs are at least ten times higher than the average salary in countries of origin such as Syria, Iraq or Eritrea.

1 A Gambian man arrives in Italy by sea; he wants to get to Germany to meet up with his family.

2 His family in Germany pays a member of a people-smuggling network there, who promises to organise the trip from Italy to Germany.

3 The German smuggler contacts an agent in Italy and asks him to pay another smuggler to take the Gambian man to the German border.

4 The Italian smuggler receives the agent's money and organises the Gambian man's transfer towards Germany.

5 The smuggler in Germany has a mobile phone business delivering to Italy. When he makes the next delivery, he pays his debt in kind to his Italian agent.

Protection of federal officials and buildings *Since the attack on the Zug regional parliament building in 2001, federal officials and buildings have been given better and more systematic protection. Questions are being continually asked about whether security measures are proportionate to the threats. Answering such questions is something of a balancing act.*

Security under the dome of the Federal Palace

On 27 September 2001, an attacker entered the parliament building in Zug undetected and proceeded to shoot indiscriminately in the parliament chamber. He killed 14 members of the cantonal parliament and cantonal council, and injured many politicians and journalists, some of them seriously. The attacker was wearing a homemade police vest and was armed with several weapons, including an assault rifle, a pistol and a revolver. The man was known to the authorities. He had several previous convictions and had threatened a bus driver with a weapon a few years prior to the attack. He had also attracted attention by writing hate-filled letters and pamphlets accusing the local authorities of abuse of office.

This was the worst attack in recent Swiss history and plunged the country into mourning. It also represented a turning point in terms of security in public buildings. The realisation suddenly dawned that even in Switzerland, security is something that cannot be taken for granted. It has its price and restricts freedom of movement. Various measures that fedpol had devised years before the attack in Zug were implemented, in particular structural and organisational measures aimed at protecting the parliament building and the offices of local authorities.

To protect members of the federal government and federal employees, fedpol systematically records reported threats. In the case of the Zug attack, employees had been threatened verbally and in writing before the incident. However, digitisation and, in particular, social media have progressively made people's inhibitions fall away. In the supposedly anonymous online world, members of the federal government and public authorities are sometimes subjected to vicious insults and threats. For example, in 2016 letters were sent and phone calls made to members of the Federal Supreme Court, the Federal Council and Parliament with the following threat:



"This Thursday I am going to kill you. The next day I'm going to blow up the Federal Parliament and then I might kill all the members of the Federal Council."

The letters were anonymous and the phone calls were made from public phone boxes. fedpol was initially unable to identify the individual behind the threats. However, the letter indicated that the person had some mental health issues.

Those who received the threats were contacted and counselled. Potential security measures were reviewed and put in place, and the relevant police services were informed. A criminal investigation was launched early on and specialists were called in to seize any trace evidence. And sure enough, fingerprints were found on the letters. Together with further investigations by fedpol, they pointed to an earlier case and to a young person already known to police. Following consultations between the public prosecutor and cantonal police concerned, the person was arrested and questioned. He proceeded to offer a detailed and elaborate confession.

The people who had been threatened were informed and the security measures were lifted.

Protection of the Federal Palace

The Federal Palace gets special protection. Over 100,000 people from Switzerland and abroad visited the seat of the Swiss Parliament last year, all of whom had to undergo security checks.

First, guests have to register with fedpol staff at the visitor entrance, where they hand over their identity document in order to receive a visitor badge. They are then guided through the security gates and metal detector, and any luggage is x-rayed. Just as some passengers find airport security checks annoying, some visitors to the Federal Palace find the security checks inconvenient, especially if there are queues, as five minutes can seem like a long wait to some people. In such moments it is worth remembering the purpose of the exercise: security measures prevent dangerous items being brought into the building.

In 2016 fedpol received 1,691 threat reports – a 59 per cent increase compared to 2015.

For the most part, however, visitors are patient and cooperative. They know that security has a price. It is therefore especially surprising that during its checks, fedpol still comes across people carrying dangerous and even prohibited objects. It is hard to believe, but last year 13 banned objects, such as butterfly knives, knuckle-dusters and a baton, were seized.

1,000 visitors a day during parliamentary sessions

The busiest times for fedpol's security staff are when Parliament is in session. On an average session day, around 1,000 people pass through the visitor entrance. In order to ensure that everything runs smoothly, there are 30 to 35 security staff on duty, who are always friendly but also dedicated to ensuring people's safety and security.

The rise in the number of reports can be explained by the increased awareness of the departments and Parliament. As before, the majority of reports do not result in criminal proceedings. Around 80 per cent of the reports received by fedpol are merely expressions of annoyance.

fedpol in focus
At the centre of policing in Switzerland

In Switzerland, security is primarily the responsibility of the cantons. In our globalised world, however, crime does not stop at borders. Indeed, crime today is becoming ever more complex, often affecting several cantons simultaneously and frequently having an international dimension.

Against this backdrop, fedpol, as Switzerland's national police agency, plays a central role. It coordinates, analyses and investigates complex cases involving serious crime. And it provides vital infrastructures. Hence, fedpol is at the heart of policing in Switzerland and is the nexus to the country's international partners. A portrait.

INVESTIGATING SERIOUS CRIME IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

On behalf of the Office of the Attorney General (OAG), fedpol conducts investigations into complex cases of serious international crime. If there is sufficient indication that a crime has been committed, the OAG launches a criminal investigation. The investigations usually concern economic crime such money laundering or corruption, offences against the state such as terrorism or espionage, or activities involving criminal mafia-like organisations.

The 2015–2019 crime prevention strategy of the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP) forms the basis of fedpol's work. The FDJP's strategy is part of the overall strategy of the federal law enforcement services and is aligned to the OAG's strategy. It identifies four key threats: terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime, and human trafficking and migrant smuggling. The FDJP strategy draws on the Federal Council's security objectives and encompasses tasks relating to coordination and analysis, which fedpol performs in its own scope of competence. The investigations fedpol conducts on behalf of the OAG are based on the strategic priorities of the latter.

DIRECTING NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION

Crime does not stop at national borders. That is why combating crime is often an international concern. fedpol is Switzerland's contact point for foreign police services. Every day, fedpol sends and receives hundreds of communications to and from its international partners.

ENSURING THE SAFETY OF PEOPLE AND FACILITIES UNDER FEDERAL PROTECTION

fedpol defines the measures required to protect federal officials, such as federal councillors, or people subject to protection under international law, such as foreign ministers on state visits to Switzerland. To this end, fedpol compiles threat assessments and determines specific security measures, which are implemented by the cantonal police. It is also responsible for the security of federal buildings and foreign diplomatic missions accredited to Switzerland. A further task includes guaranteeing safety and security on board Swiss commercial aircraft and at selected airports abroad according to an ongoing situation assessment.

DEVELOPING AND OPERATING NATIONAL DATABASES

Exchanging information and identifying wanted persons or missing objects is of key importance in fighting crime. To this end, the cantonal police use numerous channels and databases developed by fedpol, such as the RIPOL search system or the AFIS fingerprint database with an expenditure of CHF 47 million – one-fifth of its total budget – fedpol operates around fifty IT applications. All Swiss citizens benefit directly from at least one of these systems: the database for collecting data to produce the Swiss passport and identity card. In 2016, data from this application was used to produce 689,745 passports and 996,186 identity cards.

fedpol is …

908

Employees

245

million Budget

Language distribution:
72% German
19.1% French
8.5% Italian
0.3% Romansh

Salary category
17–23
Salary category
24–29
Salary category
30–38



The security landscape is in a constant state of flux: crime is evolving all the time and unforeseen events can occur at any moment. To succeed in this ever-changing environment fedpol must set priorities, manage its resources effectively, and develop and implement efficient, target-oriented processes.

To attain these goals the director of fedpol initiated several projects in 2015, which continued throughout 2016. Examples of these projects include the reorganisation of the Federal Criminal Police and a project to foster the career development of fedpol staff through a better evaluation of their professional skills. One of the aims of this latter project is to ensure that fedpol staff remain competitive on the employment market throughout their working life.

In 2016, fedpol outlined its global strategy and defined its vision and a clear mission. Together, the staff and Directorate reflected on the values that characterise fedpol on the occasion of its annual gathering.

As a modern and competitive employer, fedpol supports the compatibility between work and family life. Examples include promoting, wherever possible, work from home, part-time work and job-sharing – also for people in managerial positions – and promoting women to key positions. To foster young talent fedpol has also introduced a mentoring programme. A symbol of this personnel policy is fedpol's parent-child-room, where parents who have to come to the office at short notice can bring their children and work in an environment appropriate to their needs.



908 employees comprising
679 full-time positions



Gender balance
34.3% female and
65.7% male

Concept
Federal Office of Police fedpol
Editing
Federal Office of Police fedpol
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P. 3: Keystone/Science Photo Library/Michael Donne
P. 5 : Christoph Grünig, Bienne
P. 13 : Christoph Grünig, Bienne
P. 17 : Mark Bullen
P. 25: Keystone/Science Photo Library/Sheila Terry
P. 38/39: Keystone/Andras D. Hajdu
P. 41: Keystone/DPA/Nicolas Armer
Typeface
Adelle (Veronika Burian/José Scaglione)
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