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Federal Department of Justice and Police DFJP
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annual report fedpol 2015

Together against terrorism

2015 was an exceptional year: a fraught geopolitical situation, thousands of people forced to flee their country and step into the unknown, and of course terrorism, which struck time and again.

As Paris found itself in the grip of terror attacks for the second time that year, 2015 ended as it had begun. But fedpol had come a long way between the two terror attacks. The hard work of the TETRA Task Force is paying off, with more than 70 cases handled by fedpol and the Federal Intelligence Service by the end of 2015, including some 50 cases in which the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland opened criminal proceedings. In order to respond to the threat, the authorities involved in the fight against terrorism worked tirelessly under the influence of the task force to add to and strengthen the measures in place.

On the morning of 14 November, the day after the Paris attacks, fedpol took part in a round-table discussion with its partners: the Federal Intelligence Service, the Attorney General's Office, the Swiss Border Guard, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the cantonal police corps and the Police Management Support Staff. They all joined fedpol that day to analyse the threat faced by Switzerland and to implement initial measures. This is the image from 2015 that will stay with me: all partners, from the cantons and federal government, coming together around a table to seek common solutions.

In our complex and interconnected world, co-operation and co-ordination are essential, and this is a principle that also guides the work of fedpol. As a police service, we are no longer able to act alone; we are only effective if all partners in Switzerland and abroad join forces and take joint action. This will become clear as you read through our annual report. Whether the arrest of a jewel thief, the conviction of three Iraqi jihadi terrorism sympathisers or the extradition of suspected mafia members to Italy, our work always has an international dimension and is based on co-ordination and co-operation.

The world is moving and developing, and so too is crime. In this context fedpol has to look ahead and anticipate future risks and challenges. The tasks of fedpol are like our environment: complex and interconnected. In light of this, we have to remain dynamic, flexible and professional. And we are fully committed to achieving this goal, day after day.

This idea of a world on the move is reflected in our annual report, which has been given an overhaul and is now more concise, easier to read and looks different – with an aesthetically pleasing central theme.

Wishing you an interesting
and enjoyable read,

Nicoletta della Valle, Director

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
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Carte blanche for Aurel Märki
In the year of *Charlie Hebdo,* we decided to give illustrator Aurel Märki a kind of carte blanche to illustrate fedpol's annual report. The only specification given to the artist was the obvious theme: terrorism. The result is a series of powerful yet sensitive illustrations to accompany the text and encourage readers to engage with the topics.

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A year of Charlie   *2015 started with bewilderment and a hashtag that in the space of a few hours became a symbol of solidarity and freedom of expression. Paris, Copenhagen, Sanaa, Jakarta, Sinai, Istanbul – the list is long for 2015, a year marked by terrorist attacks.*

#jesuischarlie

When the editorial office of *Charlie Hebdo* was attacked in January 2015, the TETRA Task Force had already existed for several months. It is led by fedpol and allows the federal government and cantons to work closely together to co-ordinate, evaluate and optimise the necessary measures to fight terrorism in Switzerland.
In autumn 2015, the Federal Council approved a national strategy to combat terrorism. This serves as a guideline for the work of the TETRA Task Force. The aims of the task force are clear: to prevent terrorist attacks in Switzerland, to prevent the export of terrorism and to ensure that Switzerland is not used as a logistical base by terrorists. In 2015, the TETRA Task Force published two reports explaining its activities and the measures taken.

Ongoing investigations

The figures speak for themselves: in collaboration with the Federal Intelligence Service, fedpol handled more than 70 cases of suspected sympathisers and supporters of jihadi terrorism, and in some 50 cases the Office of the Attorney General conducted criminal proceedings assisted by fedpol.

Efficient co-ordination and co-operation within the task force has strengthened and simplified the investigation work. Information is rapidly shared between the partners involved and the cases are handled swiftly. Combating jihadi terrorism is a particular challenge for fedpol (see p.8). This is why a rapid and reliable exchange of information between the authorities is crucial to the work of the investigators.

Identifying potential jihadis

To stop the export of terrorism from Switzerland to other countries, jihad-motivated trips to conflict regions must be prevented. The law enforcement services have a range of tools at their disposal to detect the travel plans of suspects (see p.10 and p.31). Sharing information is essential to ensure a co-ordinated approach. To this end, major efforts were made in 2015 to raise awareness among police services and the Swiss Border Guard of jihad-motivated travel. Efforts focused on establishing standardised, internationally proven indicators to help identify would-be terrorist fighters travelling to conflict regions. A further focus was on

improving the fast exchange of information between the federal government and cantons in suspected terrorist-related cases. The growing number of reports in this respect shows that this awareness-raising work is paying off.

Missing person reports are a good example of this. Most of the time, the police learn about new cases of individuals travelling to conflict regions to fight jihad when their relatives report them as missing. If these reports are processed without delay and the information is immediately passed on to fedpol, the law enforcement services can act quickly. For example, in early 2016, the parents of a Swiss girl living abroad contacted the cantonal police to report their daughter as missing. According to the parents, the young woman wanted to travel to Syria with her child to join the terrorist organisation, Islamic State. The cantonal police immediately informed fedpol. In collaboration with the Attorney General's Office, the Federal Intelligence Service and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, fedpol initiated all the necessary measures. The woman was arrested before she

7 January 2015: Following the attack on the offices of *Charlie Hebdo*, people throughout the world come together to show their solidarity with the Paris victims.

reached Syria and the child was placed in the care of the father. On her return to Switzerland, the Attorney General's Office initiated criminal proceedings against the woman.

On the one hand, therefore, the export of terrorism from Switzerland to other countries needs to be prevented. On the other hand, potential terrorists must be stopped from entering Switzerland. In 2015, fedpol issued 15 entry bans to jihadis. This brings the total number of entry bans issued since the beginning of 2012 to 30.

An international fight

A defining image of 2015 was the solidarity march involving heads of state from all over the world amid huge crowds in Paris. Since then, fighting terrorism has featured at the top of the international agenda and numerous initiatives have been implemented to improve international co-operation. One example is Europol's European Counter Terrorism Centre, which identifies terrorist and violent extremist web content. Switzerland is represented in the Europol working groups by fedpol. Switzerland's participation is important

as it promotes the sharing of information and experience with European partners. The aim of the working groups is to define common strategic axes. Everyone must pull in the same direction. Such co-operation is extremely valuable to fedpol because fighting terrorism only makes sense at an international level. Whether combating the funding of terror (see p.16), regulating the handling of firearms or managing airline passenger data – the list of issues requiring global solutions is long. fedpol is heavily involved in these issues to ensure that Switzerland can play its part in effective counter-terrorism.

Raised terror threat – in Switzerland too

The Federal Intelligence Service reiterated in 2015 that the terrorist threat to Switzerland is still high and raised the level again in November. Intelligence sources suggested that IS had sent people to Europe to plan and carry out attacks. The Paris attacks committed on 13 November 2015 (see box) unfortunately substantiated such fears. The long list of terror attacks committed in 2015 is a reminder that the fight against terror is far from over.

After 13 November

It is late evening on 13 November 2015. The death toll of the attacks carried out a few hours earlier in Paris is rising by the minute. fedpol decides to send two members of staff to Paris to support the work of the Swiss embassy. The following morning, the Security Core Group, in which fedpol is represented, calls a crisis meeting with all the authorities involved. The Federal Intelligence Service, fedpol, the Attorney General's Office, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the Swiss Border Guard and the cantonal police services therefore sit together round a table to decide on initial measures and to support French investigations in Switzerland. A few hours later, the president of the Swiss Confederation, Simonetta Sommaruga, gives a statement to the media on behalf of Switzerland. The next few days are non-stop: fedpol and its partners continually assess the situation, evaluating the fitness for purpose of the existing measures and adapting them where necessary. In addition, all information that may be related to the Paris attacks has to be verified in order to identify any potential clues or tip-offs that may be useful to the French authorities. In the weeks following the attacks, fedpol follows up on some 290 reports on persons and objects, verifies 400 tip-offs and implements operational or co-ordinating measures in over 100 cases.

Counter-terrorism investigations On 21 March 2014, the police arrested three Iraqi nationals as they were leaving their flat in Beringen in the canton of Schaffhausen. They were suspected of planning a terror attack. The complex investigations came to an end in early 2016 when the three Iraqis were convicted by the Federal Criminal Court.

Fighting terrorism successfully

On 14 March 2014, the Federal Intelligence Service informed fedpol about a person residing in Switzerland who was allegedly involved in planning a terrorist attack. According to the service, the individual was in touch with a suspected leading member of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Syria. A meeting had allegedly taken place with another protagonist to plan the attack.

The Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland acted immediately: a criminal investigation was launched and a whole catalogue of measures was put in place. The transmitted information was checked, the suspects located and put under surveillance, and telephone calls monitored. Suspicions mounted against two Iraqi citizens and an unidentified person. The phone taps suggested contact with ISIL. One of the suspects travelled to Turkey. According to the monitored phone conversation, he allegedly obtained information there which "would be useful in getting

the job done." The day after he returned to Switzerland, he met up with his two accomplices in Beringen. The investigators from fedpol hesitated and consulted with the Attorney General's Office. What should they do? Arrest the trio and risk intervening too soon? Or wait and therefore put public security at risk? The safety aspect prevailed and, after a long week of intensive monitoring, the three suspects were arrested.

The search for sources
What applies to many investigations also applies in the field of terrorism: they almost always have an international dimension. However, the exchange of police information with countries such as Syria and Iraq is practically impossible due to limited legal frameworks. It is difficult to establish what is happening on the ground and to compile substantial evidence. Even if the investigating authorities obtain information, it cannot always be used in court for reasons of source protection.

Combing through vast amounts of data
The electronic data discovered at the protagonists' property was extremely valuable. IT forensics experts at fedpol combed through seized computers and mobile phones. In the case described above, two terabytes of data were seized. Information from social media chats was essential to the investigations. The sheer volume of data involved posed major challenges to the investigators: in the case described, 30,000 lines of Facebook chats were transcribed and analysed. Whole teams were mobilised to analyse the material. The operational analysts processed the data supplied by providers into a format that could be used for further processing. Next, it was the turn of the translators to transform the chats conducted in Arabic into German, not an easy task given that the content contained numerous abbreviations and coded expressions. The operational analysts then worked with the investigators to

29 February 2016: The defence counsel on the first day of proceedings at the Federal Criminal Court in Bellinzona against four alleged IS members charged with planning a terror attack in Switzerland.

Verdict of the Federal Criminal Court
In March 2016, the Federal Criminal Court found two of the defendants guilty and sentenced them to four years and eight months' imprisonment for involvement in a criminal organisation. The third defendant was sentenced to three years and six months' imprisonment for supporting a criminal organisation. The fourth defendant was acquitted.

comb through the data for incriminating as well as exculpatory elements, to verify the information and search for helpful clues.

Understanding correlations

To make this possible, the context, cultural background and history of ISIL have to be understood. This is where the strategic analysts step in to analyse and interpret the content. On the basis of this work, the investigators search for clues and promising leads. Drawing on the chronology of events that led to the founding of Islamic State, the analysts traced the history of the three Iraqis. Various allusions made to specific events in the chats revealed that they had subscribed to jihadi ideology for a number of years. The vocabulary they used also pointed to the activities of IS. The analysts also investigated the suspects' chat contacts and traced them. The information gleaned in this case revealed that the three Iraqi nationals had smuggled jihadis into Europe.

Co-operation with US law enforcement

Early on in the investigations, links to the United States became evident. As part of the Operative Working Agreement concluded with the US, a joint investigation team was deployed. This helped the investigations move forward more quickly: proceedings were accelerated and FBI agents could request data from suspicious chats directly from the Facebook operators and share relevant information with fedpol. Such co-operation benefits both sides, since the incriminating evidence can be used by fedpol and the US law enforcement agencies alike.

Staying focused

The important thing is not to waste any time. As the leading investigator stressed: "We mustn't forget that these individuals are being remanded in custody because they are suspects. If this suspicion does not prove true, they will have been deprived of their freedom for nothing." Efficiency is

called for. In the case of the three Iraqis, the incriminating evidence was stacking up. Custody was therefore extended until the trial. "We can't afford to get lost in details and have to focus on what's important", the leading investigator explained. "We could make countless speculations and follow up every lead. But we have to set priorities, take the right action and be determined about staying on track." And that paid off. At the end of 2015, following several thousand hours of analysis and investigation, the suspects were charged. Thanks to the analysis of the data and the interrogation of the defendants, the federal prosecutor was able to charge another individual. The defendants were accused of being members of and supporting a criminal organisation, and smuggling other IS followers into Europe. "The job is done", said the leading investigator. "The main goal of any investigation is to find out the truth. This involves searching for incriminating and exculpatory evidence. The final verdict is secondary – although of course a conviction also provides a certain degree of recognition of the work done."

Law enforcement

The work of the law enforcement services is subject to strict statutory provisions. The stronger the suspicion, the tougher the coercive measures. The chart provides a simple overview of the various phases of law enforcement in Switzerland.

Vague suspicion	Growing suspicion	Suspicion

Information, leads or suspicion by the public

Information from the Federal Intelligence Service

■ Stages

Prevention:

Hazard control and intelligence gathering by the Federal Intelligence Service

Preliminary inquiries:

fedpol gathers information on suspect(s) from various sources

Police investigation:

fedpol identifies a crime and informs the Attorney General's Office

■ Possible measures (not exhaustive)

- *Surveillance in publicly accessible places*
- *Identify suspect's movements and contacts*

- *Evaluate open sources*
- *Gather information*
- *Consult official files*

- *Secure traces and evidence*
- *Take person(s) in for questioning*
- *Surveillance*

■ Statutory provisions

Internal Security Act
Civilian Intelligence Act

Central Offices Act

Criminal Procedure Code

Reasonable suspicion

Strong suspicion

Legal proceedings

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Investigative proceedings by the Attorney General's Office:
Attorney General opens an investigation and fedpol continues gathering evidence

There is sufficient evidence to bring a charge against the suspect

Criminal proceedings:
Court reaches a verdict on the charges brought by the Attorney General's Office

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- *House searches*
- *Seize evidence*
- *Alerts*
- *Undercover investigation*

- *Pre-trial detention*
- *Intercept telephone calls*
- *Freeze/seize identity documents*
- *Duty to report*

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> "Good co-operation requires everyone involved to feel that they are working towards the same goals."
>
> Michael Lauber

They work together around the clock. fedpol and the Office of the Attorney General. Police officers and federal prosecutors. This partnership must work if investigations into serious crime are to be successful. We spoke to the two key players.

Committed to a common cause

Let's start with a look back at the past year. What particularly stands out in your minds about 2015?

Nicoletta della Valle, Director of fedpol
For me 2015 was my first full year as director of fedpol. It was a year when we reflected on our organisation and how we can improve and optimise our resources to meet future challenges. 2015 was also shaped by terrorism; *Charlie Hebdo*, the Bataclan, Tunis, Copenhagen. These attacks not only kept us busy with investigations on behalf of the Attorney General's Office, they were also formative for police co-operation with our partners in Switzerland and abroad. The work of the TETRA Task Force was intensive and productive. 2015 showed us that nothing works without effective national and international co-operation.

Michael Lauber, Attorney General
2015 was an important year for the Attorney General's Office. Firstly, we took some fundamental decisions about the structure of the office in order to be better equipped

to face future challenges. Secondly, many staffing decisions were made. It was also a year of high-profile cases: I'm thinking of Petrobas, the football corruption scandals, data theft at HSBC, as well as the numerous proceedings related to jihadi terrorism.

Do you see the many attacks in Europe in 2015 as a turning point in the fight against terrorism?

M. Lauber: The terror attacks in 2015 once again brought home the fact that the threat is real and can also affect Switzerland. But I don't see 2015 as a turning point. For me, there's no doubt about it: the turning point was 11 September 2001.

N. della Valle: I remember 11 September 2001 very vividly; the images were truly shocking. Perhaps the difference between then and now is that we perceived the 9/11 attacks to be happening a long way away, committed by terrorists from far-off places. Now the attacks are taking place on our doorstep and the potential terrorists are here among us.

The current context is not the same as it was before. Has anything changed regarding law enforcement over the years?

M. Lauber: I don't think law enforcement has changed much over the years; however, society's expectations of it have changed. Nowadays, people sometimes expect law enforcement to provide solutions to society's problems – beyond the scope of criminal law. But this is not the role of law enforcement. This is why communication is important, so that we don't create false expectations and to ensure that our role and mission are clear.

N. della Valle: It's true that sometimes people expect law enforcement to solve all of society's problems. This can be seen at the moment in the case of terrorism, but the phenomenon of radicalisation goes far beyond the work of the security services. We are only a part of the solution, but this is a wider social problem. Finding an answer is a challenge for all of society, not just law enforcement.

M. Lauber: There have also been a number of positive developments, such as the way

we work with our partners, which has been stepped up and has significantly improved. And this applies to our co-operation with fedpol, the Federal Intelligence Service, FINMA, the cantons and our international partners. Co-operation is a top priority as nowadays we can only fight crime if we work together. International exchange is of fundamental importance. All the major cases involving money laundering, such as the Petrobas affair, have an international dimension and we rely on efficient co-operation at operational and strategic level. In the investigation involving four Iraqi nationals, the Operative Working Agreement with the United States was extremely useful to us. We need to contemplate whether agreements of this type could also be concluded in cases of white-collar crime.

N. della Valle: Without international co-operation, we can't do our job successfully. fedpol is the single point of contact for international police co-operation and is fully committed to national co-operation and co-ordination. A key element of international police co-operation are our police attachés. For example, our liaison officer was actively involved in the Petrobas affair on the ground in Brazil. And something else that has fundamentally transformed police work are the new communications technologies that play a key role in all investigations. The internet in general, social media, mobile devices and computers are changing the nature of police work. These technologies are a challenge, and every police officer these days needs to have basic IT skills. It also means we need what we call forensic IT experts, i.e. proven experts with sound specialist knowledge in the field.

M. Lauber: Indeed, and in this sphere everything moves so fast; transmitting information via social networks is enabling a completely new type of interaction. This is why the revision of the Federal Act on the Surveillance of Postal and Telecommunications Traffic is so important to our work.

fedpol and the Attorney General's Office work together: fedpol investigates on behalf of the Attorney General's Office which in turn leads the proceedings. How does this division of roles affect co-operation?

M. Lauber: Good co-operation requires everyone involved to feel that they are working towards the same goals, both in their individual roles and in a complementary manner. And it has to be clear that both partners are needed to make progress. If we firmly believe in the benefits of this complementarity and the need for co-operation, we already have a very good basis for successful co-operation. Nicoletta della Valle and I believe in this. In the framework of our investigations, listening to and respecting police officers has proven essential. This is a commitment that is very important to me.

N. della Valle: I like to compare the division of roles between the federal prosecutors and the police with those in a hospital, where the doctors and nursing staff work hand in hand in their respective areas of responsibility and nothing works without the other. They complement each other and both are indispensable. Our co-operation works when everyone is aware of their role, whether police officer or federal prosecutor, and when everyone respects the work and the expertise of others. It shouldn't be about power, or about squabbling over responsibility, but about our shared and complementary commitment to the same cause. We have a good rapport and work well together. This doesn't mean that we always agree, but we respect each other's opinions and move forward together.

And finally: can you describe the attorney general in two words?

N. della Valle: That's an easy one – nice shoes! No, I'm just joking ... intelligent and tenacious.

And fedpol's director?

M. Lauber: Modern and complex!

What do you admire most about each other?

N. della Valle
He's always friendly and never seems to get annoyed. Sometimes I wonder how he does it.

M. Lauber
Her energy!

"Without international co-operation, we can't do our job successfully."
Nicoletta della Valle

Financing of terrorism *The events in Paris showed that terrorists require enormous financial resources to carry out such devastating attacks. But where does their funding come from? And how can the financing of terrorist attacks and organisations be prevented?*

Stopping the flow of terrorist funds

The terror organisation Islamic State is financed primarily through protection money (taxes) and other revenue collected under coercion in the IS-seized territories. Sources of revenue from abroad play a less important role (see page 18). IS uses the funds for building up the organisation, administering the territory under its occupation and paying its fighters.

Switzerland, too, could become a target of attack or be used as a support base for planning and carrying out attacks. According to the Coordination Group to Combat Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, of which fedpol is a member, the risk of Switzerland being misused by criminal and terrorist organisations is fairly low. However, combating the financing of terrorism is becoming an increasing priority at both national and international level.

SARs involving terrorist financing on the rise

The two main issues in Switzerland with regard to the financing of terrorism are the procurement of funds from people residing in the country and the misuse of the financial sector to bring together assets from various sources abroad and transfer them back abroad to finance terrorist activities. The financial sectors mainly affected are banks, service providers, such as money transmitters, and credit institutions.

In 2015, the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland at fedpol received 38 Suspicious Activity Reports concerning the financing of terrorism. This was a marked increase over the 9 SARs in 2014. The reports were mainly triggered by articles in the press. The heightened awareness of financial inter-mediaries with regard to terrorist financing undoubtedly also contributed to higher reporting volume. The asset value of SARs involving terrorist financing also rose: at CHF 32 million it is at its highest level to date.

MROS prioritises cases involving the financing of terrorism. If an initial analysis finds there is sufficient evidence of terrorist financing, MROS forwards the SAR to the appropriate law enforcement service in Switzerland or abroad. Sometimes these SARs play an important part in international investigations or criminal proceedings.

The following example illustrates the importance of international co-operation and fast action: A concerned father contacted his underage son's bank because the latter had gone missing. The father asked the bank for information on his son's spending; apparently his son had been acting out of

SARs concerning the financing of terrorism

character recently. The bank followed up on the enquiry and established various cash withdrawals abroad. It reported its findings to MROS, who forwarded the information to the authorities of a number of countries that the suspected jihadist traveller had visited. Thanks to this exchange of information, the young man was arrested three days after his disappearance and 24 hours after fedpol had received the bank report.

Alternative money transfer systems such as the Hawala (an informal transfer system that functions worldwide) are also used to finance terrorist activities. However, it is not clear what part these transfer systems play in Switzerland. In a few recent cases, money transactions have also been made using pre-paid credit cards. This method of payment is anonymous and can be used easily around the world, which makes it attractive to use in the financing of terrorism.

Fighting terrorist financing through co-operation
In 2015, the first National Risk Assessment on Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism was published in collaboration with fedpol. The NRA report contains the first comprehensive assessment of the risks of money laundering and the financing of terrorism in Switzerland. It reveals that financial crime in Switzerland is a reality and that the proceeds from crime (mostly committed abroad) are laundered here.

The financing of terrorism is a topic of intensive debate throughout Europe too. Besides closer national and international co-operation, greater weight is to be given to blocking or freezing terrorist-related assets and curbing the illegal trade in cultural objects. Further measures include granting Financial Intelligence Units such as MROS better access to centrally stored bank data, and tightening controls with respect to anonymous payment methods. Switzerland welcomes these discussions and has a keen interest in effective and practicable measures to combat the financing of terrorism. To this end it is actively involved in several European and international working groups.

million francs – total asset value of SARs involving terrorist financing

Islamic State funding

Islamic State is a terrorist organisation that has state-like control of wide areas of territory and for whom funding is, accordingly, of even greater significance than for conventional organisations. The diagram below is based on hypotheses and illustrates how IS is funded and what it in all probability uses the money for.

TURKEY

1

5

CYPRUS

ISRAEL

SYRIA

5 Support from foreign terrorist fighters

Foreign terrorist fighters support IS not just by joining the organisation to fight. They also finance their own travel and part of their own equipment.

Where does the money go to?

The majority of the money is spent on building and consolidating the organisation's administrative structures in IS-controlled territory, and on wages for its fighters. Presumably some money also flows abroad to finance terror attacks, although terrorists finance their violent crimes to a great extent themselves.

JORDAN

ISRAEL

SAUDI ARABIA

Where does the money come from?

1 Exploitation of occupied territory

IS imposes taxes on millions of people living in IS-controlled territory. Other sources of funding include bank raids, armed robberies and expropriation. Further revenue comes from agriculture, the control and trade of raw materials, and trafficking in stolen antiques.

2 Kidnappings

In the last few years IS has kidnapped hundreds of people, particularly inhabitants of IS-controlled regions in Syria and Iraq. Kidnapping is not only a means of generating funds through ransoms, but also serves propaganda purposes.

IRAN

3 Donations

Donations account for a lower proportion of revenue. However, occasionally IS receives generous donations from wealthy, private financiers from the Arab world. Fundraising through non-profit organisations is becoming an increasingly important source of revenue.

IRAQ

4 Crowdfunding

Like donations, fundraising through modern communication networks such as Twitter or its own social platforms is becoming an increasingly significant source of income for IS.

Money laundering The dramatic increase in Suspicious Activity Reports involving money laundering and the financing of terrorism proves that tighter legislation, better information systems and greater awareness on the part of the banks are effective. The exchange of information with partners abroad is also increasingly important.

Complex cases and greater reporting

In 2015, fedpol's Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland received 2,367 SARs in connection with money laundering. This was 35% more than the previous year.

The increase was due both to the scandal surrounding the Brazilian state oil company Petrobras and three other major cases, and to the heightened awareness of financial intermediaries. MROS, as the central reporting office for cases involving suspected money laundering and terrorist financing, acts as a liaison and filter between financial intermediaries and the prosecution authorities. One of its tasks is to raise awareness among financial intermediaries of money laundering and terrorist financing. Hence, in 2015 more than 90% of SARs came from the banking sector.

Total asset value rose by 44.5% to over CHF 4.8 billion. In contrast to previous years, bribery rather than fraud was the most frequently reported predicate offence to money laundering. This is a continuing trend from 2014, when the number of cases involving bribery rose twofold. MROS also received more SARs involving phishing-related fraud: 142 in 2015 as opposed to 104 in 2014, an increase of 38 reports.

Money laundering and money mules

'Phishing' is the attempt to steal a person's identity by accessing the personal data of an internet user by means of fake websites, e-mails or text messages. The aim of this type of fraud is to use the data to plunder the victim's account. To launder the money, fraudsters use financial agents known as money mules. The racket works as follows:

The money mule responds to an advertisement or is contacted by a third person and asked to make his bank account available for the transfer of money (often a four-digit amount) that orginates from hacking an account. The money mule is then directed to withdraw the sum in cash and forwarded it either by post or through a money transmitter to a person abroad who is not personally known to him. In return, the money mule receives a commission and may keep any leftover change. By receiving and passing on the money, the mule is liable to prosecution if it can be proven that he knew that money was being laundered. Money mules are often people that are in a difficult financial situation. It is not easy to prove how much they actually know about the whole thing.

Greater international co-operation

In the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism, MROS can exchange information with partner Financial Intelligence Units abroad. The number of inquiries MROS made to its foreign counterparts in 2015 rose significantly. One of the reasons for this was the growing international entanglement of financial flows.

In 2015, MROS sent 579 inquiries on 2,144 natural persons and legal entities to 95 foreign FIUs. Where SARs involve people or legal entities from abroad, MROS can request information that may be important for its analysis from its counterpart in the appropriate country.

Tighter anti-money laundering laws in Switzerland

With the entry into force of the Federal Act on Implementation of the Revised FATF Recommendations of 2012, MROS's mandate has been expanded to cover additional predicate offences to money laundering as from 2016. For example, under the new provisions, traders such as jewellers are obliged to carry out certain due diligence tasks if they accept more than

Reporting volume

	2015	2014		2015	2014	
Total number of SARs received	2,367	1,753		4,828,311,280	3,340,784,056	Total asset value CHF
Number of SARs forwarded to the prosecution authorities	1,675	1,298		3,337,667,524	2,862,395,437	Asset value of forwarded SARs
Not forwarded	692	455		1,490,643,756	478,388,619	Asset value of non-forwarded SARs

In 2015 MROS received 2,367 SARs on money laundering (+35%)

The total asset value of submitted SARs rose by 44.5% to more than CHF 4.8 billion (2014: CHF 3.3 billion)

CHF 100,000 in cash. If there is evidence that the money comes from a crime or from tax fraud, the trader must verify the background facts and submit a report to MROS if his suspicion is substantiated. Also, tax fraud is now classed as a predicate offence to money laundering if the evaded tax amounts to at least CHF 300,000 for each taxation period. And politically exposed persons – PEPs – also now include Swiss members of parliament besides foreign potentates.

Through these legal amendments, the Federal Council and the Swiss parliament seek to bring anti-money laundering legislation into line with current international standards. The measures were recommended by the Financial Action Task Force, an expert group on anti-money laundering established by the G7 in 1990. The FATF sets standards for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and evaluates their implementation by its member states. As Switzerland is to be evaluated in 2016, fedpol made intensive preparations throughout 2015, since MROS will play a pivotal role in the evaluation.

A typical case of money laundering
A client called his bank because he had purchased airline tickets via SMS at a cost of CHF 2,000 but subsequently received falsified tickets. The bank, which maintained a business connection with the company that issued the tickets and the travel agency involved, reported the case to MROS. An analysis by MROS revealed that one of the people holding power of signature over the reported account was already known to the authorities from a previous case. MROS discovered a connection to another bank, which disclosed further business connections on request. The contracting partners of the reported accounts were mostly travel agencies based in a neighbouring country of Switzerland. All the reported accounts were ultimately being used to transfer money abroad for laundering. Since MROS had reasonable grounds to suspect that the assets in the various accounts were derived from fraudulent activities, it forwarded the information to the prosecution authorities.

Corruption *Switzerland is actively involved in the fight against corruption and economic crime. Major corruption scandals, such as that concerning the Brazilian oil firm Petrobas or the former Greek defence minister, pose huge investigative challenges for fedpol.*

Millions in payoffs

11 April 2012: Akis Tsochatzopoulos accompanied by a police officer whose face is covered. For the last five years, the former defence minister has been the subject of criminal proceedings involving bribery and money laundering, also in Switzerland.

Switzerland is actively involved in fighting corruption and has signed international agreements with the UN, the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to this end. The aim is to protect Switzerland's financial centre, rooting out corruption and protecting witnesses and whistleblowers to greater effect.

In 2015, corruption was a widespread topic in the media and the public domain. Thanks to several cases with a high media impact, 2015 was the first year in which the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland at fedpol received more Suspicious Activity Reports concerning bribery than involving fraud as a predicate offence to money laundering.

Complex case of corruption concerning former Greek defence minister

In 2015, fedpol assisted the Office of the Attorney General's investigations relating to Greece's search for money originating from corruption and other criminal activities that had found its way into Swiss bank accounts. The case demonstrates the kind of challenges faced by fedpol in large-scale international corruption scandals.

For at least five years, the Greek prosecution authorities have been conducting criminal proceedings against a former Greek minister and other suspects from political circles and the army. The charges include bribery, embezzlement, abuse of office, document forgery and money laundering. The case involves arms contracts worth several billion US dollars that were awarded by the former Greek defence minister to international consortia.

Fedpol's enquiries were focussed on the criminal investigation by the Office of the Attorney General into an employee of a bank in Switzerland. The employee was responsible for bank accounts through which millions of dollars of alleged bribe money was transferred. The employee is believed to have know-ingly taken part in transactions to exchange bribes with Greek officials.

Difficult to prove

Complex cases such as the corruption scandal surrounding the former Greek defence minister highlight the challenges of investigative work. To prove a case of money laundering, three elements must be present: proof that the assets originate from a felony; proof of an act that is aimed at frustrating the identification of the origin, the tracing or the forfeiture of assets; and proof that the person committing the act knows or must assume that the assets originate from a felony. The first two criteria are objective elements and concern acts. The third – the subjective element – concerns knowledge and intention.

'Intention', i.e. what the person committing the act wanted to achieve, is difficult to prove. Firstly, the person must know or assume that they are dealing with assets that are of criminal origin. Secondly, they must intentionally thwart the efforts of the prosecution authorities to establish the origin and location of the assets and to confiscate them.

Whereas it is usually possible to establish the objective facts, in this particular case it must be proven that the Swiss bank employee knew or must have assumed that the assets he was managing stemmed from criminal activities, and that he intended to prevent the prosecution authorities from accessing the assets.

Correspondence, memos and minutes provide the authorities with information about a case, and thus about a person's wilful intention to act. Thus, if the accused bank employee passes on money to third parties, he commits an objective act of money laundering. If he is also aware of the criminal origin of this money or if it can be proven that he must have known about it, he is also guilty of committing a subjective act of money laundering.

New platform for reporting corruption

In 2015, the federal prosecution authorities launched a new instrument in the fight against corruption. Members of the public who have information on suspected acts of corruption can now report these to the police on the web-based platform www.korruptionsbekaempfung.ch. As the reporting platform guarantees anonymity, there is greater protection from reprisal, for example by an employer, and insiders are less likely to feel inhibited about making a report. The prosecution authorities hope that this will provide a new approach to the investigative process in the national and international fight against corruption. The corruption reporting platform is operated by fedpol on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General.

### Flood of information and problems of understanding

In this case, fedpol questioned numerous people, requested to see bank statements and evaluated the finance flows involved. Information from files and electronic data, requests for legal assistance, guarantees, bank statements and witness questioning from a wide range of sources had to be analysed and reviewed as part of the criminal proceedings relating to a suspected act of money laundering and abetting corruption committed in Switzerland. There were tens of thousands of pages of information.

The investigation was impeded further by the fact that the information was to a large extent in Greek. All documents had to be translated from Greek into German or vice versa. This slowed up the investigation and made it more difficult to compile the evidence. This is essentially a problem encountered in criminal investigations at international level; investigations are impeded and made more expensive owing to the language barrier particularly in countries with a language not widely spoken in Switzerland.

Organised crime *One of fedpol's strategic focuses is criminal organisations and groups; these pose a considerable threat to Switzerland. The criminal activities in which these groups engage include human trafficking, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, fraud, corruption, robbery and burglary.*

Mafia and co.

fedpol has a number of approaches in the fight against criminal organisations. It supports the cantons by providing analysis and co-ordination services, and in its role as federal police service it conducts investigations in proceedings against people involved in criminal organisations under the direction of the Office of the Attorney General. Prosecuting criminal organisations is one of the strategic priorities of the Attorney General's Office.

In its efforts to prosecute criminal organisations from Italy, the strategy of the Attorney General's Office is co-operate with the Italian authorities and provide mutual legal assistance. Thanks to fedpol's investigations, two people resident in Switzerland were sentenced in October 2015 in the lower courts in Italy for belonging to the 'Ndrangheta. If there is not enough evidence to sentence a suspect for belonging to a criminal organisation, the Swiss prosecution

authorities try to bring charges against them for individual offences. For example, in late 2014 and in September 2015, several people suspected by fedpol of being associated with the 'Ndrangheta were convicted of drug trafficking and arms smuggling. fedpol also conducts investigations into criminal organisations for the Attorney General's Office in cases involving money laundering and corruption (see p.20 and p.22).

Criminal organisations from Italy
Of all the Italian mafia organisations, the 'Ndrangheta has the strongest presence in Switzerland. This was confirmed in 2015 when, on 22 October, a court in Reggio Calabria sentenced two Italians resident in the canton of Thurgau to 12 and 14 years in prison for being members of a mafia organisation. This is the first conviction (although not yet legally binding) to confirm the existence of a 'Ndrangheta cell in

Switzerland. The two men were accused of having founded and led a so-called *locale* in Frauenfeld. This *locale* has existed since 1970 and is involved, in particular, in drug trafficking. fedpol believes that there are further 'Ndrangheta structures in Switzerland. The *locali* are directed from different regions in Italy, but there are also indications that they co-operate or compete with each other. The persons active in Switzerland act extremely discreetly. As a rule they are well integrated into society and have ordinary jobs. The offences committed by the suspected members include drug trafficking, robbery, theft, fraud, human trafficking, counterfeiting money, and illegal betting and gambling. Time and again, weapons used in 'Ndrangheta feuds in Italy are found to originate from Switzerland. Presumably, they are being smuggled in small numbers into Italy, while drugs are smuggled from Italy into Switzerland.

6 October 2005: Interrogation in mafia proceedings in Italy. In 2015, verdicts were reached in Italy on 'Ndrangheta members living in Switzerland.

What is a criminal organisation?

The term 'organised crime' denotes all types of criminal activity pursued by groups. The degree to which a group is organised plays an important role in the prosecution process. Under Swiss law, a criminal organisation is a group of more than three persons pursuing a criminal aim, the structure and composition of which are kept secret. Any person who participates in or supports a criminal organisation is liable to prosecution. Examples of such organisations are the 'Ndrangheta (Italian mafia) or Al Qaida (terrorism). Prosecuting criminal organisa-tions is a federal task; investigations are complex and involve working with the authorities abroad.

If a group is not sufficiently organised to be denoted as a criminal organisation, it is classi-fied as a criminal association or gang. Examples of this are child pornography rings, organised drug dealers or burglary gangs. Under the Swiss Criminal Code, certain crimes carry stricter penalties when they are committed by a group. The cantons are responsible for prosecuting criminal associations and gangs.

fedpol analyses and co-ordinates

The cantons rather than the federal prosecution authorities are responsible for prosecuting gang crime, and in this fedpol provides them with co-ordina-tion and analysis support. In the Armed Jewel Robbery AJR project, for example, the cantons and fedpol exchange leads, intelligence and analyses. Thanks to this project, fedpol is able to launch initial inquiries on receiving information from abroad that suspects are making their way to Switzerland or have already crossed the border. When it becomes clear where the suspects are or where they want to strike, fedpol passes this information on to the cantonal authorities concerned.

In 2015, there were several attacks on jewellery stores suspected to have been carried out by criminal groups operating from Lithuania. In most cases, the perpe-trators employ extreme violence in order to obtain their haul. These cases attract a lot of media attention. However, compared with the total number of robberies in Switzerland, the number committed by criminal groups from Lithuania is very small. Because of the degree of violence involved, attacks by these groups some-times result in fatalities. Between 2005 and 2015, a dozen people were injured, some of them badly, in 25 recorded cases. And two attacks, in Glarus in 2005 and in Zurich in 2007, involved fatalities. The total value of the goods stolen was esti-mated to be around CHF 10 million.

The perpetrators of such attacks are not usually resident in Switzerland. fedpol believes that Lithuanian gangs have been operating in Switzerland since the begin-ning of 2000. The exact nature of their organisational structure is uncertain. Police investigations show, however, that the attacks on jewellery stores by Lith-uanians are planned and co-ordinated at international level. Dealing with such well-structured organisations requires close and efficient co-operation with police authorities in other countries and with Europol, Eurojust and INTERPOL. fedpol has been registering attacks on jewel-lery stores since October 2013. While the cantons are responsible for prosecuting in such cases, fedpol takes on the co-or-dination and analysis at national level. Europol also provides valuable intelli-gence from investigations and analyses from other European countries, which allow a picture to form of the criminal operations in an international context.

Tracking criminals *fedpol can pinpoint and identify criminals within a matter of hours thanks to the efficiency of international police co-operation. This co-operation is made possible by Switzerland's membership of Schengen and its access to the Schengen Information System, a database that allows the rapid exchange of information.*

Race against time

"An offence committed locally may nonetheless have a national or international connection. International police co-operation is the appropriate response to this." This is the principle on which the fedpol investigators operate. No matter where an offence is committed, the clues often lead somewhere abroad. Once the crime is committed, the race against time begins, and a smooth exchange of information is vital. fedpol, the cantonal police forces, the Swiss Border Guard, the cantonal prosecution authorities, the Office of the Attorney General, the Federal Office of Justice and the police and judicial authorities abroad all work very closely together. They have one common goal: to identify and catch the criminal.

fedpol has a number of resources to aid its investigations, for example databases of fingerprints and DNA profiles, or alert systems via which information is exchanged (see graph opposite). The Operations Centre at fedpol is the single point of contact for all its partners. It collects and transmits via secure information channels vital information such as personal data, identification data and trace evidence from crime scenes.

When a crime is committed in a specific place, the local cantonal police consult the federal computerised search system RIPOL (Recherches informatisées de police), a database containing information on offenders, weapons, vehicles and stolen objects. Besides fedpol, the cantons, the Attorney General's Office, the Federal Office of Justice and the Swiss Border Guard can enter an alert in RIPOL.

Efficient thanks to Schengen

Thanks to Switzerland's membership of Schengen, fedpol has access to the Schengen Information System. This European database contains alerts on persons and objects, and allows Schengen member states and other countries to exchange information efficiently. fedpol is also Switzerland's main point of contact for SIS information exchange and is responsible for entering Swiss alerts in the database. Any information entered in the SIS is usually based on a RIPOL search alert. Alerts are entered into the system in order to:

- assist the search for persons wanted for deportation or to prevent non-Schengen nationals subject to an entry ban from entering the country
- assist the search for missing persons
- assist the search for persons on behalf of a judicial authority
- conduct discreet surveillance or targeted controls of persons and vehicles
- assist the search for vehicles, weapons or identity documents

In turn, fedpol receives and checks information from European states. For example, it compares fingerprints or DNA profiles from abroad with those in the Swiss database and shares these findings with its partners, requesting further information where necessary. Since 2009, there has been a considerable increase in the number of hits in the SIS database between Swiss and foreign alerts: from 8,632 in 2009 to 12,194 in 2015.

Access to the SIS database was granted to the United Kingdom in 2015, which means the search area has now become greater and SIS alerts are therefore likely to lead to even more hits in future.

Europol – exchange of information

A further important channel of information for fedpol is Europol. The Europol communication platform SIENA (Secure Information Exchange Network Application) allows Schengen member states and others to exchange information in particular on the way criminals operate. This detailed information provides very useful intelligence. In 2015, fedpol provided evidence that led to the arrest of two Lithuanian offenders. They were arrested thanks to

Number of SIS hits for Switzerland and other countries

2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015

8,687	9,791	11,595	10,898	12,075	12,194

Switzerland • Other countries • Total

Since 2010 the number of hits in the SIS database relating to Switzerland and other countries has risen significantly. In 2015, one-third of all hits concerned other countries.

international police co-operation, which facilitates the comparison of DNA profiles, personal data and photos (see box below).

INTERPOL – essential
INTERPOL, an international criminal police organisation with 190 member states, is one of fedpol's main partners at international level. As INTERPOL's National Central Bureau in Switzerland, fedpol exchanges information with other member states, for example on wanted persons, criminal activity or materials and objects that pose a threat to national security. INTERPOL continuously updates its databases with information, for example, on stolen or lost identity documents, stolen vehicles and weapons, child abuse, DNA and fingerprints.

The illustration on pages 30-31 of the case involving a thief who was handed over to Switzerland shortly after committing an offence shows the efficiency of the automated search system.

Suspected murderer arrested within hours of alert
Thanks to close co-operation with the Austrian police, fedpol was able to catch a fugitive asylum seeker suspected of murdering a young American woman in Vienna. This case demonstrates the efficiency of channels such as the SIS or INTERPOL information systems. The man was arrested in Kreuzlingen in the canton of Thurgau shortly after the Austrian authorities posted the alert.

Last January the body of a young American woman was found in Vienna. The Austrian police were soon able to identify the main suspect. The biometric traces left at the scene of the crime matched with an asylum seeker from Gambia who was also suspected of having sexually abused a ten-year-old child in Germany.

Once the suspect had been identified, the Austrian authorities launched an SIS alert. At the same time, they sent an INTERPOL notice directly to fedpol's Operations Centre, and this was immediately communicated throughout Switzerland. The alert contained the suspect's name and date of birth, a description of the crime, and information that the suspect was fleeing towards Switzerland, Italy or Germa-

ny. fedpol compared this information with that in the migration database, which holds information on foreigners in Switzerland. The digital fingerprints of the wanted person were registered in the system, as he had previously applied for asylum. The database indicated that the person had arrived at an asylum centre in Kreuzlingen on the day the Austrian authorities launched the alert. fedpol contacted its Austrian counterparts and a few hours after the alert the Thurgau cantonal police were able to arrest the murder suspect in Kreuzlingen.

Jewel thief caught within hours

Thanks to fast action by fedpol and close co-operation with its international partners, law enforcement services were able to track down a thief within hours of his commiting a jewellery theft. An alert in the Schengen Information System led to the wanted man's arrest in Hungary and his subsequent extradition to Switzerland.

1   A robbery takes place at 9:45 at a jewellery shop in the canton of Geneva. The thief steals a ring valued at several thousands of Swiss francs.

2   In the afternoon, the investigating authority identifies the thief's face and vehicle registration number from CCTV footage. The cantonal police of Geneva confirm the suspect's name and date of birth. The man is already known to the police and registered in the RIPOL database.

3   Around 17:00, the Public Prosecutor's Office of Geneva issues a warrant for the suspect's arrest and requests fedpol to enter an alert in the SIS database. The Federal Office of Justice authorises the measure, and fedpol's SIRENE Office issues the alert.

MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON
1 2 3 4	5						

Number of person-related entries in RIPOL

2015
2014

	2015	2014
Arrest warrants	59,623	59,106
Residency inquiries	45,264	38,771
Entry bans	4,870	4,402
Taken into custody	10,672	10,196
Execution of sentences and measures	414	433
Missing persons	3,571	5,142
Prevention of child abduction	126	76
Exit restrictions (HOOGAN)	33	21
Discreet surveillance	80	140

4 Half an hour later, the suspect's photo is sent to various police services throughout Europe. The Swiss Border Guard is also informed. Around 19:00, the search for the suspect is extended to all countries.

5 The thief is arrested the following day at the Hungarian-Ukrainian border.

6 Three days after the robbery, the prosecution authorities agree to an extradition request. The suspect is extradited to Switzerland some weeks later. The stolen ring is not recovered.

TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE

6

Number of SIS hits 2015

No. of hits in Switzerland from foreign alerts
No. of hits in other countries from Swiss alerts
Total

	Arrest for extradition	Entry ban	Missing persons	Wanted by judiciary (e.g. witnesses)	Discreet surveillance	Objects (vehicles, ID documents, weapons)	Total
	274	1,498	314	1,490	1,815	2,239	7630
	228	3,360	86	92	147	651	4564
	502	4,858	400	1,582	1,962	2,890	12 194

The chart shows the number of exact hits in the SIS database according to category

**Cybercrime** *Whether e-mail attacks or data theft, acts of cybercrime are becoming increasingly sophisticated. In combating crime on the internet, fedpol is able to rely on the public's help: in 2015, it received a record 11,575 reports of suspicious internet content.*

«8,242 ...»

2012

Cyber criminals become more professional

An e-mail attachment that contains a further hidden attachment. Or a few mouse clicks and an e-mail turns into a trap to steal personal data. In 2015, fedpol compiled a long list of different cybercrime phenomena. Phishing was the most frequently reported type of cybercrime, but there were also many reports of child pornography on the internet and websites selling counterfeit goods. The number of cases reported by the public rose sharply. About 82 per cent of the 11,575 reports received in 2015 concerned illegal activities. This high level indicates the growing public awareness of cybercrime. However, from the figures it is not possible to draw conclusions about how widespread cybercrime actually is.

fedpol is confronted with two types of cybercrime. Firstly, there are offences committed using technical means: for example, the criminals exploit weaknesses in information technology in order to hack into systems or infect them with malware. Secondly, the internet is used to commit crimes that existed before the advent of the web, such as extortion and the theft of personal data.

Four clear trends
Among the types of crime reported, phishing was the most widespread phenomenon, with 1,253 cases in total. Phishing is the act of trying to steal confidential data, such as usernames and passwords for using online services or accessing e-banking accounts or credit card numbers. To do this, criminals send potential victims an e-mail containing the fake logo of a reliable entity, such as a police authority or bank. The victim then replies directly to the e-mail or clicks on a link, thereby giving the criminals access to their computer in the belief that their information is going to a reliable entity. In actual fact, the criminals are able to access the victim's e-mail and e-banking accounts or use their bank card to make purchases.

A second trend is the growing number of online websites over which counterfeit goods are sold at low prices. The majority of fraudsters are based abroad. It is difficult to check their personal data and they tend to process payments using money transfer services. Furthermore, they often operate with fictitious delivery companies. The victim finds an article they want to buy at a knock-down price on an apparently genuine online sales platform, but in return for their payment they receive either a counterfeit product or nothing at all.

fedpol investigators have also observed a third trend: cybercriminals are using increasingly professional methods. For example, fraudulent e-mails are now of a very high quality and the words used are more carefully selected. In fraud cases involving fake payment orders, the fraudsters even imitate the writing style of the director of the alleged company.

The experts at fedpol have also noticed that the criminal activities are increasingly well organised: "Two or three people get together; they may never have seen each other before, and come from different countries. They share the tasks out among themselves: one might create the fake websites, while the other phishes for the personal data of potential victims on the internet. If

Reporting volume

«6,181 …»

2010

«5,330 …»

2011

«9,208 …»

2013

«10,214 …»

2014

«11,575 …»

2015

more needs to be done to carry out the fraud, the services of a third party might be brought in", explains a fedpol analyst. Criminals meet on forums in the darknet or on the internet. Like at any market, they swap, sell and buy each other's services for the purpose of committing cybercrime.

The fourth trend is the increasing use of virtual payment methods. Cybercrime has become a service market. There are currently around 2,000 virtual currencies on the internet, with bitcoin by far the most frequently used digital monetary unit. By using bitcoin one can remain anonymous, as transactions cannot be traced. Virtual currencies are not only used to purchase malicious software or to pay hackers for their services, but

also to demand ransoms. The use of virtual currencies increases the risk of money laundering. For cyber criminals it is easy to swap illicitly earned profit in the form of bitcoins for an official currency and to then release this into the regular money flow.

Tracking paedophile criminals

In 2015, fedpol received 1,193 reports on websites containing child pornography. The fight against the sexual exploita- tion of children can also only be successful if conducted at an international level. fedpol works closely with Europol (see box on cybercrime) and the INTERPOL Specialists Group on Crimes against Children on this issue. According

The number of CySARs has risen in the last few years, However, the figures do not reflect the true extent of cybercrime. More than 80% of CySARs were of criminal relevance.

to Europol, there is a growing number of darknet platforms containing child pornography. Images and videos are posted on these exchange platforms on a daily basis. Behind each image and each video is a new victim. Co-operation between countries is essential in combating this crime. The object of each action is to identify and shut down the forums, and find the victims.

Access to a private exchange platform
In 2015, fedpol carried out undercover investigations on private exchange platforms. This allowed investigators to identify a German paedophile offender. fedpol was able to prove that the German had sexually abused two victims, a girl and a boy, living in Switzerland.

In another case, INTERPOL had been trying since 2013 with the help of police in several countries to identify a person who had been sharing child pornographic images on the internet. The person claimed to have taken the images showing an unidentified victim themselves. The images were shared on a private peer-to-peer platform, which connects users' computers directly via a secure interface.

INTERPOL knew that fedpol investigators had considerable experience in detecting paedophile criminals and so asked fedpol for help. Just a few days later, a fedpol investigator managed to track down the suspect in Germany and he was promptly put under surveillance. It turned out that the internet connection he was using did not belong to him, but to his neighbour, and the suspect had been using the internet connection without his neighbour's knowledge. Moreover, the suspect already had a conviction for child sex abuse. The investigations showed that the suspect had logged in

National Strategy on Protecting Switzerland from Cyber Threat
Under the National Strategy on Protecting Switzerland from Cyber Threat, endorsed by the Federal Council on 27 June 2012, fedpol is working with the cantons to draw up a concept to categorise types and instances of cybercrime in Switzerland. Cybercrime investigations require a very high level of expertise. The cantons are therefore developing a police training programme to impart basic and specialist knowledge of cybercrime and digital forensics.

directly to a webcam in Switzerland. This enabled the investigators to trace the victims, who were recognisable on the images published by the suspect. The victims were a brother and sister, both of whom had been abused by the suspect who turned out to be a family member.

fedpol was able to prove the connection between the suspect and the victims, and co-ordinated the co-operation between the German judicial authorities and the cantonal police in Switzerland. In early 2015, the suspect's house was searched; he was found to be in possession of child pornographic material and was subsequently arrested. He was charged in Frankfurt am Main for the abuse of the two children during the years 2008 to 2013. At the time the abuse began, the children were six and eight years old. Further investigations led to the arrest of more people in the man's virtual circle of friends, including a Swiss person who had also shared child pornographic material on the internet.

Cybercrime must be tackled at international level
"Nowadays a lot of crime can be committed over the internet, and we are seeing a huge increase in this type of crime. Criminals are always one step ahead of the prosecution authorities. What is more, cybercrime does not recognise borders and so it is difficult for individual states to address the problem. The servers used to commit a crime are often located on different sovereign territories", explains the head of the Swiss Liaison Office at Europol. The Europol Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment report suggests that cyber criminals are using increasingly aggressive methods and now seek active confrontation with their victims. Cybercrime can only be successfully addressed at an international level. To this end fedpol works together with Europol, more precisely with the European Cybercrime Center, in which it is represented in three analysis groups on payment fraud, protection of infrastructures and information systems, and child sexual exploitation.

Smartphone footprints

When the contents of a computer or mobile telephone require analysis, fedpol's forensic IT specialists come into play. No other device is quite as popular or versatile as a smartphone. It can be used as a telephone, satnav device, gaming console, means of payment and much more. However, a smartphone leaves traces. By accessing the data stored on a smartphone, forensic IT specialists can detect the activities of crime suspects. During their in-depth examination, they often come across traces that are not directly accessible. Sometimes, they have to request mutual legal assistance from another country. And forensic IT specialists are faced with ever-developing technology. Below you can see the variety of traces a smartphone leaves behind.

Telephone calls

The caller list is a veritable gold mine of information. It reveals when and with whom a conversation has taken place. However, it is not possible to determine the content of a conversation from a caller list.

Games and photos

Games, photos or other programs leave behind traces that may indicate the viewing or distribution of illegal material.

Internet

People's behaviour on the internet or on social networks reveals information about their contacts and sometimes even about the content of what is exchanged.

Wireless technology and control

Since a smartphone is always connected to Wi-Fi, 3G or Bluetooth and therefore online, it leaves behind traces that provide information on what infrastructures have been used (e.g. Wi-Fi hotspots) and on the various connected devices (via Bluetooth, IR, NFC, etc.).

E-mail and e-banking

E-mail or e-banking data can reveal useful information on users and their habits.

Geolocation

Geolocation using GPS or Wi-Fi networks is a standard feature of many devices and leaves behind traces, for example through navigation, maps, photos or a browser.

Unfair trade *Across the world, men, women and children can find themselves in the clutches of human traffickers who rob them of their basic human rights. This treacherous crime is also happening in Switzerland. To combat it, international police co-operation is essential, as this example of Switzerland's co-operation with Romania shows.*

People for sale

Clara[1], a young Romanian woman from a humble background, was persuaded by her boyfriend to work as a prostitute in Switzerland. Earning 1,000 Swiss francs a day, she hoped it would allow her to finally realise her dream of buying a house, getting married and starting a family. So Clara travelled to Lugano. There, she was taken in by a woman who found her clients, set rules and dictated her working schedule. Clara entrusted her earnings to the woman, believing that she would pay it into the bank for her. Instead, it was lining the woman's own pockets. The woman turned out to be the 'real' girlfriend of Clara's Romanian lover and the couple controlled the young Romanian woman both physically and mentally. But she managed to escape and pressed charges in Switzerland and in Romania. With the help of an NGO she managed to return to Romania and received professional help for victims of human trafficking. As the national central office, fedpol was in charge of co-ordinating the investigations with the Romanian authorities in the case described above. Clara realised too late that the relationship that had started as romantic and

happy was not true love, but an insidious ploy. Her 'boyfriend' abused her feelings and trust to force her into dependency and to exploit her sexually and physically. The 'loverboy tactic' is common, also in Switzerland, which has been a destination and transit country for Romanian victims of human trafficking for some years. The case described above also shows that women are often among the perpetrators. The International Labour Organisation reckons that some 21 million people worldwide are victims of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation, forced labour or for the removal of their organs. More than half of them are women and around a quarter are children. Human traffickers do not always operate in the same way. However, central to all cases is the exploitation of people's distress or desperation, or encouraging such predicaments. In 2015, the Swiss law enforcement services, in some cases in collaboration with fedpol, investigated human trafficking cases mainly for the purpose of sexual exploitation. In more than half of all pending cases, the victims hailed from Romania, Hungary or Bulgaria, while the

perpetrators were mostly from the same country. A small number of cases also involved suspected labour exploitation. Most of the alleged victims were young women. Occasionally the victims were minors. No cases of organ trading have been confirmed in Switzerland to date.

Co-operation with Romania
Romania has been one of the main countries of origin of sex workers and potential victims of human trafficking for years. Back in 2012, Federal Councillor, Simonetta Sommaruga, pointed out that Switzerland and Romania had a common problem that they needed to solve together. In 2015, the Swiss-Romanian working group initiated and implemented by the federal councillor led to a two-year police co-operation headed by fedpol to specifically tackle the problem. The co-operation involved improving knowledge management, enhancing information sharing, and procuring logistics and IT for the Romanian authorities.

As part of the police co-operation, experts from the police and NGOs from Switzerland and Romania met in 2015 to share information and analyse the situ-

[1] Name has been changed

18 October 2012: Federal Councillor, Simonetta Sommaruga, in front of the press on EU Anti-Trafficking Day. Combating human trafficking is one of the FDJP strategic priorities in fighting crime.

ation. Specialists from several cantons and the federal government visited the regions of origin of the Romanian victims, learned about Romanian, and particularly Roma, culture, and established important contacts with the local authorities.

In the summer of 2015, an initial delegation of Romanian experts arrived in Switzerland for study purposes, and a Romanian investigator was permanently stationed with the cantonal police of Geneva. An action week was also carried out in Switzerland in November during which teams of Romanian and Swiss investigators and individuals from NGOs spoke to Romanian sex workers. These conversations revealed important information about potential exploitation, and a Romanian investigator was able to identify a suspect from Romania. fedpol is

already working with cantons and towns to plan the scope and focus of future police co-operation action weeks.

fedpol – a key partner

The prosecution of human traffickers falls under cantonal jurisdiction. fedpol assists the law enforcement services in Switzerland and abroad by co-ordinating proceedings, maintaining an international network of partners and ensuring the exchange of information with Europol and INTERPOL. The Swiss Coordination Unit against the Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants at fedpol promotes training and awareness-raising of the responsible bodies, as well as the work of the cantonal round tables. These sessions define the processes according to which the cantons

handle cases of human trafficking. The co-operation between law enforcement services, migration authorities, specialised victim support and other cantonal authorities is discussed and defined at regular meetings. In addition, fedpol has developed a national action plan to combat human trafficking. In autumn 2015, the Council of Europe's Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) published its first evaluation report on Switzerland. The report recognises Switzerland's efforts and measures to fight human trafficking and contains 25 recommendations. These include, for example, better identifying cases of exploitation, stepping up the fight against labour exploitation and paying greater attention to underage victims and their needs.

Human trafficking – A priority

Combating human trafficking is one of the priorities of the Federal Council's crime prevention strategy for the legislative period 2015 – 2019.

The National Council mandated the Federal Council in four postulates from 2012 and 2013 to look more closely at fighting human trafficking for sexual exploitation and improving the protection of prostitutes. Consequently, the Federal Department of Justice and Police was commissioned to draft a report. The report 'Prostitution and human trafficking for the

purpose of sexual exploitation' was published by fedpol on 5 June 2015. It was compiled with the help of experts from the federal government, and draws on national studies, such as the Hilber Report for the attention of the Federal Council, and country-specific opinions and studies. The report states that prostitution should not be banned, promotes a co-ordinated approach by all authorities involved, and highlights possible measures to combat and prevent sexual exploitation. Implementation of these measures falls under the jurisdiction of the cantons.

Since 1 January 2016, women from non-EU countries are no longer allowed to legally travel to Switzerland to dance in cabaret clubs. The Federal Council lifted the dancer status as it was failing to fulfil its protective function. As an accompanying measure to the lifting of the status, the Federal Council adopted a regulation that allows fedpol to provide financial support to crime prevention measures implemented by public and private organisations to protect women in the sex trade.

__Migrant smuggling__ More than a million people headed for Europe via various migrant and refugee routes last year. They paid large sums of money to flee, often risking their lives in the process. The lucrative people smuggling business is booming. Up to now, Switzerland has been only marginally affected by the phenomenon.

A multi-billion business

Europe is currently experiencing the largest refugee and migrant crisis since the Second World War. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, war and poverty drove more than a million refugees and migrants to Europe in 2015 alone. Just under half of these were from Syria. But many people are also fleeing from Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, Pakistan, Nigeria, Iran and Somalia. In recent years, the central Mediterranean route has been the most important route for migrants and refugees travelling to Europe. It goes from North Africa, via the Italian islands of Pantelleria, Lampedusa and Sicily, and onwards to western and northern Europe. In summer 2015, it was replaced by the Balkan route: from Turkey, via Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia to the heart of Europe. Almost 850,000 people opted for the Balkan route in 2015. This route is constantly being adapted in line with the changing political and border control measures of the transit and destination countries, as borders are closed and fences erected.

Switzerland – a destination and transit country

Migrant smugglers also organise journeys to and through Switzerland. Until September 2015, the central Mediterranean passage was the main smuggling route to Switzerland's southern canton of Ticino. It was primarily used by people from Eritrea, Syria and Somalia, where the smuggler mafia turned people's misery into big business.

At the end of December 2014, two Tunisian nationals were sentenced in Ticino to three years' and two-and-a-half years' imprisonment for commercial people smuggling and commercial racketeering. They had been stationed in Como to smuggle some 200 Eritreans arriving from Milan over the Swiss border to Balerna for a cost of up to EUR 300 per person. In Balerna, underage 'pedestrian smugglers' were waiting to accompany the migrants to Lugano for a fee of EUR 40. The gang of smugglers earned at least EUR 50,000 in less than a month from 200 people. The two minors were given a three-month

suspended sentence. They were all working for an Eritrean mastermind based in Milan who was arrested in Italy in February 2015. He was released from detention in October last year and is awaiting judgment. In the scope of the investigations, fedpol was responsible for co-ordinating and sharing information with Europol and INTERPOL.

In order to effectively combat trafficker groups on the Mediterranean route, fedpol works closely with its partner authorities in Italy. In addition to the co-operation platforms already established via INTERPOL and Europol, the 'Gruppo Interforze' was set up in 2015. This task force, headed by the cantonal police of Ticino, brings together experts from the cantonal police and the public prosecutor's office of Ticino, the Swiss Border Guard, fedpol and the Italian and German border control authorities.

From autumn onwards, the smugglers' route to Switzerland from the south shifted east, with most people, primarily Syrians but also Afghans, opting for the Balkan route and the route via Austria into Switzerland.

27 August 2015: Austrian forensic experts examine a lorry containing the bodies of dozens of smuggled migrants. Switzerland, as a target and transit country, is committed to the fight against people smuggling.

Cargo ships setting sail with no crew

Professional migrant smuggling knows no borders as the perpetrators have extensive international networks. The smugglers organise the transport, travel documents, such as falsified or stolen passports or fraudulently obtained visas, and often the associated pretexts for travel for refugees or migrants. According to the UNHCR, most refugees and migrants rely on the services of smugglers for at least part of their journey to Europe. The smuggler networks exploit these people's hope for a better future for pure financial gain and charge high prices for the services they offer.

In January 2016, German and Turkish investigators uncovered one of their most extensive cases of organised migrant smuggling. The traffickers had crammed a total of 1,766 people into the cargo hold of battered, scrap cargo ships. They cast the ships off without a crew as so-called 'ghost ships.' It is thought that each refugee had paid between USD 4,500 and USD 6,000, which means the operation grossed USD 9.5 million. Cases involving ghost ships have been known about for a number of years and many similar examples made headlines in 2015. The International Organization for Migration raised the alarm in 2015, stating that at least 3,770 refugees had died in the

fedpol's role in the prosecution of migrant smugglers

The cantons are primarily responsible for prosecuting migrant smugglers, while fedpol co-ordinates, analyses and supports investigations between the cantons and other authorities in Switzerland and abroad, and ensures police authorities share information. fedpol is actively involved in Europol and INTERPOL expert groups, as complex cases of people smuggling that span international borders can only be uncovered through efficient international co-operation and a joint approach. The Swiss Coordination Unit against the Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants at fedpol develops measures and tools to fight this form of crime more effectively, and promotes the training, information and networking of the responsible actors. It is made up of federal and cantonal authorities and agencies as well as non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations.

Mediterranean in 2015 trying to make it to the shores of Europe, and that globally that figure was around 5,350 people.

National action plan to combat people smuggling

In 2014, the Federal Council approved Integrated Border Management, a national strategy and related action plan to fight commercial migrant smuggling, cross-border crime and illegal migration. The action plan is being implemented between 2014 and 2017, and is being overseen by the State Secretariat for Migration. The action plan aims to identify potential cases of migrant smuggling early on and to take the relevant measures. To do this, the players involved must be trained, made aware and special-ised. In this context, fedpol's activities in 2015 included organising its first national conference on combating migrant smuggling. The event brought together over 80 experts from cantonal and municipal criminal investigation services, the Swiss Border Guard, the State Secretariat for Migration and Europol. Participants shared information about ongoing cantonal investigations, discussed the possibilities of fedpol support for the cantons and were introduced to Europol's strategy and specific measures. An additional measure under the action plan involves extending the initial asylum interviews conducted by the State Secretariat for Migration with the aim of obtaining information about migrant smugglers and how they operate.

Security service   *An impending visit by President Hollande or Chancellor Merkel sets an immense security operation in motion at fedpol, which includes risk assessments, situation reports and specific security measures. The ultimate goal is to ensure that President Hollande or Chancellor Merkel's visit to Switzerland goes smoothly.*

Selfie with François Hollande

A vacuum cleans the red carpet right up to the last minute. The guard of honour stands to attention. On 15 April, François Hollande, President of the Republic of France, paid an official visit to Switzerland. The president enjoyed a walkabout in the square around Bern's cathedral and had selfies taken with half a dozen well-wishers. The Swiss president, Simonetta Sommaruga, welcomed the prominent guest to music by the military band. Afterwards, Mr. Hollande enjoyed a plate of traditional Alpen macaroni at the Bernerhof before retiring to the French ambassador's residence. On the second day of his visit, Mr. Hollande accompanied Ms. Sommaruga to the Zurich University of the Arts. For the next stage of the visit, the French delegation travelled to Lausanne by public transport and visited the Ecole polytechnique de Lausanne. After a visit to the Olympic Museum, Mr. Hollande took his leave.

When a statesman such as François Hollande announces a visit to Switzerland, the detailed planning of security arrangements begins months in advance. Whether a train journey with the Swiss Federal Railway, a visit with hundreds of students in Zurich or Lausanne, or a walk with the Swiss president through the historical centre of Bern, the security arrangements vary depending on the agenda and must be constantly adapted to the respective situation. fedpol defines and adapts its security concept for people and facilities afforded protection under federal law according to an ongoing threat analysis. Specific measures are implemented in collaboration with the cantonal police.

Potential terrorist threat

The visit by François Hollande was classified by fedpol as a high-risk occasion, a logical assessment considering that Mr.

Hollande visited Switzerland only three months after the terror attack on the offices of *Charlie Hebdo*. The world was still in shock and France was considered a potential target of further attack because of its participation in the military coalition against Islamic State. Because of the potential threat, security was tightened in general for diplomatic missions and visitors from anti-IS coalition countries. International organisations such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organization were also subject to greater security, as were international conferences, which fedpol identified as possible targets of attack by Islamic extremists due to their symbolic importance. Hence, tighter security measures and greater close protection were necessary at the World Economic Forum in Davos, the Iran nuclear talks in Montreux and Lausanne, and at the Geneva peace talks on Syria.

15 April 2015: Visit by the French president, François Hollande, to Switzerland. Mr. Hollande's visit was classified as 'high risk' and therefore accompanied by appropriate security measures.

Threats

In 2015, fedpol registered 1,063 threats by letter, e-mail or telephone. This figure is significantly higher than in previous years. The increase was a result not only of the heightened awareness of those entitled to close protection, but also of a single incident in which a person received around 500 threats. The **1,063 threats** were made by **123 people** and directed at **89 individuals** under federal protection. The messages mainly contained expressions of annoyance; only 10% were classified by fedpol to contain an explicit threat. Although the number of reports rose considerably, the tone of the threats has not changed significantly over previous years.

There was greater differentiation in registering reports. Up to this point, all incoming reports were generally registered as 'threats' even though not all the messages contained the elements of a threat. In 2015, the incoming reports were classified according to the type of threat made.

President Sommaruga in the spotlight

Also in the centre of opposing interests was the Swiss president, Simonetta Sommaruga. Switzerland's asylum policy triggered widely differing reactions, and the president was subject to a growing number of threats. Federal councillors, parliamentarians, federal officials and senior members of the government and judiciary who feel or are indeed threatened can report to fedpol. The incidents are registered, and fedpol evaluates all threats made to people entitled to close protection under federal law, adapting security arrangements for individuals as necessary.

Precursors and weapons *The use of firearms and homemade explosives in terrorist attacks cost numerous lives in 2015, not only in Europe. Switzerland is in the process of regulating the use of substances that can be misused to manufacture explosives.*

Explosives in the hands of terrorists

Oslo, 22 July 2011, 15.25:
In the government district of the Norwegian capital a van filled with homemade explosives manufactured from fertilizers explodes. Eight people are killed, numerous others are injured. The explosion also causes immense damage to property. The terror attack is a diversionary tactic by the right-wing extremist, Anders Breivik. Following the attack, Breivik proceeds to a lake near the capital where a summer camp by the Workers' Youth League is taking place on the island of Utøya. During the 90 minutes that follow, Breivik shoots 67 people. Two more people die while fleeing.

Paris, 13 November 2015, 21.20:
An explosion outside the Stade de France football stadium is the beginning of one of the bloodiest Jihadi terrorist attacks in Europe. It is to be the first

of several bombings and shootings that night. In a series of co-ordinated attacks, several men kill 130 people in cafés, restaurants and a concert hall. The victims are either shot or die through the impact of suicide bombs.

These two incidents are the most devastating examples of terrorist attacks using firearms and homemade explosives. According to Europol, the combined use of firearms and suicide bomb belts as in the Paris attacks is a novelty in Europe. It is likely that terrorists will continue to use a combination of these two types of weapon in future.

Explosives are relatively simple to manufacture with the necessary know-how. Products readily available on the market, such as bleaching agent, solvents, disinfectants and fertilizers, contain chemicals that in certain levels of concentration can be misused to manu-

facture explosives. Manufacturing instructions are easily obtainable on the internet.

Switzerland to regulate precursors
Triggered by the attacks in Oslo, the European Union decided in 2013 to regulate the marketing and use of explosives precursors. Since 2014, the relevant EU regulation is applicable in the member states. It restricts and controls the access to several dangerous chemicals used to make explosives. To implement the regulation EU member states have various options: they can prohibit access to certain substances, introduce a permit system or require the reporting of suspicious transactions involving certain substances.

Various EU member states, including Austria and the United Kingdom, have already implemented the regulation. In other countries implementation is in the

10 July 2003: An unclaimed suitcase at Cologne station triggers a major evacuation. Terrorists used home-made explosives in the Paris attacks of 2015.

planning. If Switzerland does not introduce regulation, precursors will remain freely available on the Swiss market. This means that criminals will be able to fall back on Switzerland and acquire – unimpeded and unnoticed – the necessary substances for manufacturing explosives. The Federal Council has recognised the danger and appointed the Federal Department of Justice and Police to set a group of experts under fedpol's lead to examine various options for regulating precursors.

Private sector involved from the outset
Switzerland has various options for regulating precursors. For example, it can prohibit certain substances completely or above a certain concentration, introduce a permit system whereby private individuals have to apply for authorisation to purchase designated substances, or set up a system of registration by which the seller must register the personal data of the person buying the substances. Regulation will not prevent the misuse of precursors completely, but it will make it more difficult for criminals or terrorists to obtain the substances required for manufacturing explosives.

The report by the group of experts will form the basis for recommendations to the Federal Council, which will make its decision at the end of 2016. The group's main consideration is safety. But it also seeks to propose a pragmatic solution because any measures that are introduced will result in additional responsibilities and expense for retailers such as pharmacies, drugstores or DIY shops. Some sectors are therefore understandably critical with regard to regulation. For this reason, representatives of the economic sectors affected by the changes have been involved in the process from an early stage.

Weapons Act: better exchange of information

The National Council and Council of States revised the Weapons Act in 2015. The amendments serve to facilitate the exchange of information between the various authorities.

Weapons bought after 12 December 2008 must be registered with the cantons. The Federal Council wanted to extend this provision to weapons bought before this date, but both councils rejected this proposal in the 2015 spring and summer sessions of parliament.

However, they agreed to measures to improve the exchange of information between the various Swiss authorities. This means that the authorities can now consult all cantonal weapons registers and fedpol's ARMADA database by means of a single request instead of multiple requests to various cantonal registers, as was the case in the past.

At international level, Switzerland supports measures to combat terrorism and is engaged in the discussions for a possible amendment to the EU weapons directive.

At the centre of policing in Switzerland

fedpol in focus *In our globalised world, crime does not stop at borders. It is becoming increasingly complex, often affecting several cantons simultaneously, and regularly having an international dimension. In Switzerland, security is primarily the responsibility of the cantons. fedpol is Switzerland's national police office and as such provides the cantons with certain services and infrastructures. It also plays a central role in co-ordinating, analysing and investigating complex cases of serious crime. Hence, fedpol is at the heart of policing in Switzerland and is the nexus to the country's international partners. A portrait.*

MANAGING POLICE CO-OPERATION AT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

Crime does not stop at national borders. That is why combating crime is an international concern. fedpol is Switzerland's contact point for foreign police services. Every day, fedpol sends and receives hundreds of communications to and from its international partners. The information contained in each message is triaged, processed and check before being forwarded for follow-up action to the appropriate authority in the cantons or abroad.

International police co-operation is based on three pillars:

Bilateral co-operation

Switzerland has concluded numerous bilateral agreements regulating in detail co-operation with the police services of other countries. These countries include Austria, France, Germany, Liechtenstein and Italy.
Various police attachés stationed in key countries facilitate co-operation. The attachés have a local network of reliable partners, provide on-site support, and ensure a fast and safe

INVESTIGATING SERIOUS CRIME

On behalf of the Office of the Attorney General, fedpol conducts investigations into complex cases of serious international crime. If there is sufficient indication that a crime has been committed, the Attorney General's Office launches a criminal investigation (see p.10). These investigations usually concern economic crime such money laundering or corruption, offences again the state such as terrorism or espionage, or activities involving criminal mafia-like organisations. fedpol compiles strategic analyses on criminal phenomena and threat assessments for the Attorney General's Office and the cantons. It also co-ordinates intercantonal investigations or those with an international connection.

The strategic priorities of the Federal Department of Justice and Police for the years 2015–2019 focus on four main areas of crime:

Criminal mafia organisations

Crime by mafia-like organisations and other offences committed for monetary gain pose a significant threat to Switzerland. Fraud, which is often committed from abroad but is reported in Switzerland on account of its link to criminal organisations, is one of the five greatest money laundering threats to Switzerland.

Criminal terrorist organisations

Switzerland's strategy for combating terrorism, approved by the Federal Council

exchange of information between fedpol and its international partners. fedpol also operates the Police and Customs Co-operation Centres in Geneva and Chiasso. The centres facilitate cross-border co-operation in police and customs matters with France and Italy.

European co-operation
fedpol works closely with its European partners. Thanks to the Schengen Association Agreement, Switzerland has access to the Schengen Information System, a European database on wanted or missing persons and objects (see p.31). Switzerland also co-operates closely with Europol: three liaison officers from fedpol are currently stationed at the Europol headquarters in The Hague and are involved in numerous working groups, especially on anti-terrorism, cybercrime and human trafficking. Cross-border police co-operation in Europe has been strengthened in the last few years through the Prüm Convention. Police services across Europe are now exchanging more information on DNA profiles, fingerprints, vehicles and vehicle owners. This closer co-operation facilitates their work by saving them time and allowing greater efficiency in identifying suspects or pursuing leads. Switzerland is not yet party to the Prüm Convention, but the Federal Council has commissioned fedpol to negotiate Switzerland's membership. In a next step, the EU is expected to approve the commencement of negotiations. The cantonal police services in particular would benefit from Prüm membership.

Global co-operation
At global level, fedpol co-operates primarily with INTERPOL and the United Nations Organization. fedpol has access to INTERPOL's crime databases, mainly for the purpose of tracing people and stolen property.

in 2015, pursues clear objectives: to prevent terrorist attacks in Switzerland, to stop the export of terrorism and to make every effort to prevent Switzerland from being misused as a logistical and organisational base for terrorist activity. In its capacity as Switzerland's national police service, fedpol conducts inquiries on behalf of the Attorney General's Office. It monitors potential terrorist financing (see p. 16), heads the TETRA Task Force on Combating Terrorism and functions as national co-ordination unit for all terrorism-related matters. The office is involved in planning measures to be implemented in the event of a terrorist attack in Switzerland (see p.6), and is responsible for providing structures and resources in a crisis situation, such as a terrorist attack or the kidnapping of Swiss citizens abroad.

Cybercrime
Any person who wishes to report illegal matter on the internet or other computer-related offences can submit a suspicious activity report to fedpol. Following analysis of the report, fedpol stores the data and forwards the information to the appropriate prosecution authorities in Switzerland or abroad. Until a few years ago, nearly all the reports concerned paedophile crime. These days, however, more and more reports concern economic crime. fedpol also compiles situation reports and case studies on cybercrime (see p.32).

Human trafficking and people smuggling
Given the current geopolitical situation, human trafficking-related crime is not likely to abate. fedpol co-ordinates anti-trafficking activities and assists the cantonal law enforcement services in fighting human trafficking and people smuggling. The office implements measures to raise awareness of the problem in society and, in collaboration with the Swiss Police Institute, co-ordinates the training of specialists in this field.

3

OPERATING NATIONAL DATABASES AND COMPETENCE CENTRES

Exchanging information and identifying wanted persons or missing objects is of key importance in fighting crime. To this end, the cantonal police use numerous channels and databases developed by fedpol, such as the RIPOL search system or the AFIS fingerprint database (see p.28). With an expenditure of approximately CHF 49 million - one-fifth of its total budget - fedpol operates around 50 IT applications. All Swiss citizens benefit directly from at least one of these: the information system for collecting data to produce the Swiss passport and identity card. In 2015, data from this application was used to manufacture 760,515 passports and 1,039,399 identity cards.

4

ENSURING THE SAFETY OF PEOPLE AND FACILITIES UNDER FEDERAL PROTECTION

fedpol defines the measures required to protect federal officials, such as federal councillors, or people subject to protection under international law, such as foreign ministers on state visits to Switzerland. To this end, fedpol compiles threat assessments and determines specific security measures, which are implemented by the cantonal police. It is also responsible for the security of federal buildings and foreign diplomatic missions accredited to Switzerland. A further task includes guaranteeing safety and security on board Swiss commercial aircraft and at selected airports abroad according to an ongoing situation assessment.

fedpol: 926 employees, CHF 250 million budget and a parent-child-room

The security landscape is in a constant state of flux: crime is evolving all the time and unforeseen events can occur at any moment. To succeed in this ever-changing environment, fedpol must set priorities, manage its resources effectively, and develop and implement efficient, target-oriented processes. To attain these goals, the director of fedpol initiated several projects in 2015, such as the reorganisation of the Federal Criminal Police and a project to foster the career development of fedpol staff through a better evaluation of their professional skills. One of the aims of this latter project is to ensure that fedpol staff remain competitive on the employment market throughout their working life.

A further example is the internal self-evaluation project 'Improve fedpol.' The aim of this project was to ascertain fedpol's strengths and weaknesses, and to foster a culture of continual self-improvement. The process yielded a catalogue of comprehensive improvement measures that are currently being implemented. One example of these measures is the improvement of internal and external communication.

fedpol aims to remain a modern and competitive employer. That is why the directorate has adopted a series of measures to improve the compatibility between work and family life. Examples include promoting, wherever possible, work from home, part-time work and

job-sharing also for people in managerial positions, and promoting women to key positions. To foster young talent, fedpol has also introduced a mentoring program. A symbol of this personnel policy is fedpol's parent-child-room, where parents who have to come to the office at short notice or in the event of an emergency can bring their children and work temporarily alongside them.

Language distribution:
72.1 % German
19.2 % French
8.3 % Italian

Gender balance:
34.3 % female
65.7 % male

1 parent-child-room

Proportion of women in management:
salary category 24–29: 21.7 %
**salary category 30–38: 15.4 %**

926 employees comprising
837 full-time positions

Analysis
of salary categories

Salary category
01 – 11
12 – 17
18 – 23
24 – 29
30 – 38
Other

2015

100 %

100 %

60.7 %

38.6 %

31.6 %

23 %

20.2 %

10 %

5 %

4 %

3 %

1.8 %

1.5 %

0.6 %

Number of women 326
Number of men 600

Other information
www.fedpol.admin.ch